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FREE SPEECH, OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH,
AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
Marc JonathanBlitz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Psychotherapy, said one of its earliest clients, Anna 0, is a "talking
cure."' It banishes or lessens mental illness and suffering not with
medicine or surgery but with words. This aspect of psychotherapy raises
an interesting set of First Amendment questions. Is verbal
communication between a therapist and her client2 protected by the First
Amendment even though it is part of a healing process, or does
government have the same authority to restrict this speech-based healing
method as it does to restrict the use of pharmaceuticals or medical
equipment? If the government may, in some circumstances, restrict the
content of what a therapist can permissibly say to her client, under what
* Alan Joseph Bennett Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. For suggestions on
earlier drafts of this paper, or the topics discussed in it, I am grateful to BJ Ard, Jonathan Manes,
Jane Bambauer, Bernard Blitz, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Jan Christoph Bublitz, Joseph Couch, Veljko
Dubljevic, Marshall Andrew Glenn, Stephen Henderson, Joshua Hauser, Dennis Jowaisas, Margot
Kaminski, Harish Kavirajan, Vicki MacDougall, Jane Campbell Moriarty, Amy Newberry, Leslie E.
Packer, Shannon Roesler, Andy Spiropoulos, Carla Spivack, Joseph Thai, Deborah Tussey, and
Jacob Victor. I am also grateful to participants who discussed this topic in presentations by the
author at a Yale Information Society Project Thomson Reuters Speaker Series Talk by the author,
Brain Matters 2014, the 2014 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and an Oklahoma City University
School of Law Faculty Colloquium.
1. John Launer, Anna 0 and the 'Talking Cure,' 98 QJM: INT'L J. MED. 465, 465 (2005).
Anna 0 was the pseudonym of Bertha Pappenheim, an Austrian writer who was treated for
hysteria by Josef Breuer, a mentor and colleague of Sigmund Freud. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen,
Bertha Pappenhein (1859-1936): Bertha Pappenheim, the Original Patient of Psychoanalysis,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 29, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/freuds-patientsserial/20120 1/bertha-pappenheim- 1859-1936.
2. Psychotherapists-and psychotherapy texts--differ in how they refer to individuals who
use a therapist's services. Some psychotherapists and texts describe such individuals as "patients."
Others refer to them as "clients." Stephen Joseph, Patients or Clients?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 4,
2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/what-doesnt-kill-us/201308/patients-or-clients. As
one article notes, those who use the latter term have often done so to "signify a rejection of [a]
medical way of thinking, replacing it with the humanistic language of growth and change." Id
In this Article, I generally use the term "client," in part because I want to challenge the notion
that constitutional law can treat psychotherapist speech as analogous to physician speech for
all purposes.
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circumstances may it do so? Must it show that therapists' statements
about human psychology are false or harmful to the client? Or, may it
constitutionally bar even truthful therapist-client communications that
raise little risk of harm to the client's physical or mental health on the
grounds that such verbal treatments promote values or behaviors at odds
with those of the profession or of society at large?
In the past two years, these questions have received attention from
federal courts, thanks to a high-profile legal controversy over
state efforts to protect minors from some psychotherapists' use of
"sexual orientation change efforts" ("SOCE").3 California barred
psychotherapists from administering SOCE to minors in 2013.4
New Jersey did so in the same year.' Illinois,' Oregon,' and Washington
D.C.' have now done so, as well. The Obama administration has also
weighed in on the dangers of SOCE for gay and transgender teenagers.9
And, while the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case on this issue,
it has taken note of it. In Obergefell v. Hodges, where it held that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry,"o the Court
noted that discrimination against gays and lesbians included
psychiatrists classifying homosexuality as a "mental disorder" and
observed that only in "recent years have psychiatrists and others
recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human
sexuality and immutable.""
In the midst of this controversy, federal appellate courts in the
Ninth and Third Circuits have confronted the question of whether
California and New Jersey, respectively, violated the First Amendment
by banning SOCE therapy for clients younger than eighteen years old. 12
Both found such therapy restrictions constitutional and had good reasons
3. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 865-865.2 (West 2013); King v. Governor of N.J.,
767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014).

§ 865.1.

4.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE

5.

N.J. STAT. ANN.

6.

See Aditya Agrawal, Illinois Bans Gay Conversion Therapyfor Minors, TIME (Aug. 21,

§ 45:1-55 (West

2013).

2015), http://time.com/4006675/illinois-bans-gay-conversion-therapy-on-minors.
7.

See Katy Steinmetz, Oregon Becomes Third State to Ban Conversion Therapy on Minors,

TIME (May 19, 2015), http://time.com/3889687/oregon-conversion-therapy-ban.
8.

See Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Bans Gay Conversion Therapy of Minors, WASH. POST

(Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-bans-gay-conversion-therapy
2014/12/02/58e6aae4-7a67-1 I e4-84d4-7c896b9Oabdcstory.htrnl.
9.

See Michael D. Shear, Obama Calls for End to "Conversion" Therapies for Gay

and Transgender Youth, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/
us/politics/obama-to-call-for-end-to-conversion-therapies-for-gay-and-transgender-youth.html.
10. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
11. Id at 2596.
12. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown,
740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014).
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for recognizing that government must have the power to protect against
therapies premised upon the false assumption (criticized in Obergefell)
that homosexuality is a mental illness.' 3 A physician could not expect
the First Amendment to save her from professional discipline or legal
liability if she wrongly diagnosed a clearly healthy patient with cancer or
a serious autoimmune disease. Similarly, a clinical psychologist does not
have a First Amendment right to diagnose a symptom-free client with
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, for example, and then recommend
unnecessary therapy sessions. Nor, as the Ninth and Third Circuits both
agreed, does she have a First Amendment right to falsely suggest to a
client, or the client's family, that homosexuality is a mental disorder 4
something the vast majority of psychologists have recognized as wrong
for the more than forty years since homosexuality was removed from the
Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders.'" Nor is there a
right to make false claims about the power of talk therapy to change a
person's sexual orientation. Neither doctors nor psychotherapists have a
First Amendment right to treat a disease that doesn't exist with a
treatment that doesn't work.
Yet, behind this shared conclusion was a deep disagreement about
psychotherapy's First Amendment status. In the view of the Ninth
Circuit, California's talk therapy restriction did not violate the First
Amendment because talk therapy is not protected by the First
Amendment.1 6 In short, the Ninth Circuit held in Pickup v. Brown that
such therapy is conduct not speech." What matters, for First
Amendment purposes, is not that the "talking cure" involves talking, but
that it aims at curing." Even though "the mechanism used to deliver
mental health treatment is the spoken word," it is still professional
healing activity.' 9 Like administering medicine or surgery, it is designed
to transform and heal a person and not simply to inform or communicate
with her.20 To be sure, added the Ninth Circuit, free speech law does
13. See King, 767 F.3d at 232-33, 237-40; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222, 1231-32.
14. See King, 767 F.3d at 221; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222.
15. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION

22-24 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 APA REPORT], http://www.apa.org/pi/igbt/resources/therapeuticresponse.pdf; see also King, 767 F.3d at 221 (recounting findings that sexuality is not a disorder);
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222 (noting that homosexuality "was removed from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" in 1973).
16. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230.
17. Id. at 1227-29.
18. Id. at 1226.
19. Id. at 1227.
20. Id. at 1229-30 (treating the restriction of "administration of therapies" as a regulation of
conduct and stating that the verbal activity regulated is "therapeutic, not symbolic").
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shield some of the things psychotherapists say about mental health.2
Such speech is protected not when it is a component of psychotherapy,
but rather when it offers information or opinions about psychotherapy to
the public or to an individual client.2 2
The Third Circuit, by contrast, had very different reasons for
finding New Jersey's ban on SOCE therapy constitutional in King v.
Governor of New Jersey.23 The speech that occurs as psychotherapists
deliver talk therapy, according to the opinion, may be part of a healing
process.24 But, it also entails communication of ideas and feelings and,
as such, deserves significant constitutional protection from government
21
suppression. Just as the government may not interfere with our private
conversations, whether to empty them of views it dislikes or compel
individuals to voice views that officials favor, 26 it may not seize control
of the communication that occurs between psychotherapists and their
clients and distort it to serve the state's purposes rather than those of
clients. When the government regulates therapy, it cannot-consistent
with the First Amendment-seek to "suppress disfavored ideas under the
guise of professional regulation." 27 This does not mean that the words
used in talk therapy are merely speech. They are also medical and
professional tools, the use of which can damage a client if used in a way
that falls short of professional standards. 28 As a consequence, instead of
shutting officials out almost entirely from regulation of psychotherapy, it
left them free to enter in many cases where dangers to health require
their intervention.29 In the Third Circuit's view, the harms presented by
SOCE therapy to minors constituted such a case. While New Jersey's
ban unquestionably restricted First Amendment speech,30 it did so in
ways narrowly tailored to serve the "substantial government interest" of
protecting minors from an ineffective treatment with harmful effects."
That both circuits ultimately reached the same result may seem to
indicate that the difference between their approaches is insignificant.
Whether we call psychotherapist-client communication "conduct"
21. Id. at 1230.
22. Id. (noting that California's law did not restrain psychologists from "imparting
information or disseminating opinions" and suggesting that had it done so, it would have violated
First Amendment law).
23. 767 F.3d 216, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2014).
24. Id. at 224.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 228.
27. Id. at 236.
28. Id. at 224, 236-38.
29. Id at 236-38 (discussing the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny).
30. Id. at 229.
31. Id. at 233, 234, 237-40.
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outside the First Amendment or "speech" within it, it seems to be
amenable to professional regulation and licensing requirements. Indeed,
a recent case on physician speech even described the Ninth and Third
Circuits as adopting essentially the same approach.32 Why worry, then,
about how it is categorized for First Amendment purposes if the end
result is that states can restrict treatments they find unsafe or otherwise
harmful to clients' interests?
First, although these distinct approaches led to the same conclusion
here, they may not always do so. Consider a hypothetical state law that
takes sides in what some writers call "the dogma eats dogma" battles
between different schools of psychotherapy." Adherents of each school
have their own distinctive theories and techniques. For those in the
psychoanalytic (or psychodynamic) school, a client's emotional or
mental struggles often have their roots in unconscious feelings or beliefs
forged in childhood experience or other significant episodes in life.34
The therapist's goal is to help the client unearth these hidden sources,
come to terms with them, and move beyond them." For cognitivebehavioral therapists, by contrast, the focus is often on current
thinking patterns rather than past conflicts: they trace psychological
problems to how thinking patterns influence behavior, and then
focus on changing those thinking patterns.36 For still other schools
of therapy, both psychoanalysis and cognitive-behaviorism fall
short: Humanistic or existential psychotherapists claim that
psychological healing requires "not merely . .. intellectual or behavioral
reprogramming," but "experiential .. . reawakening."37 According to
practitioners of "relational-cultural therapy," it also requires that
therapist and clients alike free themselves from the Western myth of the
self-reliant individual and start from the premise that "we grow in
32. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 896 (11th Cir. 2015) (treating Pickup as
a case that, like King, essentially applied intermediate scrutiny), reh'g en banc granted, opinion
vacated (Feb. 3, 2016); see also Recent Case, FirstAmendment-Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida
Law Banning Doctors from Inquiring About Patients' Gun Ownership When Such Inquiry Is
Irrelevant to Medical Care.-Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014),
128 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1050 (2015) (characterizing the Ninth Circuit as "applying intermediate
scrutiny to much of a doctor's speech").
33. John C. Norcross, A Primer on Psychotherapy Integration, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 3, 3 (John C. Norcross & Marvin R. Goldfried eds., 2d ed. 2005).
34. See NANCY MCWILLIAMS, PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 1, 3 (2004).
35. Id. at 1-4.
36. Keith S. Dobson & David J.A. Dozois, Historical and Philosophical Bases of the
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPIES 3, 4-6
(Keith S. Dobson ed., 2d ed. 2001).
37. KIRK J. SCHNEIDER & ORAH T. KRUG, EXISTENTIAL HUMANISTIC THERAPY 6 (Jon
Carlson & Matt Englar-Carlson eds., 2010).
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relationship[s] throughout our lives" and should focus on understanding
and shaping those relationships." Other psychotherapists adhere to still
other theories and approaches.39
Would the First Amendment place any barriers in the way of a state
law that banned one or more such approaches while leaving therapists
free to offer others? The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Pickup suggests
the answer is "no." Just as the FDA may bar certain drugs for relieving
pain while permitting others,40 and court cases would not find that such a
ban violates First Amendment freedoms, so state legislatures are
constitutionally permitted to favor one type of talk therapy over another.
For the Third Circuit, such a restriction would likely be far more
problematic. In favoring one type of therapy over another, the state
would be preventing therapists from telling clients their beliefs about the
human psyche and preventing clients from seeking out-and drawing
guidance from-the psychological school of their choice. Such a
scenario would, under the Third Circuit's approach, entail restriction of
First Amendment speech.41
There is a second reason why we should care about whether (and
when) talk therapy counts as speech. The Third and Ninth Circuits'
disagreement over talk therapy's First Amendment status is part of a
much larger judicial debate over whether, and to what extent, the First
Amendment protects "the occupational speech" that a client receives
from someone she has hired to provide advice or other information
based on a particular kind of expertise.42 As individuals bring their
38.

JUDITH V. JORDAN, RELATIONAL-CULTURAL THERAPY 3-5 (Jon Carlson & Matt Englar-

Carlson eds., 2010).
39. See BRUCE E. WAMPOLD, THE BASICS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (Jon Carlson & Matt Englar-Carlson eds., 2010) (stating that "there are

more than 500 distinct psychotherapeutic theories and the number is growing").
40. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Action to Halt Marketing
of Unapproved Ergotamine Companies Ordered to Cease Manufacturing and Distribution of Illegal
Drugs to Treat Migraine Headaches (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm 108857.htm.
41. Such partisan government intervention is not entirely hypothetical. During the midtwentieth century, a faction of the American Medical Association lobbied for-and some state
legislatures considered-proposals that would allow psychotherapy only when practiced by licensed
physicians, such as psychiatrists. See COMM. ON CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE GRP. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE RELATION OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY TO PSYCHIATRY 3-4

(1949). In recent years, some psychotherapists in Great Britain have worried about proposed
regulations that would favor certain therapy approaches over others. See IMPLAUSIBLE
PROFESSIONS: ARGUMENTS FOR PLURALISM AND AUTONOMY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND

COUNSELING 13-14 (Richard House & Nick Totton eds., 2d ed. 2011) (arguing against the "topdown, conformist, coercive model used by [the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy] in
particular is incompatible with the best values of our craft" and describing damage that would be
caused by "coercive accreditation models").
42.

See Eugene Volokh, Professional-Client Speech and the First Amendment, WASH.
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emotional and psychological problems to psychotherapists, they also
bring health concerns to physicians, legal questions to attorneys, and
financial challenges to accountants. They hire architects to design houses
and buildings for them and designers or artists to help them make their
homes, workplaces, or websites aesthetically appealing. They hire tour
guides to lead them through and inform them about cities or other
locales and to provide a sense of their nature and history. All of these
services involve communication, but courts have been unsure about the
degree to which such communication is protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, there have been recent judicial decisions struggling
with the questions about whether, and to what extent, the government
runs afoul of the First Amendment when it imposes restrictions on
interior designers, tour guides," physicians,4 5 and veterinarians.4 6
In this Article, I will suggest that the Third Circuit's debate with the
Ninth Circuit over psychotherapy's First Amendment status provides a
helpful lens through which we can understand, and give clarity to, the
larger debate over occupational speech. In fact, I suggest here that
behind the dispute over psychotherapy's First Amendment status-and
that of other kinds of occupational speech-lies a much deeper problem
of First Amendment theory: How should free speech law deal with
realms of human action where government's presence is necessary to
assure individuals' health and safety but possibly dangerous to their
intellectual liberty and autonomy?
This problem arises in many areas of occupational speech
regulation, but is particularly clear when officials restrict talk therapy.
On the one hand, if there is any activity that should be staunchly
protected against state manipulation, it is the self-exploration that
individuals engage in as they try to understand their inner lives. We are
shielded from state interference, for example, when we wrestle with
religious or philosophical questions in private conversations with

POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/20/
professional-client-speech-and-the-first-amendment (noting that "[o]ne of the big uncharted zones
of First Amendment law (here there be monsters) is professional-client speech").
43. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1189, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding licensing
requirements for interior designers constitutional).
44. See Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding tour guide
licensing tests constitutional).
45. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 868-69, 900-01 (11th Cir. 2015)
(finding limiting physician records on gun ownership constitutional), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Feb. 3, 2016).
46. See Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 534
(2015) (upholding a Texas law prohibiting veterinarians from practicing unless they had first
examined the animal).
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friends 47 or in private diary entries 48-or, when we seek to explore our
emotions by recording a dream we have had or a feeling we have
experienced. These efforts at self-understanding are protected against
state restriction when they occur in living rooms, cafes, or library
rooms.49 Why, then, should they suddenly become fair targets for state
restriction or bans when they occur in a therapist's office? We may find,
after all, that some efforts at understanding or transforming our thoughts
and feelings cannot succeed unless we recruit the help of a psychologist
or other expert,s0 and such recruiting of help alone does not eliminate
our First Amendment interest in being able to reflect upon, and
communicate about, our thought patterns.
On the other hand, if government's interference in psychotherapy is
sometimes impermissible, there are also times when its failure to
intervene would seem irresponsible. Government is not supposed to
interfere with our choices about what to say or think or about what
values to hold. But it is charged with protecting our health and safety,
and, in psychotherapy, such health and safety interests are very often at
stake. Among the clients who psychotherapists treat are individuals who
have, or could develop, mental conditions that heighten the risk of
suicide or violent behavior.' As Elyn Saks and Shahrokh Golshan point
out, people can "die as a result of suboptimal therapy." 2 Indeed, many
clients who seek therapists' help are not wrestling with deep
philosophical questions. They come for the more concrete and limited
goal of conquering a particular mental illness." A person with an
Anxiety Disorder may simply want to banish her anxiety. A person with
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder may turn to a psychologist simply to
quiet his obsessions and compulsions. In these circumstances,
47. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (agreeing that "the fear of public
disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech"); see also id.
at 542-544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that First Amendment "speech interests" are
furthered when "personal conversations be frank and uninhibited").
48. See Daniel J. Solove, The FirstAmendment as CriminalProcedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
112, 123 (2007) ("The ability to keep personal papers and records of associational ties private is a
central First Amendment value.").
49. See id. at 121-23.
50. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that some listeners
are unlikely to get access to certain types of expert knowledge except through professional speech).
51. See, e.g., Klein v. Solomon, 713 A.2d 764, 766 (R.I. 1998) (concerning a suit against a
university psychologist for failing to properly treat a student, who later committed suicide).
52. ELYN R. SAKS & SHAHROKH GOLSHAN, INFORMED CONSENT TO PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE
LAW, THE THEORY, AND THE DATA 77 (2013).

53. A primer on brief dynamic therapy noted that "[m]ost people who are coming for therapy
are in emotional pain, and they want to have this pain alleviated as soon as possible. They are not
fascinated by their psyches, nor do they seek mental health perfectionism." HANNA LEVENSON,
BRIEF DYNAMIC THERAPY 5 (Jon Carlson & Matt Englar-Carlson eds., 2010).
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government seems to have just as much reason to regulate psychologists'
treatment of mental health as it does to regulate physicians' treatment of
bodily health-to assure that in either profession, health practitioners are
practicing effective medicine or mental health treatment and are not
defrauding or endangering their patients or clients.
The question of psychotherapy's First Amendment status, then, is
what kind of First Amendment regime can best adjudicate between, or
somehow reconcile, these two conflicting demands-to keep
government interference out of the way we shape our psyches with
words, while letting it into medical decisions that carry significant health
risks? As it turns out, although this challenge is new to judicial review of
therapy regulation and to occupational speech regulation more generally,
it is not new to First Amendment law. The Supreme Court confronted
the issue in the 1992 case of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.54 Officials,
according to the opinion, receive leeway under the First Amendment to
protect individuals from the harms that flow from certain kinds of
speech-like the violence or fear triggered by "fighting words" or true
threats, the reputation-damaging features of libel, or the risk of fraud or
deception raised by certain commercial speech." But this speechrestricting power is not meant to give officials a blank check. Rather,
they are allowed only to restrict the component of such speech that
causes the harm (of a kind government may protect against)." For
example, while government may permissibly restrict libel to prevent the
damage it does to reputation, it may not use this reputation-protecting
power to restrict "only libel critical of the government." 7 The latter
selective type of libel law would be focused not on libel's reputationdamaging qualities (which are just as present in libel supporting
government as libel critical of it), but rather on the message it carries.
A similar approach can help assure, as the Third Circuit put it, that
government does not misuse its power to protect us from fraud or health
risks in talk therapy by using it to "suppress disfavored ideas under the
guise of professional regulation."" If government wishes to ban a form
of talk therapy, it should be able to assure courts that such a speech
restriction is designed to protect clients' mental health and not prevent
them from considering messages that government considers political or
cultural heresy.

54. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
55. Id. at 383-85.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 384.
58. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2014).
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,

Part II sets out this First Amendment framework for professional
speech regulation in more detail and explains some of the challenges it
raises for future cases on psychotherapy or other occupational speech.5 9
Parts III and IV explain why these challenges cannot be avoided simply
by following the Ninth Circuit's alternative framework (or a variant of
it) and classifying talk therapy as "non-speech conduct." 6 0 In Part
this Article first looks at the Ninth Circuit's argument that talk therapy is
medical treatment-analogous to prescribing a drug-that just happens
to be "deliver[ed]" through "the mechanism" of "the spoken word."', It
explains that this analogy is a problematic one, since talk therapy works
its changes not simply by imposing them onto a client's or patient's
physiological functioning, but often by enlightening her about her
mental functioning or personal history and persuading her to undertake
certain behavioral changes. The cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
changes produced by talk therapy are similar, in other words, to changes
that rhetoric or other speech produces in other circumstances where it
unquestionably receives First Amendment protection.
Part IV considers another alternative to the approach I sketch in
Part I: an approach set forth by Robert Post, which allows for limited
protection for occupational speech modeled on that already provided to
commercial speech, but only in order to assure that such speech carries
accurate information (consistent with professional standards).62 On this
approach, the state is barred by the First Amendment from interfering
with physicians' or therapists' communication of expert knowledge to
their patients or clients, but remains free to regulate these professional
channels of communications so long as it avoids "corrupt[ing] . . . the

diffusion of expert knowledge." 6 ' This Article agrees that the First
Amendment should, as Post's approach requires, protect professional
speech from regulation that prohibits professionals from dispensing
disciplinary truth, or requires them to voice a false version of it. 64 But, it
argues, this approach is too narrow: It should protect professional-client
conversations not only to assure their accuracy, but also to protect the
autonomy of the conversations' participants.65 First Amendment law, in
other words, should allow the state to wrest control of these
conversations from their participants (for example, the therapist and the
59.

See infra Part II.

60.
61.
62.

See infra Parts HI-TV.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2014); see infra Part IH.
See infra Part V.C.

63. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 47 (2012).

64.
65.

Id at 47-48; see infra text accompanying notes 332-35, 350-53.
See infra Part IV.D-E.
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client) only where doing so is necessary to stave off professional
deception, incompetence, health risks or some other harm that
government has responsibility to protect us from. In other words,
to the extent Post's approach is valid, it should be understood as
one instance of the broader holding of R.A. V, which would
bar restriction of occupational speech not only where such restriction
corrupts (rather than protects) the accuracy of the speech but also
in other circumstances where government lacks adequate harm-based
justification for its censorship.
Part V highlights another reason for why an approach rooted in
R.A. V is superior to alternatives to regulation of occupational speech-a
reason that focuses specifically on psychotherapy.6 6 Psychotherapy
regulations, in particular, require an approach that does more than
simply protect the accuracy of therapists' communications to clients. In
short, the conversations that occur in psychotherapy are more likely than
those in medicine to wander onto philosophical terrain where what
works for a particular client is not a matter of disciplinary truth, but
rather of that client's own "conception of the good." Psychotherapy, in
other words, is more likely than many other professional endeavors to
require conversations where government has no business telling
individuals what answers to reach: intellectual and emotional struggles,
in which individuals are struggling with questions of how best to live
their lives or what type of person to become-as in many deeply
religious or moral meditations. Recent scholarly discussions of
psychotherapy's First Amendment status tend to ignore or minimize this
topic, treating talk therapy as simply a variant of physician speech and
subject to the same First Amendment analysis.6 But, psychotherapy is
distinct in ways that have importance for understanding how First
Amendment law should apply and more specifically how R.A. V's rule
confining the government only to legitimate health protection purposes
can apply to the realm of psychotherapy, where health protection is
sometimes difficult to distinguish from philosophical exploration.

66. See infra Part IV.
67. But see Warren Geoffrey Tucker, It's Not Called Conduct Therapy; Talk Therapy as a
Protected Form ofSpeech Under the First Amendment, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 885, 886-87,
903-05 (2015) (emphasizing respects in which psychotherapists' interactions with clients are
different from those which doctors have with their patients).
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TALK THERAPY AND OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH AS A FIRST
AMENDMENT BOUNDARY PROBLEM

A.

ConstitutionalProtectionfor Realms ofAutonomy

Our intuitions about whether talk therapy should be constitutionally
shielded from government restriction may well differ from case to case.
Consider two examples. First, imagine a psychotherapist insists (without
supporting studies or other evidence) that she has developed a talk
therapy method that will entirely cure Alzheimer's disease 6 8 -not
merely improve quality of life or cognitive skill in an Alzheimer's
patient, but completely reverse and eliminate the cellular changes that
lead to the dementia associated with the disease. She aggressively
markets this talk therapy to older individuals recently diagnosed with
Alzheimer's. Should the government be able to stop her from doing so,
even though it would be preventing a therapist from communicating with
a willing client? Many people would likely say "yes." What the
psychotherapist is offering here is therapeutic "snake oil." It does not do
what the therapist claims it will do and does not produce the kind of
mental change the client is seeking. Especially when the target audience
for such a treatment are individuals who are desperate to cure an
incurable condition, and perhaps, are also made more vulnerable to
fraudulent practices by the onset of the Alzheimer's itself, the
government should be able to intervene.
By contrast, imagine a different kind of government limit on
psychotherapy-one that is designed to protect clients not from
therapy's failures, but from its successes. Imagine that officials become
concerned that certain variants of humanistic psychotherapy are
encouraging individualism and non-conformity, instead of helping
individuals become better adjusted and more loyal to their community.69
Or that certain variants of psychoanalysis are leading individuals to think
too critically or negatively about their parents' values and behavior. Or
that certain kinds of relational-cultural therapy are inappropriate in
68.

See Current Alzheimer's Treatments, ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, http://www.alz.org/research/

science/alzheimersdiseasetreatments.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (noting that "Alzheimer's
medications can temporarily slow the worsening of symptoms and improve quality of life for those
with Alzheimer's" but that "there is no cure").
69. See Louis Hoffman et al., Humanistic Psychology and Multiculturalism:History, Current
Status, and Advancements, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH,

AND PRACTICE 41, 51 (Kirk J. Schneider et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015) (noting that humanistic psychology
has an "individualistic" focus and that "conformity is generally discussed in pathological terms");
Donald E. Polkinghome, The Self and Humanistic Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANISTIC
PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE, supra, at 87, 90-91 (noting the harmful effect

attributed to "the press of social confonnity").
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treating psychotherapy as a forum for exploring "questions about social
change as well as personal change,""o or taking an overly critical stance
towards American culture's emphasis on self-reliance."
May the government constitutionally ban such therapy not on the
ground that it predictably fails to achieve its goals, but because, even if it
does what the client wants, it promotes goals which are, in the
government's view, the wrong kinds of goals? Intuitively, such a therapy
restriction seems deeply at odds with First Amendment values. The
government may not censor the private advice we give to friends,
whether verbally or in e-mails or text messages.7 2 Nor may it compel us
to change that advice so that it carries the government's views rather
than our own." Why should it be able to do so in restricting the
communications we have with psychotherapists? Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said that government may not seek to assert control over "an
existing medium of expression" and reshape it to meet government ends
rather than those of the speakers and listeners that use it. 7 4 It may not, for
example, stop lawyers from developing sound legal arguments because
legislators (or their constituents) dislike such arguments or the legal
change they might produce." Nor should it be able to stop psychologists
from providing advice that an individual finds helpful on the ground that
the legislators (or their constituents) dislike the beliefs conveyed by such
therapy or the insights or feelings it generates.
These examples suggest that a satisfactory constitutional
framework for regulation of psychotherapy should give government (1)
sufficient room to protect therapy users from fraud and serious harms
that might result from psychotherapists' errors, but (2) without giving it
authority to reshape therapy to serve its own ideological ends (by barring
clients from making autonomous choices about communications they
find valuable for their own psychological healing or development).
Psychotherapy, in other words, should be safeguarded by a selective
First Amendment barrier. When ideologically driven officials try to
mold psychotherapy or other professional speech to reflect political or
cultural orthodoxy, the Constitution's speech protection should block
such interference. When, however, officials insist not on political or

70.

JORDAN, supra note 38, at 96-97.

71. Id at 2-3 (noting that relational-cultural therapy departs from the ideal of "standing on
your own two feet" and instead emphasizes the importance of relationships where individuals
depend on each other).
72. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 543.
75. See, e.g., id. at 544.
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cultural conformity but on professional competency, free speech law
should let them regulate.
This is, as explained in Part I, precisely the position on
psychotherapy's First Amendment status taken by the Third Circuit in
King.7 6 Instead of insulating psychotherapists' speech (or other
professionals' speech) inside the First Amendment fortress that the
judiciary erects around public debate-by securing it behind the almost
impassable wall of "strict scrutiny"-the Third Circuit instead provides
it with the weaker, more permeable judicial shielding of "intermediate
scrutiny."" This shielding is "intermediate" because instead of shutting
officials out almost entirely, it leaves them free to enter in many cases
where health or other dangers require their intervention.78
This solution is, in fact, one instance of a solution to a much deeper
First Amendment puzzle; one which has implications not only for First
Amendment status of psychotherapy, but also for that of other
occupational speech. As noted earlier, free speech law often has to deal
with realms of human action where government's presence is
necessary to assure individuals' health and safety but is simultaneously
dangerous to their intellectual liberty and autonomy.79 This is a
challenge that faces many kinds of occupational speech regulation, but it
is particularly stark when officials wish to restrict what a therapist can
discuss with her client.
The Constitution, as the Court has emphasized, carves out spaces
for Americans where "the State" is not a "dominant presence," and
where it is up to each individual-rather than those who exercise
collective political power-to make decisions about the nature of that
space (and its contents).so For example, it is generally up to me, not
government officials or political majorities, to decide what I will think or
say, or what religious principles shall guide me. "Liberty" presumes that
each individual (not state officials or those whom they represent) will be
sovereign in the realm of "thought, belief, [and] expression," and also in
decisions regarding "certain intimate conduct."' Understood this way,
76. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234-36 (3d Cir. 2014). Eugene Volokh has
also suggested, much more briefly, a similar framework under which government could regulate
professionals to protect clients but not to target ideas within professional exchanges in other
respects. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, "Situation Alerting Utterances" and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277,

1343-45
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

(2005).
King, 767 F.3d at 233-35.
See id. at 234-35.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 573-74 (2003).
Id. at 562.
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freedom of expression is one part of a larger system of constitutional
protection that is intended to secure an "autonomy of self." 82
This system of constitutional liberties did not originate with the
Constitution. One finds it in the earlier liberal theory of John Locke, who
argued that the "civil magistrate" could legitimately make and enforce
laws with respect to our outward actions and possessions, but had to
leave to each person the right to make decisions regarding his own inner
life.83 For Locke, this line was essentially a line between political power,
on the one hand, and religious conscience and belief on the other. On
one side was the civil magistrate whose power extended only to "civil
interests" such as protection of "life, liberty, health, and indolency of
body; and the possession of outward things such as money, lands,
houses, furniture, and the like." 84 On the other was the "care of souls,"
which was necessarily the responsibility of the individual himself, since
our religious commitments were a matter solely of the "inward
persuasion of the mind," a realm where the "outward force" of the state
necessarily had no power." For Locke, this inward realm, and the
responsibility for "care of the soul" that came with it, was essentially
about religious thought and practice." It was ultimately about obtaining
salvation. In modem times, by contrast, the care of the soul often takes
on a secular form-one that includes private reflection and meditation of
a non-theological nature, and one that may well draw upon
psychotherapy. It is thus not only religion, but also-as Kent Greenawalt
notes-a much wider realm of human activity that falls into a realm that
contemporary constitutional law, following Locke, has reserved for the
autonomy of self and insulated against state control.
Psychotherapy poses a challenge to First Amendment law in large
part because, rather than being entirely within or outside such a
constitutionally secured space for individual autonomy, it falls partly
within and partly outside of it. As noted earlier, psychotherapy is in
some respects deeply personal. Like religious or spiritual exploration,
psychotherapy is often, as the noted therapist and writer Irwin Yalom
puts it, "a deep and comprehensive exploration into the course and

82. Id.
83. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Charles L. Sherman ed., William
Popple trans., 1689), reprinted in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Mortimer J. Adler

et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Id.
87.

KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 30 (1989); see also

Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 147-50 (1989).
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meaning of one's life."88 Such explorations, of course, fall squarely
within the realm of "thought, belief, and expression" that the First
Amendment secures against majoritarian control. It is not the business of
the state or its officials to tell a person what should give her life meaning
or purpose.
On the other hand, while it is not the state's prerogative to tell a
person what kind of values or beliefs she (or her therapist) should view
as meaningful or valuable, it is the state's responsibility to inform her
what kind of mental health treatments are dangerous or ineffective and,
perhaps, at times, bar such treatments altogether where a warning fails to
provide sufficient protection. Especially where the cost of therapeutic
failure might be a deep and crippling depression or suicidal feelings,
government has a right to insist that the therapy be competently
delivered and based in the right kind of expertise and evidence.89
The challenge raised by psychotherapy for First Amendment law,
then, is that the expressive activity that occurs in psychotherapy
straddles both sides of the important constitutional boundary line that, as
Steven Heyman puts it, divides the outward realm of the state from "the
inward life of the individual."o The central question is as follows: What
kind of First Amendment regime can best reconcile these two conflicting
demands-to keep government interference out of the way we shape our
mental life with conversation and other discussion, while letting it into
medical practices with significant stakes for our mental health?
How, in other words, can First Amendment law simultaneously allow
the state to regulate the aspects of psychotherapy that are its business,
while keeping it out of those aspects that should remain a sphere of
individual autonomy?
R.A. V, discussed in Part I, provides one doctrinal solution to his
challenge." It provides a solution to the challenge of how courts
should analyze situations where government regulates-and must
regulate-an activity that falls on both sides of the boundary line
between the inward life of the individual and the outward realm of the
state. 92 R.A. V essentially instructs courts to assure that when
government does so regulate, it should stay (as much as possible) on its
own side of this line.93
88. IRVIN D. YALOM, THE GIFT OF THERAPY: AN OPEN LETTER TO A NEw GENERATION OF
THERAPISTS AND THEIR PATIENTS 125 (2009).
89. See, e.g., Klein v. Solomon, 713 A.2d 764, 766 (R.I. 1998).
90. Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutral Doctrine in
FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 10 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 657 (2002).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 54-67.

92. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384-90 (1992).
93. See id.
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More specifically, R.A. V. sets out a "choice of scrutiny" rule: It tells
courts to apply a level of scrutiny that matches where officials are
aiming their regulatory power.9 4 It does so against the background of a
more extensive doctrinal framework for applying different kinds of
judicial scrutiny. When a government restriction is one that intrudes into
a sphere of human life that the Constitution reserves for individual
autonomy, courts typically begin with the presumption that such
government intrusion is unconstitutional.95 They then abandon this
presumption (and uphold the government restriction) only in the rare
circumstance where the government can overcome strict scrutiny. That
is, the government must show that it is acting to achieve a "compelling
government interest" and that its measure is absolutely necessary to
achieve that interest.96 For example, courts apply such strict scrutiny
to-and almost always strike down-laws that burden speech on the
basis of its viewpoint or topic." By contrast, where government is acting
in a sphere in which state power is typically acceptable, then any
legitimate goal will be sufficient (even if it is far less important than a
compelling interest) and any means for achieving that goal will be
permissible (so long as they are rational). 98 If government regulates
commercial interactions, for example, courts will almost always find
such a measure constitutional unless the government lacks any "rational
basis" for its action. 99

Of course, this line between the realm of strict scrutiny (where the
government generally cannot regulate) and the realm of rational basis
(where it can usually regulate freely) is not determinative when the
activity regulated by government is, like psychotherapy, an activity that
extends across both realms. Talk therapy, moreover, is not the only kind
of speech that cuts across this boundary line. As the Court pointed out in

94. See id
95. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812-13, 816-17 (2000);
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382.
96. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (noting that content-based restrictions on speech are
generally subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be "narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest" and "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative").
97. See id.; R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382, 391; Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 193
(3d Cir. 2008); see also PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 32-33 (2013) (pointing
to "content neutrality" as the central focus of First Amendment doctrine).
98. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 981-82 (N.D. Cal.
2012) ("Under the rational basis review, a law must be rationally related to the furtherance of a
legitimate governmental interest.").
99. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012)
("[R]ational basis review [is] conventionally applied in routine matters of commercial, tax and
like regulation.").
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R.A. V, the same problem arises whenever the government makes laws
restricting types of speech that raise certain types of harms: Certain
kinds of speech receive less than full First Amendment protection
because they do not simply convey ideas or feelings-they also (in
doing so) create certain kinds of risks or harms. 0 Fighting words, for
example, predictably generate physical violence.' Libel damages
individuals' reputations and can make it difficult for them to obtain a
loan, a job, or some other benefit.1 02 Advertising not only conveys
messages about particular products or services, it also provides
individuals with a foundation for making crucial decisions, for example,
about what kind of a car will provide them and their families with safe
transportation or what kind of food products will further their health
rather than harming it.' 0 3 Such speech, in other words, has important and
sometimes immediate effects not just on the ideas people choose to
believe, but also on individuals' physical or financial welfare, or (in the
case of violent threats) their ability to function free of crippling fear. It
thus affects not only the internal realm of ideas, but in John Locke's
words, the realm of "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body, and the
possession of outward things."' 04 The problem is that this gives
government the opportunity to pretend it is protecting individuals
against health risks or fraud when it is really shielding them from the
ideas or messages that the government (or those whom it favors) simply
opposes. R.A. V thus instructs courts to look carefully at the government
interest underlying the law and to set the level of scrutiny accordingly.'
Consider how this framework guided the Court in R.A. V itself: A
group of teenagers had burned a cross outside the home of an AfricanAmerican family and were subsequently arrested for violating a St. Paul
ordinance that made it a crime to burn a cross, display a swastika, or
otherwise use symbols or language, "which one knows or has reasonable
100. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 385-86.
101. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (stating that
fighting words are unprotected because they "provoke immediate violence"); Cannon v. City and
County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the "state interest" in restricting
fighting words is "the avoidance of violence and breach of the peace which may be threatened by
the use of' such words).
102. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (finding that the First
Amendment should allow states to "retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual").
103. See 0. Lou Reed, Nonspeechlike Advertising and the FirstAmendment: A Refinement and
Application of Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1025,
1031 (noting the possibility that certain advertising can "lead[] to addiction, disease, and death, with
significant societal consequences").
104. LOCKE, supra note 83, at 3.
105. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 384-90.
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grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."l0 6 The Court assumed (in
accordance with the decision it was reviewing) that this ordinance
criminalized only a kind of speech it called "fighting words" o 7-words
which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.""0 s Because such expression predictably
triggers violence, it is-despite its expressive qualities-very much the
government's business and, thus, "in the outward realm of the state." 09
Government may normally have no business telling us what to believe or
say, but it does have a responsibility to protect individuals from violence
and this may require it to regulate expression that predictably (and
intentionally) generates such violence. Thus, in 1942, the Court decided
that, unlike most of what we say or write, fighting words are a fair target
for government restriction,"o and, as it later made clear, they can thus be
restricted any time government has a rational basis for doing so.
Still, according to the Court in R.A. V., the leeway that government
receives to regulate such violence-generating speech is a kind of limited
license.11 2 It exists only for the limited purpose of dealing with fighting
words' likelihood of generating violence."' If, said the Court, officials
censor these words not to prevent violence, but rather to censor ideas the
government finds erroneous or objectionable, such ideological
suppression brings government into the realm of verbal conduct reserved
for the autonomy of selfH 4-and thus into the realm where government
is subject to strict scrutiny. In other words, as the Court explained in
R.A. V, "a particular instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis
of one feature .. . but not on the basis of another.""' And on the account
I am giving here, the proscribable feature of the speech is some aspect of
it that places it in the realm of the state-its direct effect, for example,
on physical safety.
106. Id at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292 (1990)).
107. Id at 381.
108. Id at 413 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).
109. See Heyman, supra note 90, at 657.
110. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-74.
111. As Justice White's concurrence in R.A. V. pointed out, even though fighting words
generally receive no First Amendment protection, the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
nonetheless requires the government have a rational basis to punish an individual who uses them.
R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 406 (White, J., concurring) (noting that "the Equal Protection Clause requires
that the regulation of unprotected speech be rationally related to a legitimate government interest").
112. Id. at 391-92 (majority opinion).
113. Id.at391.
114. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 391-93.
115. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 385.
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This aspect of First Amendment doctrine has not played a
significant role in the Court's case law on professional speech
regulation. But, it was a key part of the Third Circuit's analysis in
King.16 Just as the government is afforded more leeway than the First
Amendment normally allows to restrict fighting words to deal with their
violent effects, the government is afforded more speech-restricting
power than that which it usually receives when it protects the important
health and safety interests at stake in professional speech.'1 7 But, the
Third Circuit was not willing to allow it such leeway until it first
confirmed that the New Jersey law was aimed at the part of talk therapy
that made it proscribable-namely, the aspect of talk therapy that raised
possible health or financial harms for a therapy client."' The
government is left with leeway to restrict professional speech, including
talk therapy, not just for any government purpose it deems important,
but rather to further the specific purpose of "protecting [citizens] from
ineffective and/or harmful professional services."" 9 That, found the
Third Circuit, was precisely the purpose that New Jersey had intended
when it sought to shield minors from the potential harms of SOCE.' 20
To be sure, for courts to apply R.A. V, they need to be able to tell
what is "proscribable" in a category of speech, such as true threats or
libel. They need to be able to tell the part of the speech content that is
the business of the state and, thus, fair game for regulation or restriction.
In fact, this is especially important because government-according to
R.A. V-may selectively punish only a subset of fighting words, libel, or
obscenity, so long as such selectivity is based upon "the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable."l 2 1 For example, a state
can decide that (given its limited resources) it will punish only the
most obscene instances of obscenity-those which "involve[] the
most lascivious displays of sexual activity."'2 2 But, it may not
selectively punish certain instances of obscenity on some other
basis, such as targeting "only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages."l23
At times, perhaps, it will be a simple matter for courts to identify
the "reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable," and then
use that to differentiate between permissible and impermissible
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See King v. Governor ofN.J., 767 F.3d 216,236-37 (2014).
Id.at229.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 237-38.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
Id.
Id.
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selectivity in speech restrictions. The reason true threats are excluded
from First Amendment coverage, for example, is because the state needs
to be left with power to "protec(t] individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders."' 24 Where a true threat
restriction is based on offering such protection against violence, it is
legitimate. Where it instead targets true threats for some other reasons,
such as silencing policy stances contained within some of them, then it is
illegitimate. In other cases, however, it is less clear. For example, as I
have argued before, the Justices appear to disagree about what qualities
of commercial speech make it more proscribable than other speech, with
some Justices emphasizing the extent that commercial speech lacks the
value one finds in political speech, and others emphasizing "the risk of
fraud" it raises, as well as other specific harms that flow from it. 125
If, as I said above and the Third Circuit appeared to assume in
King, talk therapy restrictions are generally only permissible (or given a
pass from strict scrutiny) when they target the "proscribable" component
of talk therapy, then courts have to be able to identify what it is that
makes it-or other occupational speech-proscribable. I argue below
that it lies in the extent to which clients justifiably rely, and often have
no choice but to rely, on the professional experts' judgments: Laws on
professional licensing or malpractice must be able to limit (to some
extent) what professionals say to their clients where doing so is
necessary to protect the clients whose health and safety depend on the
accuracy of that advicel 2 6 or where clients rely on a professional's
continued adherence to certain recognized rules or norms of their
profession, such as commitments to confidentiality. Where the state
instead tries to restrict a psychotherapist or other professional's speech
because of some other kind of disagreement with its content, its
restriction will, as a general matter, merit strict scrutiny.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny as an Alternativefor-or Supplement toChoice of Scrutiny
There are at least three additional important questions that the Third
Circuit did not address, but that might be important in future cases on
psychotherapy regulation (and, perhaps, other regulation of professional
speech). One is precisely how R.A. V 's choice of scrutiny rules fit

124. Id.
125. Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Pandora's Box of 21st Century Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Sorrell, R.A.V., and Purpose-Constrained Scrutiny, 19 NEXUS: CHAPMAN'S J.L. & POL'Y 19,45-48
(2013-2014).
126. See infra Part lV.
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together with the Court's application of what is called intermediate
scrutiny. Psychotherapy, as noted before, falls into a gray zone of
sorts-a realm of activity that deals both with individuals' private and
internal beliefs (where the state has no business telling them what to do)
and their health and financial well-being (which the state is charged with
protecting). In other cases where courts encounter such a gray zone, they
often sidestep the difficult challenge integral to applying R.A. V's
framework: They avoid having to say whether the government is focused
on its own business or is interfering with individual autonomy. They
instead apply a level of scrutiny that lies somewhere in between the two
extremes. This intermediate level of scrutiny is not met when
government pursues any legitimate goal. Rather, the government's goal
must be a "substantial" or "important" one because more minor
government interests do not justify the risks to liberty that arise when
government regulates activity where our autonomy is very much at
stake. 12 7 But, given that such substantial interests may often need
protection, courts will not insist they rise to the level of a compelling
interest-since such a compelling interest requirement does not merely
make government regulation more difficult, it makes it virtually
impossible. Likewise, the means the government chooses must have
more than a rational relationship to its goals. 12 8 They need not be as a
precisely targeted to these goals as strict scrutiny demands, but they
should be narrowly focused enough not to do "substantially more"
damage to expressive freedom than is necessary.1 2 9
Applying this intermediate level of scrutiny, one might argue,
spares courts the need to engage in a difficult inquiry about the
government interests or motives underlying a speech restriction. Indeed,
perhaps for this reason, First Amendment law applies intermediate
scrutiny in a number of different circumstances where the government
operates right at the boundary line between regulable conduct and
protected expression. In symbolic conduct, for example, a message or
other expressive content is conveyed not through written or spoken
words, but rather though conduct, such as burning a flag or a draft
card.13 0 The non-speech part of this conduct (burning something), is
conduct the state can typically regulate, subject only to rational basis

127. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1997); King v. Governor
ofN.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (2014).
128. See King, 767 F.3d at 237; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (noting
that laws subject to strict scrutiny because they regulate content are "presumed invalid").
129. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665-66.
130. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369, 370, 376-77 (1968).
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review."' The communicative part of it (the message of protest), the
state cannot restrict under the First Amendment, unless it meets strict
scrutiny. The framework that the Court developed in United States v.
O'Brien thus splits the difference and lets the state regulate it subject to
intermediate scrutiny.' 32 Government may prohibit the burning of draft
cards, for example, if its action is otherwise constitutional and is not
suppressing speech. But even then, it can only do so if it pursues the
kind of end required under intermediate scrutiny (a significant one) with
the types of means allowed under such scrutiny (means which avoid
restricting substantially more speech than necessary).' 3 3 A similar test
applies when government regulates the "time, place, and manner" of
speech instead of its content. Assuming the government's claim of
content-neutrality is justified, it may regulate the time, place, and
manner of speech whenever this restriction is "narrowly tailored to a
significant government interest" and "leave[s] open[] ample alternative
channels of communication" (an additional factor not in O'Brien's
version of intermediate scrutiny).' 3 4
Intermediate scrutiny also applies in one common circumstance
when government is permitted by the Court to regulate speech on the
basis of its content: In commercial interactions, the state is barred from
simply targeting commercial messages it dislikes (because it is up to
each seller what to say about a product and each buyer how to respond).
But it may nonetheless regulate such commercial communication
because, as the Court said in Edenfield v. Fane, "[c]ommercial
speech . .. is 'linked inextricably' with the commercial arrangement that
it proposes.""' As in symbolic conduct restrictions, the government's
goal must be substantial or significant, and its means of achieving this
goal must not restrict substantially more speech than necessary.1 36 These
means must also "directly advance" the government's goal. The
government does, however, receive substantially more leeway to

131. Id. at 375-77.
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id.
134. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that "time, place,
and manner" regulations are constitutional when they "are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information"). To be sure,
applying intermediate scrutiny may well leave considerable uncertainty, since courts can vary in
how skeptically they scrutinize government's claim that a particular interest is substantial or that the
means of achieving it are narrowly tailored enough.
135. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10
n.9 (1979)).
136. Id.
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regulate advertising that is false or misleading or that advocates illegal
conduct; in that case, it is subject only to rational basis review. 1 7
Why not, then, follow this example in occupational speech cases?
Indeed, the Third Circuit has already followed suit. In addition to
applying R.A. V's choice of scrutiny rule, King also applied to
occupational speech restriction-and particularly to restriction of
psychotherapy-the same form of intermediate scrutiny that the Court
applies in commercial speech cases.138 Applying this test to New
Jersey's restriction on providing SOCE therapy to minors, the Third
Circuit found that the ban was aimed at a substantial government interest
(protecting the mental health of minors), directly advanced that interest
(by barring a therapy which the vast majority of psychologists view as a
threat to minors' mental health, without offering any benefits), and did
so without causing substantially more damage than necessary to
expressive freedom.' 3 9
To be sure, the Third Circuit did not apply intermediate scrutiny
instead of R.A. V's choice of scrutiny rule. Rather, it combined these two
parts of First Amendment doctrine. It applied intermediate scrutiny to
New Jersey's restriction on talk therapy, but did so only after first
assuring itself, as R.A. V requires, that New Jersey's restriction had a
purpose that justified state restriction of occupational speech-namely, a
specific purpose of "protecting. . . citizens from ineffective or harmful
professional services."40 And, this makes sense. If the Third Circuit

were instead willing to allow the government to restrict psychotherapy
on the basis of any substantial government purpose, this would produce
intuitively strange results. Imagine, for example, that, in the interest of
conserving resources, New Jersey compelled therapists to encourage
their clients to carpool or otherwise reduce their use of carbon fuels.
Such an interest in conserving energy would likely count as a substantial
government interest of the kind needed to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
In fact, the Supreme Court has classified it as such in a leading
commercial speech case.' 41 But, it is has little to do with the function of
psychotherapy. Any attempt by government to use its speech-compelling
power to graft an energy conservation message into therapy should thus
merit strict rather than intermediate scrutiny under an R.A. V analysis. In
other words, the state should be authorized to interfere in our
137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Conn'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563-64 (1980).
138. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233-34, 237 (3d Cir. 2014).
139. Id. at 237-40.
140. Id. at 235.
141. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568.
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conversations with therapists not only when it is has a substantial
interest, but also an interest of the right kind-namely, the kind
of health- or consumer-protection interest that justifies the state's
entry into what would otherwise be an inappropriate setting for its
regulatory power.
In fact, King is hardly the only case where one finds such a twostep inquiry wherein a court asks (as it does in R.A. V): (1) whether the
government has the right kind of goal or interest, and (2) in applying
intermediate scrutiny, whether this goal or interest is substantial or
significant enough, and was pursued in a narrowly tailored fashion to
advance the goal or interest without doing unnecessary damage to
expressive freedom. The same two-step inquiry is built into the black
letter law tests that the Court has crafted for evaluating the
constitutionality of content-neutral speech regulation.1 42 The four-prong
test that the Supreme Court set out for analyzing symbolic conduct in
O'Brien is, as I have noted above, generally characterized as a form of
intermediate scrutiny. But, it has an R.A. V -style choice of scrutiny rule
built into it, which effectively instructs a court to ask whether strict
scrutiny should apply instead.1 43 Normally, government need not
overcome the almost insuperable barrier of strict scrutiny to regulate
symbolic conduct. It need only overcome the lower hurdle of
intermediate scrutiny. But, the government gets the benefit of this more
generous intermediate scrutiny standard, under O'Brien, only if its
interest is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression."" If the
government's interest in punishing draft card burning is not to prevent
the protester's threat to safety or destruction of property but to silence
him, then it will be subject to strict scrutiny, just as when its purpose in
punishing fighting words is not to prevent violence but to empty
discussion of certain ideas.1 45
A choice of scrutiny rule is likewise built into the Court's test for
time, place, and manner regulation: When the state regulates where,
142. Int'l Women's Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 F.3d 346, 361,
369 (5th Cir. 2010).
143. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). In fact, the R.A. V majority took
note of this component content-neutral speech restriction itself and noted that the choice of scrutiny
rule was analogous to it. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (finding that
"nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the
ideas it expresses" and indicating the fighting word likewise cannot be restricted on the basis of
non-proscribable ideas in it).
144. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
145. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399-400, 403, 410 (1989) (applying strict rather than
intermediate scrutiny to a Texas law punishing the burning of an American flag because it
suppressed symbolic expression on the basis of the ideas it expressed and was thus "outside of
O'Brien'stest").
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when, or how speech can take place, it is normally subject to
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. But, that is only true
where its time, place, and manner regulation is genuinely content
neutral. 146 Where it instead aims at the content of speech, rather
than something other than content (such as decibel level), it is subject to
strict scrutiny.1 4 7
Intermediate scrutiny and R.A. V's choice of scrutiny rule thus,
together, provided the Third Circuit-and can provide other courtswith a First Amendment framework it could use to meet the challenge
of distinguishing legitimate regulation of psychotherapy from censorship
in "the guise of professional regulation."'4 8 A legitimate regulation
of psychotherapy must have the kind of purpose or interest necessary
to justify such regulation under R.A. V (a purpose or interest in
protecting against "ineffective or harmful" therapy) and must be
narrowly tailored to achieving an instance of such a purpose that is
"substantial" and not insignificant.149
C.

The Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: Intermediate Scrutiny or
Rational Basis Review?

There are two other important questions that the Third Circuit did
not address, but which will likely be important in future cases on
psychotherapy regulation or other regulation of occupational speech-at
least if such cases follow the Third Circuit's lead (as this Article argues
they should) and apply R.A. V
One question is what kind of options should exist in the choice of
scrutiny that R.A. V instructs courts to make. In King, the Third Circuit
decided that such a choice was a choice between intermediate and strict
scrutiny: When government's purpose in regulating talk therapy was
simply to impose on such conversations the ideology of its choice, its
regulation would be subject to strict scrutiny (and likely be held
unconstitutional).` 0 When government's purpose is instead to "protect[]
its citizens from ineffective or harmful professional services,"' its
regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny.' 52 This kind of two-track

146. See Int'l Women's Day, 619 F.3d at 354, 359, 369 (citing Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (holding that time, place, and manner permitting requirements
are constitutional, but if content-based, they are subject to strict scrutiny)).
147. Id. at 354.
148. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2014).
149. Id. at 237.
150. Id. at 235.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 234-35 (applying intennediate scrutiny).
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option, between strict and intermediate scrutiny, is certainly one choice
of scrutiny scenario that arises in the First Amendment context. As
mentioned above, this choice is built into the black letter tests the court
applies to speech restrictions that are purportedly content-neutral.153
However, in other cases, the choice of scrutiny that R.A. V asks
courts to make in First Amendment cases is not a choice between strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, but rather between strict scrutiny and
rational basis review. In other words, where the government's purposes
in speech regulation are of the right kind, the court's skepticism toward
that regulation drops not merely to an intermediate level-where the
government measure might survive a somewhat skeptical judicial
evaluation-but to minimal scrutiny or rational basis, where the
government's regulation is virtually guaranteed to be found
constitutional. Consider, for example, how the Court analyzes a situation
where government targets speech that constitutes a "true threat"-that is,
a "statement[] where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."l 54 So long as the
government's interest in targeting such a true threat is an interest
of the right kind-so long as the government is restricting such a
threat in order to prevent the violent intimidation inherent in it'"-then
its restriction will be constitutional as long as it has a rational
basis."' The government will not need to show-as it would
under intermediate scrutiny-that its ban on true threats is narrowly
tailored to the achievement of a substantial or significant interest.'
This may be, in part, because the Court treats the interest in preventing
such intimidation as inherently significant. But, in any event, it does
not require government to make the showings normally required under
intermediate scrutiny.
The two possible levels of scrutiny in this case, therefore, are
rational basis review (for situations where the government is genuinely
focused on protecting against intimidation) and strict scrutiny (for
situations where the government is using its power of restricting true
threats as a pretext for ideological suppression of particular views). A
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
155. Id. at 359-60 (stating that true threats laws are permissible because the state's interest in
protecting "prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' and 'from
the disruption that fear engenders').
156. See Christopher P. Guzelian, False Speech: Quagmire?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 19, 55
(2014) (noting that unprotected categories of speech can be punished if "the sanctioning law
survives rational basis review").
157. See Black, 538 U.S. at 358-60.
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court, in other words, will either adopt an extraordinarily skeptical view
about the constitutionality of the government's speech measure orwhere the government has the right kind of purpose-take a highly
deferential stance. There is no middle-ground level of intermediate
scrutiny needed here.
One might likewise argue that, when a government's professional
regulation has the appropriate kind of purpose (as is demanded by
R.A. V) and can thus escape from the nearly impossible challenge of
having to satisfy strict scrutiny, professional regulators should then be
subject only to rational basis review. Indeed, one might argue that so
long as government regulators of occupational speech can show-to the
court's satisfaction-that they are not aiming at ideological suppression,
then they need (and deserve) the extensive leeway and high-level of
deference that comes with rational basis review. As Robert Post points
out, a constitutional framework or theory that "immediately converts
every effort to regulate professional practice into a constitutional
question is surely suspect [since] professional practices are subject to
many regulations, like ordinary malpractice law, that do not" raise First
Amendment questions."' As the Ninth Circuit similarly emphasized in
its analysis of psychotherapy in Pickup, "doctors are routinely held
liable for giving negligent medical advice to their patients, without
serious suggestion that the First Amendment protects their right to give
advice that is not consistent with the accepted standard of care."'5 9 A
framework that subjects most occupational speech to rational basis
review-except when there are "red flags" indicating that the
professional regulation is really ideological suppression in disguisemight avoid destabilizing existing professional regulatory regimes.
However, there are at least some kinds of occupational speech
regulations-and I will discuss them more specifically belOW1 6 0 -that
should be subject to the tougher test of intermediate scrutiny, and I argue
that restrictions of psychotherapy must often be among them. When even
a justifiable restriction (that is, one aimed at protecting our health or
other interests the government has responsibility for protecting)
inevitably does collateral damage to core First Amendment interests and
might well do so in circumstances where government interests are not
substantial enough to justify damage, then courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny to assure this damage is not significantly greater
than it has to be. This, for example, is perhaps why courts apply

158.
159.
160.

PosT, supra note 63, at 51.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2014).
See infra Parts IL.A, IV.E.
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intermediate scrutiny, and not rational basis review, to content-neutral
restrictions, such as laws designed to assure the free flow of traffic. A
content-neutral requirement that protestors obtain a permit before using
a park for a protest does not merit strict scrutiny because it is not aimed
at silencing the protest; rather, it is simply assuring that the park can also
be used by other speakers (or visitors) for other purposes at other
times.' 6 1 However, a regulation that limits these protestors' speech far
more than necessary is likely to do unnecessary damage to a core First
Amendment interest (in this case, engaging in political speech) and
should thus be subject to intermediate scrutiny.1 62 Below, this Article
argues that restrictions on psychotherapy should generally be subject to
intermediate scrutiny for the same reason. Government restriction on
what people can say to their therapists (and what their therapists can say
to them) undercuts individuals' interests in forming their own beliefs and
values free from government interference.16 3
D. Deference or Skepticism for the Government's
Account of a Law's Purposes
There is another question that this type of analysis raises: I
said earlier that R.A. V.'s choice of scrutiny tells courts to apply a level
of scrutiny that matches where officials are aiming their regulatory
power.'" But how is a court to tell where officials are aiming
their power? Do they look solely at a statute's or regulation's text?
Or, can they engage in more probing inquiry of what motives caused
the legislature to enact that text, or cause regulators to apply it in
a certain manner?
The Court itself has long taken the position that the focus should be
on a statute's text and design and not on the unstated purposes that may
have motivated its passage. In O'Brien, it insisted that when a
government statute had a stated purpose unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, the Court would likely take the government at its word:
"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law," it said, "that this Court
will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive."' The Court added that "[i]nquiries
into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."'

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-99 (1984).
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
See infra Parts I.A, I.E.
See text accompanying note 94.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383.
Id.
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That said, it is not clear that this entirely rules out a concern about
Congress's underlying purposes. As Justice Kagan has argued, the
distinction between an inquiry focused on statutory text (and operation)
and one focused on purpose may not be as stark as it at first appears. She
argues that "notwithstanding the Court's protestations in O'Brien," the
Court's First Amendment doctrine is often focused on "the discovery of
improper governmental motives" "-and that this focus best explains its
reasoning in R.A. V1 68 But, she argues courts generally "discover
improper purpose directly": they use "prox[ies]" that involve applying
certain doctrinal tests (like a strong presumption against content
discrimination) to a statute's text and design.1 69
In any event, whether a court looks only at statutory text and
operation, or also tries to ferret out hidden purposes, there is also a
question of how readily should courts defer to the government's
characterization of the interests that underlie the text (or that motivated it
to enact that text). For example, when New Jersey, California, or another
state assures a court that its ban on a certain kind of psychotherapy has
to do with harm it causes to clients relying upon it, and not simply
dislike for the ideas conveyed by it, how skeptical should courts be of
such government claims? Should courts strongly defer the legislature's
claims that its targeting of a certain type of therapy has a valid basis? Or
should it instead give legislators' explanations a hard look and perhaps
decide that legislators' claims that they are tackling a serious health or
safety risk may just be a pretext for ideological suppression?
In O'Brien, the Court seemed quite deferential to the government's
insistence that a statute which penalized the burning of draft registration
cards-and only draft registration cards-had a legitimate purpose. It
showed such deference even though Congress enacted the statute
realizing that the Vietnam War protesters were burning draft cards to
express protest.
In its 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, by contrast, the Court
was far from willing to take the Vermont legislature's claims of its
statutory purpose at face value.1 70 Vermont had barred pharmacies or
data mining companies from selling or disclosing certain information to
drug marketers.' Although it claimed that this ban on sharing
prescription information with drug companies was imposed to protect
167.

See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in

FirstAmendment Doctrine,63 U. Cm. L. REv. 413,414 (1996).
168. Id. at 422-23.
169. Id. at 458.
170. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2662-65, 2672 (2011).
171. Id. at 2660-61.
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patient and doctor privacy, the Court found this explanation dubious.1 72
For one thing, Vermont had itself claimed-in the law's text-that its
purpose was not solely to protect patient and doctor privacy but also to
counter "hasty and excessive reliance on brand-name drugs" instead of
generic alternatives (the use of which would bring down overall
healthcare costs).1 73 For another, the law's design seemed to undermine
lawmakers' claims that it was largely geared toward protecting privacy;
although it kept sensitive medical information out of the hands of drug
marketers, it left precisely the same sensitive medical information
available to many others who might want to sift through it (academic
researchers, for example). Its evident purpose-according to the Courtwas thus not to pass an even-handed data protection law, but rather to
keep prescription data from being used in drug companies' marketing
efforts. 7 4 As a consequence, the Court said the Vermont law merited
"heightened scrutiny" and not the lower, intermediate level of scrutiny
that applies to commercial regulations that target "a risk of fraud," or
have some other appropriate basis for regulating commercial speech."'
The Court, to be sure, avoided an intensive search for unstated
motives. As in O'Brien, it focused on the statute's text and operation. It
examined what kind of speech about pharmaceuticals it burdened and
what kind of speech it left unrestricted. But, in doing so, it was far from
willing to simply accept Vermont's claim that the speech restriction
furthered a valid privacy protection interest.
It is not entirely clear which of these possible stances on deference
the Third Circuit viewed itself as taking when applying R.A. V On one
hand, it took little time to conclude that New Jersey's purpose was to
protect minors from a serious danger in SOCE therapy-suggesting that
it heavily deferred to New Jersey's insistence that its law was aimed at
preventing mental health harm, not as using its coercive power to take
sides (and force psychotherapists to take the state's side) in ideological
debates.' 76 On the other hand, there was evidence available to the court
that seemed to corroborate New Jersey's claim that the mental health of
minors was at stake: The psychological and medical organizations that
New Jersey had relied upon, for example, had condemned SOCE therapy
with unusual "urgency and solidarity," and the American Psychological
Association ("APA") had cited evidence of potential harms. 77
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2659-61, 2669-70.
Id. at 2661, 2670.
Id at 2662-63, 2670-71.
Id. at 2667-68, 2672.
King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 221-22, 236-40 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 238.
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In any event, should courts continue to apply R.A. V to occupational
speech going forward-and insist that government restriction of therapy
be genuinely focused on protecting against "ineffective or harmful"
therapy-they will have to decide how much skepticism they will
bring to government's predictable assurances that its interests are
of the right kind. And there are at least three principles suggested by
R.A. V., or the cases applying it, that can serve as starting points for
guiding such an analysis.
First, courts should not be willing to set aside strict scrutiny at all
unless it is clear that there is some kind of speech harm at stake-some
kind of impact the speech has on the outward realm of the state that
justifies state interference in speech of a kind normally unacceptable
under the First Amendment."' In the case of commercial speech, for
example, the Court has said this is a "risk of fraud" or some other
harm to consumers that the court has recognized as a basis for
commercial speech regulation. 9 In the realm of occupational speech, I
argue below it is the damage that can result when incompetence or
dishonesty undermines the reliance that individuals place in their mental
health treatment provider, or their doctor, lawyer, or accountant. 80 On
the other hand, in some occupational speech relationships-for example,
when individuals hire a graphic designer-such threats to health and
safety are minimal.
Second, where reliance interests are at stake, courts should likely
defer to professional regulations that are generated by institutions, which
they have good reason to believe understand and act in accordance with
the relevant professional norms.'s' For example, state legislatures
typically authorize a Psychology Board to license practicing
psychologists, and set forth standards of professional conduct that,
among other things, often subject licensed psychologists to the APA's
Code of Ethics.'8 2 It would be odd for a professional board to be subject
to a plausible First Amendment challenge if it sought to discipline a
psychologist, for example, for treating a child without the consent of one
of the parents, or for failing to provide "competent diagnosis,
counseling, [or] treatment... in keeping with the usual and customary
practice in this State." 8 3 Thus, the typical conduct of such a board in

178. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
179. Id. at 388-89.
180. See infra Parts HI-IV.
181. E.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir. 2014); see R.A. V., 505 U.S. at
387-89.
182. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.15 (2014).
183. Id. § 90-270.15(15).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/8

32

Blitz: Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy

2016]

FREE SPEECH, OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

713

regulating the speech of professionals subject to it should be strongly
presumed to be consistent with the purpose of safeguarding the client's
interests at stake in a professional regulation. Paul Horwitz suggests that
the actions that a profession takes with respect to its own members
should-where they involve speech restrictions-typically be viewed
through the lens of what he calls "the institutional First Amendment."1 8 4
In his view, when certain institutions play a key role in the ecology of
public discourse-institutions such as newspapers, libraries, universities,
and churches-they should receive significant deference from
courts with respect to the speech that occurs within their boundaries."'
Professional speech, suggests Horwitz, also likely fits this description.
This should probably matter a great deal to how courts apply RA. V
in assessing whether a professional regulation serves the health, safety,
or other interest that makes such a restriction of speech content
permissible under the First Amendment.' 8 6 In other words, where
government regulations of professional speech are promulgated
by professional communities themselves, this should provide a sort
of safe harbor. Such a safe harbor makes less sense, however,
if a professional body's judgments represent one view among many
conflicting views held by the relevant type of expert, rather than
representing a consensus within the profession.
Third, even where a safe harbor does apply, it should only provide a
presumption of a legitimate purpose. This presumption should be set
aside when there exist, what Mark and Nat Joseph Stern describe in the
commercial speech context as, "facial indicia of aims" other than
protecting consumer or client interests-indicia that "official
suppression of ideas is afoot."' One such indication is discussed by the
Court in Sorrell: When a regulation of commercial speech seems
strangely selective-when it targets not all speech that raises a risk of
privacy harm, for example, but only that portion of it that takes a
disfavored position in a public debate-there is reason to suspect that the
government is using its commercial speech power not to protect
consumers, but rather to silence "disfavored speakers" in order to move
public discussion in the state's "preferred direction."' The same kind of
problem may arise in psychotherapy. Imagine that a state bars
psychotherapists from using a controversial therapy technique unless it
184. HORWITZ, supra note 97, at 125-26, 248-49.
18 5. Id.
186. Id. at 248-49.
187. Nat Stem & Mark Joseph Stem, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for
Content-BasedCommercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REv. 1171, 1188 (2013).
188. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2662-63 (2011).
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has been shown, by certain kinds of studies, to be effective. But, the
same state makes no effort to ban other, less controversial therapy
techniques for which there is a similar lack of empirical support. In such
a situation, the state should at least be expected by courts to explain why
it is targeting only talk therapy with a certain content.
III.

ANALOGIZING TALK THERAPY TO MEDICAL TREATMENT

There is, to be sure, a simpler way for courts to reconcile the two
seemingly conflicting imperatives in therapy regulation that I discussed
earlier: (1) honoring the First Amendment requirement of keeping the
government out of the way we shape our psyches with words; while (2)
letting it into medical decisions that carry significant health risks-that
is, to make one side of this tension disappear. In a sense, this is what the
Ninth Circuit did in Pickup. We do not need to worry, the court
concluded, that in restricting what is said in talk therapy, government
will be unconstitutionally restricting First Amendment speech because
what is said in talk therapy simply is not "speech" of the kind the First
Amendment protects. It is professional "conduct."'" The words spoken
in a therapist's office are simply vehicles for medical treatment, not for
the exchange of ideas. So, like any other form of professional conduct, it
can be restricted by the state as long as the restriction can overcome the
very low hurdle of rational basis review-that is, as long as it was
rationally related to a legitimate government objective.' 90 Intermediate
scrutiny of the kind later applied by the Third Circuit has no place. Nor,
the Ninth Circuit seemed to assume, is there any need to check (before
applying rational basis rather than heightened scrutiny) whether the
government's interests or purposes in regulating therapy are interests or
purposes of the right kind-as R.A. V. requires when the government
tackles certain kinds of speech harms."' The harms regulated by the
government restrictions of talk therapy are not, in the Ninth Circuit's
view, harms that arise from, or are related to, communication of ideas.
They are harms threatened by a certain kind of professional conductnamely, fraudulent or incompetent medical treatment-and so, rational
basis review is the appropriate level of scrutiny regardless of the
government's purposes or interests.' 92 It is thus helpful to look more
closely at the Ninth Circuit's position to see if it presents a plausible
alternative path.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223-32 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1225-26.
Id. at 1228-31.
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Psychotherapy Licensing and Sexual OrientationChange Efforts

In the past two years, the most prominent decisions on
psychotherapy have dealt with SOCE.'9 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Pickup, for example, addressed this question. But over a decade earlier,
the Ninth Circuit first asked if talk therapy was speech in a 2000 case on
California's licensing requirements for those who wished to practice
"psychology" and hold themselves out as "psychologists."l9 4 The case
dealt with California's Business and Professions Code provision
specifying that any person can qualify for a license in California only if
they have obtained "a doctorate, or a degree deemed equivalent, in
psychology or a related field such as educational psychology.""9 s The
Code also required all applicants to have "at least two years of
supervised professional experience under the direction of a licensed
psychologist."l96 In NAAP v. California Board of Psychology, three
individuals challenged the constitutionality of these requirements. 1 7
Two had only master's degrees in psychology, along with other
certificates or clinical training experiences of other kinds.' 9 Another
was a physician who had obtained psychological training at an institute
that did not award doctorate degrees.'" They were joined in this
challenge by the National Association for the Advancement of
Psychoanalysis ("NAAP"), a professional organization, which claimed
that California's licensing laws unreasonably burdened its members'
opportunity to offer, and clients' right to receive, psychotherapy.20 0
In NAAP, the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty finding the
California licensing requirement constitutional.20 ' Before turning to the
plaintiffs' free speech challenge to the licensing requirements, it
addressed a different constitutional argument of the plaintiffs based on
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that individuals will not be
deprived of liberty without "due process of law." 202 This clause bars the
government from imposing certain kinds of restrictions on individual
autonomy. Officials may not interfere in certain "personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
193. Id. at 1215 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
194. Nat'I Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2000).
195. Id. at 1047.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1046.
198. Id at 1048.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1056.
202. Id. at 1049-50.
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child rearing, and education."203 For example, as the Court stated in
Griswold v. Connecticut, the state generally does not belong in the
"sacred precincts of marital bedrooms."20 4 Such a sphere of "intimate
conduct," as the Court later said in Lawrence v. Texas, is one of the
spheres where the Constitution prevents the state from being a
"dominant presence." 205
If the state generally has little say in what citizens may do in their
bedrooms, why should it have substantially more say over how they
choose to shape their thoughts and feelings? 206 The Ninth Circuit's reply
in NAAP was brief. The psychotherapist's professional relationship with
her client, it said, is quite different from the "close knit" relationships
sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.20 7 It is
not akin to marriage or another family relationship that the state has no
role in micromanaging. It is a business and professional relationship of
the kind that states have long had authority to closely regulate.2 08
Although my focus here is on First Amendment free speech rights
rather than Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, it is worth briefly
noting that this answer is at best incomplete. Our due process rights not
only protect our entry into intimate relationships-theyprotect our right
to engage in "certain intimate conduct." 20 9 This intimate conduct often
occurs in close-knit relationships. But, at least some of it may occur in
(and require access to) professional relationships with people outside of
one's circle of friends and families. The constitutional right to terminate
a pregnancy, as one district court opinion recently stressed, cannot be
exercised "without a medical professional." 2 10 In this respect, due
process rights mirror rights in other constitutional amendments. In the
same opinion, the court noted that "[t]he right to keep and bear arms
means little if there is no one from whom to acquire the handgun or
ammunition."2 1 1 The right to exercise free speech on the Internet would
likely suffer significantly if government could restrict what services

203. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).
204. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
205. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
206. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (recognizing a federal psychotherapistpatient privilege and observing that "[e]ffective psychotherapy .. .depends on an atmosphere of
confidence and trust," allowing for "frank and complete disclosure of facts" about
"sensitive ... problems").
207. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000).
208. Id at 1050-52.
209. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
210. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1379 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
211. Id.
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customers can purchase from web designers or blogging platforms. 2 12 A
constitutional liberty thus does not vanish as soon as the person
exercising it recruits the help of a business or professional. The Court
has said that the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the Bill of
Rights secure, against government interference, a space for autonomy of
the self.2 13 If this autonomy of self includes a right to understand or alter
that self, our exercise of such conduct may be shielded against state
interference even when we do so with the help of a psychologist rather
than relying on private reflection or on conversations with friends and
family. This suggests that NAAP's due process analysis, which the Ninth
Circuit cited and endorsed again in 2013, is at the very least insufficient.
The other constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs to
California's licensing requirement was a First Amendment challengeand this one gave the Ninth Circuit more pause in upholding California's
law.214 On one hand, it said that although talk therapy involves speech,
this does not mean that government restriction of it will typically raise a
First Amendment problem. 2 15 Rather, it observed that one can find
"some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes,"216 but that cannot plausibly mean that a person moves
through life with a First Amendment shield around her every action.217
Where, as in talk therapy, speech is a vehicle not for communication of
ideas, but rather for the "treatment of emotional suffering and
depression," the First Amendment does not place it beyond the state's
211
regulatory power.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit also noted that
communications between a psychotherapist and a client do receive
"some constitutional protection" under the First Amendment. 2 19 The
court was not entirely clear about the nature of such free speech
protection for therapy. But, it seemed to suggest that government
regulators might well run afoul of First Amendment requirements when
212. See Jack Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REv. 2296,
2297 (2014) (noting that government can exercise control over First Amendment speech by
controlling "web-hosting services" and numerous other aspects of the "digital infrastructure that
people use to communicate").
213. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
214. Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d
1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).
215. Id. at 1054.
216. Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).
217. Id. at 1054.
218. Id
219. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459
(1978)); see also id (stating that "[t]he communication that occurs during psychoanalysis is entitled
to constitutional protection").
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they go beyond establishing safety-minded entry and ethics requirements
for therapists, and attempt to micromanage the content of therapists'
conversations with clients.220 California's licensing requirements,
stressed the court, "do not dictate what can be said between
psychologists and patients during treatment."2 21 Nothing, the court
insisted, suggests that psychotherapists' communications were being
"suppressed" by California "based on [their] message" or because of
officials' "disagreement with [any] psychoanalytical theories."222 Rather,
these licensing requirements were content-neutral attempts to assure
"public health, safety, and welfare," not attempts to target certain
disfavored schools of thought within psychotherapy.223
This guidance for analyzing psychotherapy restrictions, however,
seems incomplete. 224 The licensing requirements in NAAP were arguably
content-neutral, but state regulation of professional conduct designed to
protect health and safety may well be content-based. If a malpractice law
penalizes a doctor for giving advice at odds with professional standards,
such a penalty is based on the content of the ideas that the doctor
expresses and the lack of agreement between these ideas and the views
of the medical establishment. One way to make room for such contentbased restriction would be for the Ninth Circuit to replace its own
suggested First Amendment intermediate scrutiny with that later adopted
by the Third Circuit. Instead of implausibly insisting that officials
always avoid targeting talk therapy's content, even when that content
raises dangers to health and safety, it could (as the Third Circuit later
did) permit the state to target such harmful content, but only in ways that
target what makes it harmful to health, safety, or financial welfare, and
not in ways that target ideas the state simply finds objectionable.225 This
is, as the Third Circuit noted, a form of intermediate scrutiny (and also
an inquiry of the kind made in R.A. V).226 But, it does not demand
complete content-neutrality. Rather, like the intermediate scrutiny
applied to commercial speech, it permits some content-based restriction
of speech (namely, that aimed at a substantial government interest, such
as health and safety protection) while forbidding restriction.22 7
This was not, however, the approach that the Ninth Circuit took in
clarifying NAAP's framework. It returned to the question of talk
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id at 1055-56.
Id at 1056.
Id. at 1055-56.
King v. Governor ofN.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 234.
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therapy's First Amendment status thirteen years later in Pickup. In
finding that California's bill banning SOCE therapy for minors did not
violate the First Amendment rights of therapists or their clients, the
Ninth Circuit softened its earlier suggestion that state regulation of
psychotherapy treatment itself must remain scrupulously content neutral
and entirely avoid restricting "what can be said between psychologists
and patients."228 NAAP's strict warning against this kind of government
speech restriction, it said, applies only to a therapist's communications
about psychotherapy, not speech that was an integral part of talk therapy
treatment itself.229 The latter kind of treatment constituting speech is
medical conduct. So, like any other form of professional conduct, it can
be restricted by the state as long as the restriction can overcome the very
low hurdle of rational basis review-that is, as long as it is rationally
related to a legitimate government objective.230
The Ninth Circuit's position, however, is both problematic and
ambivalent. It is problematic because it seems to cut against the strong
intuition (discussed earlier)23 1 that government would be acting at odds
with important First Amendment values if-for ideological reasons-it
barred therapists from taking certain approaches or drawing upon certain
theories. Whatever shortcomings it may have had, the Ninth Circuit's
discussion in NAAP took note of this concern: The First Amendment, it
assumed, would stand in the way of officials who censored therapy
because of their disdain for its message or because of their
"disagreement with any psychoanalytical theories" underlying it.2 3 2 Its
discussion in Pickup, by contrast, seemed to dramatically lower the
barriers against such an ideological attack on talk therapy-at least when
such an attack was aimed at talk therapy itself and not at conversations
describing it.
Perhaps for this reason, some discomfort with the implications of
rational basis review is evident even in Pickup itself. The opinion oddly
suggests that rational basis review might-in this context-be tougher
than it usually is.233 For example, in a footnote, the court emphasized:

228. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nat'1 Ass'n for
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)).
229. Id. at 1231 (noting that a regulation of "only treatment itself' should not be deemed to be
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's earlier suggestion that the state may not restrict what can be
said between psychologists and patients).
230. Id.
231. See supratext accompanying notes 33-41.
232. Nat'I Ass'nfor Advancement ofPsychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1056.
233. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1232 n.8.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

720

[Vol. 44:681

We need not and do not decide whether the legislature would have
acted rationally had it banned SOCE for adults. One could argue that
children under the age of 18 are especially vulnerable with respect to
sexual identity and that their parents' judgment may be clouded by this
emotionally charged issue as well. The considerations with respect to
adults may be different. 234
This language suggests that a therapy restriction may fail rational
basis if-unlike that of California-it bars SOCE for all therapy clients
and not just clients who are minors. This is odd for a number of reasons.
First, as Robert Post has pointed out, rational basis review is such "a
deferential standard of review" that it "grant[s] the political system
virtually unchecked discretion to" restrict occupational speech.'
In warning that government may perhaps hit a constitutional roadblock
in extending its SOCE therapy ban to adults, the Ninth Circuit thus
seemed to strangely suggest that there are somehow meaningful
checks on the discretion that rational basis review typically leaves
"virtually unchecked." 23 6
Second, there is another reason it is hard to see how a state
legislature could possibly flunk rational basis review if it extended its

ban on SOCE therapy to adults. The 2009 APA Report that California
and New Jersey heavily relied upon in banning SOCE therapy for
minors would almost certainly provide just as strong a basis for
forbidding it for adults. That is because the 2009 APA Report's evidence
of harm and ineffectiveness came primarily from studies of how adult
clients fared in that therapy.237
The Ninth Circuit also took pains, at the beginning of its discussion,
to emphasize just how limited California's restriction of SOCE was. The
court said, "[i]mportantly," the restriction not only allowed therapists to
continue talking with minors and parents about this banned therapy-it
also left "mental health providers" free to continue "administering
SOCE to any person who is 18 years of age or older," allowed
unlicensed counselors, such as religious counselors, to continue
providing SOCE even to minors and allowed psychotherapists to steer
interested minors (or their families) to these unlicensed counselors or to
other states for SOCE treatment.2 38 It is unclear why, if the government
needed to satisfy only rational basis review, it was also "importan[t]" to

234. Id.
235.

Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled

PhysicianSpeech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 986 (2007).
236. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1232 n.8; Post, supranote 235, at 986.
237. 2009 APA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3,44-45.
238. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1223.
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the Ninth Circuit's decision that the restriction at issue left adults, and
even minors in some circumstances, with opportunities to continue
finding and using SOCE therapy.
This suggests that, although the Ninth Circuit insisted it was
applying rational basis review, it may have wanted to warn state
legislators and regulators that a different, more all-encompassing talk
therapy restriction may not receive as generous a reception from the
judiciary-and the rational basis review that applies to such restrictions
on what therapists and clients discuss during treatment may be a
tougher-than-ordinary form of rational basis review. It may, much like
intermediate scrutiny, filter out restrictions on therapy that are based on
the wrong kinds of government interests, like ideological disagreements
with psychotherapy theories that have already won acceptance among a
large number of practitioners.
There is another problematic feature of the Ninth Circuit's
argument for applying rational basis review to talk therapy restrictionsnot just that it applied this standard, but how it justified doing so. The
court said therapist-client speech was not First Amendment speech
because it was "therapeutic, not symbolic."2 39 And, an act that
"'symbolizes nothing,' even if employing language, is not 'an act of
communication' and, thus, is not protected by free speech law.240
The claim that communications in talk therapy so not symbolize
anything is a puzzling one, and it is implausible to understand the Ninth
Circuit as taking the position that comments made by a therapist have no
meaning. Consider the following example of a therapist-client exchange
from one guide to cognitive behavioral therapy:
Therapist: "So, Pamela, how have you been feeling this week?"
Pamela: "Just really sad . .. as usual. It seems like I'm always

feeling that way."
Therapist: "Did anything in particular trigger this sad feeling this
weekend?"
Pamela: "Yes, I had to go to my cousin's wedding, and it was
really difficult because I started thinking about how I will
never get married."
Therapist: "Pamela, that's what we call an automatic thought. It's
something that just pops into our heads over and over again
without our really thinking about it or examining the truth of
the thought. It affects the way we feel and act in a negative
239.
240.

Id. at 1230.
Id.
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way. Maybe we should look at some of your automatic
thoughts a little closer."
Therapist: "So, let's write down this automatic thought that you
are having. 'I will never get married.' Your going to your
cousin's wedding was the situation that triggered the thought,
'I will never get married."'
Pamela: "Yes, that's true."
Therapist: "When you were at the wedding and that thought came
to you, how did you feel?"
Pamela: "I felt really sad and hopeless."
Therapist: "So, can you see how our thoughts can affect our mood
and change the way we are feeling?"
Pamela: "Yeah, I guess if I hadn't had that thought, I wouldn't
have felt so bad." 241
In a sense, of course, this communicative exchange is all part of the
cognitive-behavioral treatment provided by the therapist. The therapist
and the client's expectations are that, as they jointly discuss and analyze
the client's thoughts, they will empower her to develop a greater
awareness of how these thoughts (and the feelings accompanying them)
come into being and how to change them. On the other hand,
the discussion of automatic thoughts surely informs the patient,
both about the nature of the therapy that she is undergoing
and also about the nature of her depression. It does so by
using words to symbolize certain aspects of the world-such as,
thoughts, feelings, and the events that trigger these thoughts (such as, the
wedding Pamela attended). So, while the speech is therapeutic, it is
simultaneously symbolic. Moreover, in this case, the therapist's
speech also communicates a message (that automatic thoughts occur
and can be irrational)-a message that would be thwarted by a
government restriction that targeted this type of exchange or, more
broadly, that barred cognitive-behavioral therapy altogether.
We can sharpen this objection by borrowing a part of the Third
Circuit's argument for intermediate scrutiny. In the course of that
argument, the Third Circuit offered the following analogy to explain
why, in its view, talk therapy is First Amendment speech:
Consider a sophomore psychology major who tells a fellow student
that he can reduce same-sex attractions by avoiding effeminate
behaviors and developing a closer relationship with his father. Surely

241. JEFFREY A. CULLY & ANDRA L. TETEN, A THERAPIST'S GUIDE TO BRIEF COGNITIVE
BEHAVIORAL THERAPY 46 (2008).
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this advice is not "conduct" merely because it seeks to apply
"principles" the sophomore recently learned in a behavioral
psychology course. Yet it would be strange indeed to conclude that the
same words, spoken with the same intent, somehow become "conduct"
when the speaker is a licensed counselor. That the counselor is
speaking as a licensed professional may affect the level of First
Amendment protection her speech enjoys, but this fact does not
transmogrify her words into "conduct." 242
Why do the same words that clearly are symbolic-and do receive
First Amendment protection-when spoken by a friend cease to be
symbolic when spoken by a therapist? The most plausible way to read
the Ninth Circuit's statement that the words are "therapeutic rather than
symbolic" is not that the words are inherently without meaning, but
rather that they perform a function different from words that merely
communicate ideas.
B.

Talk Therapy as the FunctionalEquivalentof Conduct

The answer on which the Ninth Circuit appears to place the most
weight is that, although talk therapy takes the form of speech, it is
actually the functional equivalent of prescribing or administering a drug
to a patient. 243 A doctor administering medication to a patient is not, in
doing so, communicating with that patient. She is not offering ideas or
suggestions to the patient which the patient is free to accept or reject.
She is, rather, directing the patient to ingest chemicals that will
predictably transform the patient's physiological functioning in certain
ways. Even if the patient refuses to believe the medicine will work, the
medicine will nonetheless have physiological effects: Antibiotics will
kill harmful bacteria inside the patient's body, for example, regardless of
what the patient thinks about the treatment.
Talk therapy, one might argue, is similar. It changes a therapy
client's brain functioning not simply by communicating ideas and
suggestions, but often by imposing changes on her that she does not
even realize are occurring. The Ninth Circuit made an argument akin to
this. It compared a psychotherapist's use of talk therapy to a doctor's
prescription of a drug. 2 " In doing so, it drew upon its earlier decision in
Conant v. Walter.245 In Conant, the federal government argued that,
since it had the power to punish the use, or prescription, of marijuana,
242.
243.
244.
245.

King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2014).
See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229.
Id.
309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
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even for medical purposes, it also had the power to punish a doctor for
advising a patient that its use would, in the doctor's medical judgment,
be beneficial.2 46 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed. It found that the
government's attempt to control the discussion between the doctor and
her patient "strike[s] at core First Amendment interests of doctors and
patients."2 47 The court said, "[a]n integral component of the practice of
medicine is the communication between a doctor and a patient.
Physicians must be able to speak frankly and openly to patients." 2 48
Recounting this defense of physician speech in Pickup, it then
emphasized that its argument in Conant did not give the doctor a First
Amendment right to prescribe medical marijuana to the patient (given
that doing so was illegal).2 49 The First Amendment right there was a
right to talk about a medicine or drug-not to prescribe or administer it.
Similarly, the court said in Pickup, a psychotherapist has a First
Amendment right to talk about therapeutic treatment, not to administer
it.250 The latter is like prescribing or administering a drug, an act which
does not merely confer information to the person receiving it, but causes
changes in her physiology or psyche that would otherwise not occur.251
As Judge O'Scannlain pointed out in dissenting from the
Ninth Circuit's refusal to rehear Pickup en banc, the analogy between
a therapist's spoken words and a doctor's written prescription is
a weak one: "[B]y writing a prescription, a physician's words
have an independent legal effect: ordinarily, it entitles the patient to a
controlled chemical substance he otherwise would have no right to
possess." 25 2 What the therapist says in talk therapy has no such
"independent legal effect."
There are, however, at least some considerations that, at first
glance, appear to weigh in favor of the Ninth Circuit's insistence that
psychotherapist speech should be seen as akin to administering
pharmacological or other medical treatment. First, some studies have
found that talk therapy aimed at treating depression often has effects on
the brain similar to those caused by antidepressants or psychiatric
medications.2 53 Moreover, as Neil Levy suggests, some of the statements
246. Id. at 632-34.
247. Id. at 636.
248. Id.
249. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2014).
250. Id. at 1227.
251. Id. at 1229 (analogizing the speech of psychotherapists during treatment to a doctor's
"speak[ing] the words necessary to provide or administer the banned drug" in Conant, 309 F.3d at
637-38).
252. Id at 1219 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
253.

See JOHN E. DOWLING, CREATING MIND: How THE BRAIN WoRKs 59 (1998) (noting that
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a psychotherapist makes to a client in treatment are designed not simply
to convey ideas to the client, but rather to change the patient's mental
operations in more subtle ways-sometimes outside the client's
consciousness. 254 He notes that, "traditional means" of therapy "include
many techniques that are not addressed to the rational agent." 25 5 For
example, in psychodynamic or psychoanalytic therapy, the therapist
often expects that her relationship with a client will produce an intense
form of "transference" whereby the feelings that the client has toward
her parents or other people in life will be unconsciously directed toward
the therapist, where they can be more clearly revealed and analyzed.2 5 6
Even in forms of therapy that do not focus on transference, some argue,
what is crucial is that there be a successful "therapeutic alliance" or
working relationship between therapist and patient wherein both are
committed, and believe in, the technique being used.257 in fact,
according to Bruce Wampold, the existence of such a relationship (and
the joint commitment to a common approach) is more crucial for the
success of therapy then the substance of the particular approach.25 8 One
might argue that what is most significant for the change produced by
therapy is not that the therapist or client exchange certain ideas, but
rather that they form a bond within which any such exchange of
psychological ideas (whether it fits the psychodynamic approach, the
cognitive-behavior approach, or any other approach) will have
therapeutic effects, so long as therapist and client both believe in its
efficacy. The psychotherapist and client's words, then, are significant
not for the ideas they carry, but as a force that bonds them into a certain
kind of goal-oriented partnership.
These features of psychotherapist speech, however, do not, taken
alone, distinguish it from other speech that is clearly protected by the
First Amendment. Our brain functioning, for example, is altered not just
by the speech that occurs during psychological counseling. It is changed
by speech in other contexts. A person's brain wiring is transformed to
some degree, for example, when she becomes fearful of performing for
"[t]here is evidence that psychotherapy can alter brain chemistry" by causing release of
neurotransmitters or neuromodulators); Richard A. Friedman, Like Drugs, Talk Therapy Can
ChangeBrain Chemistry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/27/health/
behavior-like-drugs-talk-therapy-can-change-brain-chemistry.html
(discussing studies showing
"that pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy can produce remarkably similar effects on functional
brain activity").
254. NEIL LEVY, NEUROETHICS: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 69-70, 130 (2007).

255. Id. at 250.
256. LEVENSON, supranote 53, at 23-25.
257. WAMPOLD, supra note 39, at 51-55, 96-99.
258. Id. at 54-55, 95-99.
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an audience of any kind after such a performance is mocked or criticized
by peers.2 59 Indeed, criticism of this kind can leave emotional scars that
have deep and lasting effects on a person's outlook and behavior. But,
that does not mean that such criticism ceases to be speech for First
Amendment purposes.
Likewise, the fact that speech is sometimes calculated to affect
people by appealing to their emotions rather than their rational
understanding does not disqualify such speech from First Amendment
protection. 2 60 Politicians often appeal to people's emotions to win
support. A movie or other work of art (or a video game, for that matter)
will draw audiences (or gamers) in, not by presenting a list of reasons
that they should be interested, but by generating excitement-sometimes
with techniques of which the audience is not fully aware. Such art or
entertainment still counts as First Amendment speech, and still receives
First Amendment protection.261 So, too, will words spoken in the context
of intense friendships or romantic relationships. Indeed, Jerome and
Julia Frank argue that psychotherapists' use of communication is very
similar to that of "rhetoricians" because "both ... rely on the stimulation
of emotions and on what rhetoricians term 'argument' as methods for
transforming meanings,"2 62 and if anything, it is rhetoricians who are
more likely to intentionally generate certain emotions in their audiences
(and are generally more adept at doing so).263
This does not mean that the professional context of the therapeutic
speech is irrelevant. Perhaps there is something that justifies classifying
the mind- or brain-altering speech that occurs in a therapist's office as
"conduct," even if one continues to label as "speech" words with similar
effects outside of that professional relationship. As the Ninth Circuit
emphasized, the Supreme Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., specifically noted that "prohibitions of conduct have 'never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech . . merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of

259. See Kirsten Weir, The Pain of Social Rejection: As Far as the Brain Is Concerned, a
Broken Heart May Not Be So Differentfrom a Broken Arm, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Apr. 2012, at

50,51-53.
260. See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127
HARv. L. REV. 2392, 2422 (2014) (pointing out that argument generally has an emotional dimension
and that "[i]f emotional appeals are manipulative, then all appeals are manipulative").
261. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. PIrr. L.
REV. 519, 548 (1979).
262. JEROME D. FRANK & JULIA B. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 68 (3d ed. 1991).

263.

Id. at 69.
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language."' 2 64 If, for example, a person orders an associate to carry out a
murder-for-hire, he will not be able to rely on the First Amendment to
argue that his order was speech rather than conduct and, thus, insulated
from government penalty.
However, simply citing Giboney, and then noting that speech is part
of "mental health treatment," is not sufficient to justify treating it as
conduct. As Eugene Volokh has argued,265 numerous courts and scholars
have attempted to use Giboney as the springboard for less-than-complete
arguments for excluding certain speech from First Amendment
coverage. Whereas a crime boss's order to commit a murder, or engage
in a bank robbery, is speech that triggers physical violence, the
psychological changes triggered by psychotherapy discussion are similar
to psychological changes triggered by other kinds of speech. We may,
for example, find ourselves transformed-and perhaps even find our
depression or anxiety healed-by reading a book on cognitive
behavioral therapy, or hearing about its insights from a friend, and not
just by learning about and experiencing it in therapy. Those who
encounter it in therapy seem (at least in studies of efficacy) to improve
much more frequently and markedly than those who do not receive
therapy.266 But, none of the courts discussing the First Amendment
status of psychotherapy have explained why the relationship established
in psychotherapy, or the success it tends to generate in improving
people's psychological functioning, should transform the therapists'
speech into non-speech for First Amendment purposes.
The same difficulty plagues the Ninth Circuit's attempt to draw a
clear distinction between speech that constitutes therapeutic treatment
and speech that merely describes such treatment. As Justice O'Scannlain
asked in dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc: "[B]y what
criteria do we distinguish between [psychotherapist] utterances that are
truly 'speech,' on the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand,
somehow 'treatment' or 'conduct'?"2 67 Consider again the model
conversation on automatic thoughts from A Therapist's Guide on Brief
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy268 : On the one hand, this speech (both that
of the therapist and that of the client) is part and parcel of the therapist's
course of treatment. On the other hand, it simultaneously provides
264. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
265. Volokh, supra note 76, at 1311-26.
266. BRUCE E. WAMPOLD & ZAC E. IMEL, THE GREAT PSYCHOTHERAPY DEBATE: THE
EVIDENCE OF WHAT MAKES PSYCHOTHERAPY WORK 82 (2d ed. 2015).

267.

See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215-16 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing

en banc).

268.

See supra text accompanying note 241.
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information to the client about the therapy and what she is supposed to
gain from it: It informs her about automatic thoughts, how they operate,
and the role they play in triggering the client's specific problems.
There are, perhaps, artificial boundary lines that a court might draw
to distinguish psychotherapist speech, on the one hand, from treatment
or conduct, on the other. For example, courts might limit their definition
of psychotherapist "speech" or "recommendations about treatment"
solely to the initial exchange between a therapist and client. The APA's
Ethics Code requires psychotherapists to share certain information with
"clients/patients as early as is feasible in the therapeutic relationship
about the nature and anticipated course of therapy" and provide
"sufficient opportunity for the client/patient to ask questions and receive
answers."269 Psychotherapists are likewise required to discuss and
address the client-patient's questions about "fees, involvement of third
parties, and limit[ations] of [the therapist's] confidentiality."2 70 When
the therapist intends to treat a condition "for which generally recognized
techniques and procedures have not been established, psychologists
inform their client-patients of the developing nature of the treatment, the
potential risks involved, alternative treatments that may be available, and
the voluntary nature of their participation."271 So, courts might find that
the conversations psychotherapists have in this pre-treatment phase of
interaction with the client receive First Amendment protection.
After all, as noted earlier, some writers argue that one of the key
reasons that psychotherapy often has the success it does is that clients
are changed by the relationship they form with a particular therapist and
by the commitment they form, and maintain, to that therapist's particular
approach.27 2 If that is true, then courts might hold that recommendations
about treatment end, and treatment itself begins, when such a
professional relationship is formed and begins to transform the client's
thinking in ways that would be unlikely to occur if the client heard the
same information-for example, about automatic thoughts-outside of
that therapeutic relationship. One might thus treat informed consent as
the last stop in the therapist's and client's path of discussion about
treatment before they leave the First Amendment realm of discourse and
deliberation behind them and enter the realm of medical treatment and
the dangerous or significant consequences it might have for a client's
health and safety.
269. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 10.01(a) (AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 2010).

270. Id.
271. Id. § 10.01(b).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
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The problem with extending such First Amendment protection to
the informed consent process, and only the informed consent process, is
that-in psychotherapy, at least-that is by no means the only part of
talk therapy where dissemination of important knowledge takes place.
Much of what a client learns about the therapeutic process and how she
can use it to transform her thinking, she learns not before the process,
but during it. Consider again the example above, wherein the cognitive
behavioral therapist tells her patient about automatic thoughts and the
importance of pausing to examine them and assess whether they are
rational: Why should a therapist's communication about this aspect of
cognitive behavioral therapy be protected only if covered by the
therapist in obtaining informed consent and in explaining "the nature and
anticipated course of' cognitive-behavioral therapy, but not if the
therapist instead conveys precisely the same information during therapy
itself? As Elyn Saks and Shahrokh Golshan write, many
psychotherapists are of the view that some of the education about the
therapeutic process and what it can achieve can only be effectively
conveyed to a client after therapy begins.2 73 There are reasons to "be
skeptical, for example, about whether, at the beginning of the process,
the patient can really absorb the information about risks and benefits in
any meaningful way."274 Partly for this reason, some therapists adopt a
"process view" on which the practitioner "obtain[s] informed consent
over time," and not simply at the "start of the process."2 75
Such a broader understanding of occupational speech protection is
also consistent with the Court's opinion in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez.276 At issue in Velazquez was the constitutionality of a statute
specifying that, where lawyers received government subsidies to help
clients make arguments for welfare cases, they could not challenge the
constitutionality of U.S. welfare laws (unless they were willing to forego
the subsidies).27 7 The Court struck down this legislation. The
government, it said, may not control "an existing medium of
expression. . . in ways which distort its usual functioning."2 78 It may not
use its financial power to distort the way lawyers craft and generate
arguments, particularly when doing so will force lawyers to say things at
odds with effective lawyering, or prevent them from saying things

273.

SAKS & GOLSHAN, supra note 52, at 28.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at 45-48.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Id. at 536-39.
Id. at 543.
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required in effective lawyering.2 79 Here, the Court was extending First
Amendment protection not merely to the discussion a lawyer has with a
prospective client prior to providing that client with legal services.2 80
Nor was it limiting the First Amendment to the discussion a lawyer has
with a client about the client's options: To sue or not to sue? To use or
avoid using a particular argument in a brief?281 Rather, it held that free
speech law protects lawyers in advancing a legal argument-challenging
a welfare law's constitutionality-in speech that is at the heart of a
litigator's professional conduct, namely the advocacy that occurs in, and
makes a difference to, the outcome of litigation.282
IV.

RELIANCE IN TALK THERAPY AND MEDICINE-AND THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH

A.

ConsideringStrict Scrutiny

Given the problems in the Ninth Circuit's arguments for treating
talk therapy as conduct subject only to rational basis review, one might
suggest that the best response is to give talk therapy the same protection
as other speech. After all, it is up to each person, not government
officials, what moral, spiritual, or practical advice they will seek out
from friends. They should be equally free, one might argue, to choose
among the offerings in the marketplace of ideas generated by experts,
such as psychologists. In seeking a solution to life problems or
emotional confusion, they should be able to seek out Freudian,
psychodynamic advice from psychologists, if they so choose, or
cognitive-behavioral advice if they prefer that.
This is essentially the position taken by Paul Sherman in a recent
essay calling on courts to offer staunch First Amendment protection to
occupational speech.283 The first part of his argument is that, under the
284
Supreme Court's 2001 ruling in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project,

even if one can justify describing talk therapy, or another service offered
by a professional, as "professional conduct," it remains speech for First
Amendment purposes so long as it carries a message from speaker to
listener. 285 As the Court said in Holder, when "the conduct triggering
279. See id. at 543, 545-48.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. See generally Paul Shennan, Commentary,
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183 (2015).
284. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
285. Sherman, supra note 283, at 189-91.
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coverage under [a] statute consists of communicating a message," it
counts as First Amendment "speech." 2 86 The second part of Sherman's
argument is that if government then restricts such speech on the basis of
its message (rather than a content-neutral basis like its decibel level or
location), such coercive silencing of what we can say or hear is
presumptively unconstitutional-it can pass constitutional muster only
in the very rare circumstance that government can overcome strict
scrutiny.2 87 This stance is, in fact, the one taken by a district court that
the Ninth Circuit reversed: Judge William B. Shubb, in a decision by the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, found that
California's SOCE therapy was precisely such a content-based
restriction on therapists' speech, and it was premised on the
government's "disagreement with [certain] psychoanalytical theories,"
and its agreement with others.288 He thus applied strict scrutiny and,
unsurprisingly, found that California's ban could not overcome this
(almost insurmountable) standard.28 9
On this view, the right response to the Third Circuit's "college
sophomore" hypothetical is that when psychotherapists offer
the same advice as a college sophomore, they should receive
the same level of First Amendment protection. And, there is
another observation that supports this claim of a functional equivalence
between psychotherapists' advice, on the one hand, and the advice
of friends and family members, on the other. As Richard Restak
notes, "[fjor centuries," before the rise of modern psychology, "the
[central] treatment for depression was talking to friends."2 9 0 Justice
Scalia likewise noted in his dissent in Jaffee v. Redmond (the case
that established a federal psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege)
that "[flor most of history, men and women have worked out
their difficulties by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best
friends, and bartenders."2 9 1

286. Holder, 561 U.S. at 28; see also Sherman, supro note 283, at 190.
287. Sherman, supra note 283, at 191-93; see United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S.
803, 813 (2000) (noting that content-based restrictions on speech are generally subject to strict
scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest," and "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative").
288. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115-17 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev'd sub nom. Pickup
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014).
289. Id atl117-21.
290.

RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW BRAIN: How THE MODERN AGE IS REWIRING YOUR MIND

121 (2003).
291. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. FirstAmendment Jurisprudenceand OccupationalSpeech
There is, however, a problem with this argument for strict scrutiny.
In the professional marketplace of ideas, certain interests of ours are at
stake that are not at stake in ordinary speech interactions. While citizens
in our constitutional system must be left free to hear and decide for
themselves the merits of various contributions people make to
democratic discourse, they are not similarly left to fend for themselves
when faced with possibly fraudulent or ineffective professional or
commercial services (even when these services involve speech).
Government is charged with protecting individuals from incompetent or
dishonest doctors and psychologists and unsafe or ineffective medicines
and therapies. Given the reliance interests at stake in these professional
interactions, government officials cannot be handcuffed too tightly by
First Amendment law. When we recruit the services of a doctor, we
depend heavily on medical advice we are ill-equipped to question. As
Daniel Halberstam points out:
[We] tend to lack the knowledge to evaluate [our] own medical
condition or to understand fully the various treatment options apart
from their careful presentation by the physician.... Although patients
may get a second opinion, the social practice of seeking treatment from
a physician, or even a second opinion, is not a general unbounded
scholarly investigation, but the placing of trust in, and the recognition
of the authority of, one or more physicians. 292
These considerations provide a possible answer to the Third
Circuit's analogy and challenge. In striking contrast to offerings of
personal wisdom from a college classmate, psychotherapists draw upon
a body of expertise and years of training that college sophomores
generally lack, even when they are psychology majors. In return for the
fee charged by therapists, clients rely on that expertise in a way they
generally do not rely on a friend's suggestions. They can also rely on
therapists to provide something else, apart from such expertise: a series
of professional commitments (such as duty of confidentiality) that is
backed not just by social norms akin to those of friendship or kinship,
but by disciplinary rules and legal penalties. Our reliance on our doctor's
advice is backed not just by our own individual sense of the doctor's
qualifications, but by the reassurance that is provided by professional
monitoring and legal constraints. We do not simply take a doctor's word
that she is a doctor. We rely on our knowledge that she has been vetted
292. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status ofSocial Institutions, 147 U. PENN. L. REv. 771, 845 (1999).
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by the medical profession (in obtaining an M.D. or D.O. degree, and in
training during a residency) and also by the state (in meeting licensing
requirements), and would be subject to professional discipline and legal
penalties if she ignored the profession's standard of care.
Thus, the confidence we place in a physician's words has a
significance for us here not unlike the confidence we place in many nonverbal features of our environment. For example, when we enter an
elevator and let it lift us up twenty floors, we rely on our assumption that
its design and engineering are sound enough to keep us from a
dangerous fall (in part, because its design and engineering meet building
code requirements). Similarly, when we take medicines (or, in other
cases, cease to worry about physical symptoms), we do so in part based
on our reliance upon a doctor's verbal advice-we are staking our
physical welfare (and possibly our lives) on the assumption that the
physician's advice is medically sound and is consistent not just with the
doctor's own best judgment, but with the standards of the medical
profession and the laws that govern it.
The strict scrutiny that protects public debate is thus a poor fit for
expert advice that we rely upon to assure our health. The barrier that
strict scrutiny erects against state interference is too strong. Even if this
allows a patient to sue a doctor for malpractice after the fact,
and only when there was "legally cognizable harm,"293 this would
likely be insufficient for the government to play the role it does in
protecting our reliance interests. Given the harms that can arise
from incompetent or unethical medical practice by a physical or a
mental health professional, we want government to be able to protect us
before those harms arise, and not simply to authorize malpractice suits
when it is too late to stop them.
Proponents of strict scrutiny might respond that such arguments are
not sufficient to deny occupational speech the same high level protection
accorded to other speech. As the Supreme Court made clear in United
States v. Stevens, the categories of content that receive lower
protection-such as fighting words, true threats, obscenity, defamation,
and commercial speech-are part of a small list of exceptions to the
strong default rule that speech may not be restricted on the basis of its
content.2 94 And, as the Court also made clear in that case, neither courts
nor government officials can freely add to that list simply on the ground
that the "social costs" of applying the normal First Amendment default

293. See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
294. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010).
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rule (strict scrutiny) seem too high.295 The list of exceptions must remain
a short and exclusive one if it is not to undermine the First Amendment's
strong prohibition on content-based censorship. Thus, we cannot rule out
strict scrutiny for occupational speech restrictions simply because it
seems to be a poor fit. Rather, under the Court's rule in Stevens, the only
category that can be added to the list of unprotected (or less protected)
content categories is a category that is essentially already there: It is only
when a type of speech has "been historically unprotected, but . . not
yet . .. specifically identified or discussed as such in [free speech] case
law," that its presence on that list may be expressly recognized by courts
(even if they have not done so before).296
But, even given this demanding test for suspending strict scrutiny,
the speech of professionals-if not all of those engaged in an
occupation-seems to meet it. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices have
already made it clear that that professional speech delivered in the
course of professional services to a client receives far less protection
than does speech where reliance interests are absent. In 1945, for
example, the Supreme Court held in Thomas v. Collins that the First
Amendment did not permit Texas to arrest a union organizer for making
a speech to a group of workers on the ground that he lacked the
"organizer's card" required for such activity by state law. 2 97 But, it
indicated that if the organizer's activity consisted not simply of speaking
to a gathering of workers, but went "further" into "collection of funds"
or "securing subscriptions" to join a union, then it would "enter[] a
realm where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may
be imposed." 298 In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson added that the
government must have a "wider range of power over the pursuit of a
calling than over speech-making" to "shiel[d] the public against the
untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible."2 99
In his 1985 concurring opinion in Lowe v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Justice White analyzed the difference between "speechmaking" and "pursuit of a calling" more deeply.3 oo A doctor or lawyer is
staunchly protected when broadcasting his view to the world for anyone
to consider (and possibly reject), because constraints on such
communication are "regulation[s] of speaking and publishing as

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 518, 532-34 (1945).
298. Id. at 540.
299. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
300. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 231-33 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Thomas, 323
U.S. at 545.
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such." 30 1 But, the First Amendment applies with much less force, said
Justice White, where a professional "takes the affairs of a client
personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
client in the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances."302
This distinction has continued to serve as the starting point for other
professional speech cases.303
Sherman suggests that it is only a subset of occupational speech
regulation-namely, laws establishing punishing medical, legal, or
perhaps other professional malpractice-that might satisfy "the
historical test set forth in United States v. Stevens." 3 Aggrieved clients
and patients, he writes, have long been able to sue doctors and lawyers
for malpractice.30 s But, he says, "the mere fact that speech may be
punished after it causes harm is different from saying that it may be
prophylactically banned or licensed."3 06 But, licensing laws also have a
long history.307 And, neither Justice Jackson's concurrence in Thomas,
nor Justice White's in Lowe, spoke of such a limit on government power
to protect clients from misleading or incompetent professional speech.
For Justice White, the key question in determining the First Amendment
status of a professional's speech was not whether it was regulated before
or after a harm arose from it, but rather whether it was delivered to the
public (in a book or newspaper) or to a client (as part of the
professional's role, and within a relationship where the professional
"takes the affairs of a client personally in hand").
The public-private speech distinction implicit in judicial analyses
like those of Justice Jackson and Justice White has been given an even
clearer formulation-and justification-in Robert Post's analysis of
professional speech. Post provides an explanation of the rationale for
this difference in his book, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic
Freedom.30 s In public discussion, he claims, a physician's speech-like
301. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 883-85 (1Ith Cir. 2015), reh 'g
en banc granted, opinion vacated (Feb. 3, 2016).
304. Sherman, supra note 283, at 196.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 883-85 (noting that state regulation of the
professions is "deeply rooted" and citing Supreme Court precedent that states "have broad power to
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions") (citing
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Feb.
3, 2016); see also Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1279 (2016)
("Licensing requirements for law and medicine in the United States likely date back to the founding
period . . . .").
308. POST, supra note 63, at 38-43.
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the speech of others-is contributing to a realm of public discourse, the
nature of which must remain free from government control, even if this
leaves it chaotic and often filled with questionable statements.309 Public
discussion, in other words, follows Oliver Wendell Holmes's tenet in
Abrams v. United States that "all life is an experiment."" 0 Thus, First
Amendment discourse in public is necessarily a free-for-all where,
subject to rare exceptions, anything goes. And psychotherapists, doctors,
lawyers, and other professionals are as free as other citizens to join in
this public debate.
By contrast, the professional practices individuals rely upon to
provide guidance for their health, legal affairs, or finances cannot be
such a free-for-all. As Post notes, a doctor "who offers bad advice to a
patient" may not invoke the First Amendment principle that protects
unhindered discussion to argue that "his advice was an experiment, as all
life is an experiment.""' Rather, the speech must accord with
"authoritative professional standards."312 The law-rather than giving
doctors and lawyers First Amendment freedom to tell their clients
anything they wish to say, or anything that accords with their personal
judgment-"stands as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert
pronouncements."3 13 That is why an ill person can rely upon a doctor's
advice rather than being left to wonder whether, and to worry that, the
doctor might, without the patient being able to tell, be offering advice
deeply at odds with accepted medical wisdom or scientific studies.
C.

FirstAmendment Protection ofReliance Interests
(Versus PublicDiscourse)

However, drawing a line of this sort-between professional speech
to the public (as a citizen) and private, personalized speech to a client (as
a professional providing a service)--does not clearly tell courts
everything they need to know. It leaves unanswered the question of
whether the latter, less protected side of this distinction-the side in
which the professional provides private and personalized advice-is (1)
speech that does receive First Amendment protection but receives less of
it than does speech to the public, or (2) conduct that lies entirely outside
of the First Amendment and, thus, receives no free speech protection at
all. The Third Circuit's analysis adopts the first of these two options: it
309. Id. at 12-13, 43.
310. Id. at x (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
311. POST, supra note 63, at 45.
312. Id. at 44-45.
313. Id.
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protects professional speech against regulation, but only with
intermediate scrutiny rather than the strict scrutiny that applies to
restrictions of public deliberation.314 The Ninth Circuit's analysis of
psychotherapy, by contrast, appears to favor the second. The reliance
and trust we place in a psychotherapist does not merely weaken the free
speech protection that covers talk therapy-it eliminates it entirely, at
least when we are in treatment (and not simply talking with the therapist
about treatment)."
Part III of this Article argued that the Ninth Circuit's answer is in
many ways problematic.316 However, there is a variation of the Ninth
Circuit's argument that provides some First Amendment protection for
professionals' speech to their clients-beyond that provided by rational
basis review-but continues to treat it as fundamentally different from
public deliberation and decidedly outside the First Amendment's core.
This argument begins with the observation that the First Amendment
does not and cannot protect all uses of language. As Frederick Schauer
writes, there are numerous examples of speech "that the First
Amendment ignores."3 17 For instance, he notes: "Securities violations,
antitrust violations, criminal solicitation, and many other categories of
'speech' remain uncovered by the First Amendment.""' Some of our
speaking falls outside the First Amendment's scope, and this may well
include some speaking that communicates ideas-such as, the
information in reports required by the SEC. Moreover, writes Schauer,
professionals' speech to their clients seems to be among the categories
that are often left outside the First Amendment's scope: Medical
malpractice suits brought against a doctor for a misdiagnosis, for
example, do not raise a First Amendment question even though that
misdiagnosis comes in the form of speech.3 19
Other scholars have drawn upon the work of Alexander Meiklejohn
to help explain why certain kinds of speech are protected by the First
Amendment and others are not. The First Amendment, Meiklejohn
argues, does not protect all communication, but only the communication
that contributes to, and underlies, the process by which we govern
ourselves in a democracy.320 More recent scholars have refined
314. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014).
315. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014).
316. See supra Part III.
317. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExplorationof
ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1765, 1768 (2004).
318. Id at 1771.
319. See supra text accompanying note 158.
320. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
255 (1961) ("The First Amendment does not protect 'a freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of
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Meiklejohn's claim. Lillian R. BeVier, for example, argues that the First
Amendment protects not all speech, but "the process of forming and
expressing the will of the majority according to which our
representatives must govern." 32 1 James Weinstein likewise argues that
free speech theory should be "firmly based in the right of individual
participation in the political process."3 22 Robert Post also presents his
own version of this approach: The "best possible explanation
of the shape of First Amendment doctrine," he writes, "is the value
of democratic self-governance." 32 3 The Constitution protects that
"communication in the public sphere" which allows for the "democratic
legitimation" that occurs when "those who are subject to law believe that
they are also potential authors of law."324
Post, moreover, extends this model to help explain existing First
Amendment doctrine about professional speech. As an initial matter, he
writes, professionals' speech to their clients is not speech that is aimed at
forming public opinion.3 25 The "private, professional communications
between doctors and their patients plainly do not count as public
discourse" and thus, at least presumptively, do not count as the kind of
speech the First Amendment protects.326 This is not simply because they
occur in a private setting. Free speech may protect private channels of
discussion that are tributaries feeding into the larger ocean of public
discourse. Our conversations with family members, friends, and
colleagues help educate us both about the issues of the day, and-even
when they concern personal issues, like the family budget or questions
about personal health or consumer choices-help shape our
understanding of whether and how government can respect our interests,
for example, in deciding questions about health insurance coverage.
Indeed, on Post's account, such private conversations may even be a
part of public discourse in that they are part of an ongoing conversation
by which we determine how our society should be structured: "[T]here is
no reason," as he points out, "why public opinion might not be formed
one conversation at a time."327

those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is [thus] concerned, not
with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.").
321. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance andLimits ofPrinciple, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 308-09 (1978).
322.

James Weinstein, ParticipatoryDemocracy as the Central Value of American Free

Speech Doctrine,97 VA. L. REv. 491, 513 (2011).
323. Robert Post, ParticipatoryDemocracy and FreeSpeech, 97 VA. L. REv. 477, 482 (2011).
324. Id
325. Post, supra note 235, at 974.
326. Id.
327. POST, supra note 63, at 46.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/8

58

Blitz: Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy

2016]

FREE SPEECH, OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

739

There is, however, another reason that the private conversations we
have with doctors or other professionals fall outside of the
constitutionally protected realm of public discourse. As Post observes,
they occur "within social relationships" that are characterized by
"dependence and reliance."328 In short, communication where we solicit
advice from someone we depend on to deliver a service based on
expertise is not communication that we are well-placed to autonomously
query. Daniel Halberstam draws a similar contrast between professional
speech and public discourse: Professional-to-client discussion is not part
of an "unbounded public debate" where even the ultimate values that
guide us are fair game for questioning and revision, and it is up to each
of us to freely decide which values we adhere to and what claims to
accept.3 29 Rather, says Halberstam, it is a "bounded speech practice" or
"predefined communicative project" where a doctor's communication,
for example, has a given goal (providing health guidance to a patient
who needs it and is ill-equipped to question it), and government may
intervene to assure that the doctor's speech serves that goal.33 0 If, as the
Court has said, the function of free speech is to protect debate that is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 33 1 perhaps professional speech
does not fit the bill, because it is not open-ended intellectual exploration,
but rather a form of practical conduct to achieve an agreed-upon
personal end (like restoration of physical or mental health).
Still, while professional-client communications-on
Post's
model-are presumptively excluded from the scope of the First
Amendment, there are situations where this presumption is not the end
of the story: The medical wisdom we receive in a doctor's office may
not be public discourse, but it is knowledge this is often essential for us
to engage in intelligent public discourse about medical or health issues.
We will not, for example, be well-positioned to critique the laws or
policies that determine how we receive and pay for healthcare unless we
have an accurate sense of how the practice works (and when it works
well). For this reason, argues Post, professional speech does have some
First Amendment value-even though its value is of a different kind
than that of public discourse.332 Rather than being a form of speech by
which we participate in public discourse, the conversations we have with
doctors represent speech that helps provide the raw material for such
discourse by generating knowledge necessary for it. In this respect, Post
328. Post, supranote 323, at 483, 485.
329. Halberstam, supranote 292, at 832-33.
330. Id. at 844-45.
331. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
332. See Post, supra note 235, at 974-78.
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argues, professional speech is akin to advertising or other commercial
speech, which-although it is information that furthers consumer
purchases rather than democratic decisions-is still valuable for citizens
because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, it provides information
that might be of value to economic policy decisions or other spheres of
human life that are the subject of democratic decision-making. 333 And,
just as the First Amendment allows courts to protect commercial speech
against government restrictions that undermine its accuracy, so too
should it protect "the integrity of physician-patient communications as a
channel for the communication of accurate medical information."3 34
More generally, says Post, the First Amendment should protect
professional speech against regulation that "corrupt[s]" the "diffusion of
expert knowledge" rather than protecting it-for example, by prohibiting
professionals from dispensing disciplinary truth or requiring them to
voice a false version of it. 3 3 5

With Post's approach as background, it is now clear that the First
Amendment should-at the very least-protect the reliance interests that
individuals bring to a doctor-patient relationship, or a therapist-client
relationship. If, as Post says, the law is supposed to "stand[] as a surety
for the disciplinary truth of expert pronouncements,"33 6 it betrays this
function when it is instead a surety for nothing but the legislature's own
ideological stances. This appears to be the case, for example, in many
regulations that require doctors to give voice to abortion-related views,
even though these views (whatever their merits) have little connection to
medical science or practice. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Stuart v.
Camnitz, by requiring physicians to "display the sonogram, and describe
the fetus to women seeking abortions," the government was effectively
commandeering physicians' speech to carry the government's own
ideological message.337 Apart from limiting the doctor's own preferences
about what to say, it "threaten[ed] harm to the patient's psychological
health, interfer[ed] with the physician's professional judgment, and
compromis[ed] the doctor-patient relationship." 3 Far from giving a
patient confidence that she could trust her doctor's advice, this law
compelling sonograms deeply undermined that confidence by making it
clear that a doctor's speech might reflect something other than good

333. Id. at 974-76, 978.
334. Id. at 940.
335. See POST, supra note 63, at 47-48.
336. Id. at 45.
337. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242, 246, 253 (4th Cir. 2014).
338. Id. at 250.
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medical judgment-it might reflect the state legislature's judgments
about political and moral issues.339
D.

An Alternative Approachfor ProtectingReliance
Interests in Speech

There is, however, another way of understanding the significance of
reliance interests in First Amendment law, and it involves beginning
with a different presumption. Instead of presuming that professional
speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, except insofar as (and to
the extent that) it delivers accurate information of a certain kind from an
expert to a client, one might begin from the opposite starting point:
Professional speech is protected, but such protection is reduced to allow
the government the regulatory space it needs to protect citizens against
certain types of harms that can arise from justified reliance of a kind
which is normally absent in First Amendment communication-namely,
the reliance of an individual when she trusts a professional or an
authoritative source of information about a commercial or financial
transaction she is contemplating.
This contrast between (1) providing protection only to the extent
speech has a certain quality or value (for example, disseminating truthful
information), and (2) limiting protection of speech only in order to let
the state address a certain kind of harm, has already made a recent
appearance in First Amendment jurisprudence. As I have argued in
earlier scholarship,340 such contrast appears to lie at the core of the
disagreement in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. between the majority and
dissenting opinions.341 For the dissenting opinion, the commercial
speech was more amenable to government restriction than other speech
339. There are cases that-in contrast to Camnitz-have upheld compelled ultrasound
requirements, after subjecting them only to a much more lenient review that is the "antithesis of
strict scrutiny" and derived not from First Amendment law, but from the undue burden analysis the
Supreme Court set forth in Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa. v. Casey. See Tex. Med. Providers v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575-76 (2012). Other cases have similarly upheld other state controls on
physician speech to women seeking abortions. There is also a significant scholarly literature
analyzing such decisions. See generally, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control:
FurtheringPartisan Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REv. 293 (2013);
Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory UltrasoundLaws, 34 CARDozo L. REV.
2347 (2012); Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions,
Fact, and Open Questions, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2016). A thorough analysis of
these physician speech cases is beyond the scope of this Article. What is important, as a number of
these analyses emphasize, is that state intrusion into doctor-physician speech can undermine a
patient's ability to rely on their doctor's judgments, and that this threat to reliance interests should
play an important part in the First Amendment analysis of state interference in physician speech.
340. Blitz, supranote 125, at 45-48.
341. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2680 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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in large part because, while commercial speech serves an "informational
function," it did not have the same importance, and is not deserving
of the same protection, as 'core' political speech."3 42 For the majority
opinion, by contrast, commercial speech was staunchly protected
from government restriction-except when that restriction targeted
some harm inherent in commercial speech such as a "risk of fraud"
raised by marketing.3 43
The same choice between First Amendment frameworks exists for
professional speech. The government might have greater authority to
regulate because (1) such speech has distinctive and narrower First
Amendment value, because unlike public discourse, its value lies only in
its promulgation of accurate information (the "limited value" approach),
or (2) given the reliance individuals place in professional speech to solve
pressing health or other problems, such speech raises distinctive harms
(the "speech harm"-based approach). Moreover, where courts adopt the
latter of these two approaches, they are essentially treating professional
speech as another category of speech-like fighting words, true threats,
libel, or commercial speech-which R.A. V gives government a kind of
limited license to restrict, so long as it does so for the harm-controlling
purposes or interests that justify government action.3 4 4 In this model, as
discussed earlier, courts would permit government to impose restrictions
on professional speech, but only if it is targeting inaccurate information
or other deviations from professional standards that make a
professional's advice harmful, deceptive, or otherwise damaging to
interests of the client that government is responsible for protecting.3 45
At first glance, perhaps, there may seem to be little practical
difference between these two approaches. It does not matter, one might
argue, whether one begins with the presumption that occupational
speech is "non-speech" or "speech" for First Amendment purposes if,
when courts take additional factors into account, they move from either
of these opposing starting points to the same First Amendment middle
ground (where occupational speech gets some free speech protection,
but not as much as public debate). In other words, if it is clear the
First Amendment should protect "the integrity of physician-patient
communications as a channel for the communication of accurate medical

342. See id. at 2673-74 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
343. Id. at 2672 (majority opinion) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)).
344. See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 394-96.
345. See supra Part II.D.
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information,"3 46 but only accurate information, why does it matter
whether courts justify such protection on the basis of (1) the value that
accurate medical information has for patients' understanding of these
health issues (and that of the public), or (2) the harm that the government
does to patients by depriving them of that information? The two
approaches, on this argument, are merely two different ways of
describing the same First Amendment framework: six of one, half-adozen of the other.
My argument here, however, is that it is of consequence for First
Amendment law which of these approaches courts adopt, and that the
latter, speech-harm-based approach is the better choice for two reasons.
First, government may harm the integrity of physician-patient (or
psychotherapist-client) communications not only when it interferes with
the flow of accurate information, but also in other ways. For example,
imagine a situation where government allows every physician complete
freedom to convey any accurate medical information she wishes to
convey to her patient, but also requires her to inform each patient
seeking an abortion of philosophical arguments that abortion is morally
impermissible (and bars her from offering philosophical arguments for
its permissibility). It may be true that such a compelled speech
requirement is objectionable, in part, because it can result in deception
or confusion. Even if the physician is permitted to make it clear that (1)
such arguments come from philosophy and not from medical science,
and (2) the arguments do not represent the physician's own point of
view, but rather the view endorsed by legislators, there is a risk patients
may still assume that what they hear in their physician's office from
their physician represents her own judgments and those of the medical
profession. As Nadia Sawicki notes: "Where informed consent mandates
require physicians to communicate messages dictated by the state, there
is a substantial risk that patient-listeners will not recognize the true
origins of the speech."34 7
But even where such confusion is absent, such a compelled speech
requirement seems intuitively in tension with First Amendment
principles. To use the Supreme Court's language from Velazquez, it
exerts "control" over "an existing medium of expression . . . in ways
which distort its usual functioning."3 48 More specifically, it partly wrests
control of this medium away from the patient and physician-and
uses it to promote (as Camnitz puts it) the state's own ideological

346. Post, supranote 235, at 940.
347. Sawicki, supranote 339, at 33.
348. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001).
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preferences.3 4 9 The same would be true if government compelled a
psychotherapist to voice state-designed messages to their clients, for
example, about the state's views on the supposed value to the client's
life (and mental well-being) of performing particular kinds of service to
one's community.
To be sure, Post's framework for physician speech also treats such
compelled speech as problematic, even when it does not deceptively
disguise the state's view as the physician's own: It is not only when
physicians are compelled to hide medical truths or voice medical
falsities that free speech rights are undermined, but also, he writes, when
they are compelled to "affirm ideological truths to which they might
well object.""o But, it is hard to see why this follows if the only First
Amendment value that physician (or other occupational) speech has for
individuals lies in the disciplinary truth embodied in it.
If a compelled speech requirement leaves such disciplinary truth
untouched (because the physician remains free to convey her
understanding of medical wisdom), why is it nonetheless problematic?
For Post, the answer lies in the case of Wooley v. Maynard,"' which
makes it clear that the state may not compel individuals to give voice to
an "idea they find morally objectionable."352 This is in part because the
Supreme Court cited Wooley in upholding state-required disclosures by
physicians to patients seeking an abortion and noted, in doing so, that
such disclosure requirements are constitutional even though a
"physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated."35 3
But, the Supreme Court may have made this assumption in part
because it saw physician-patient speech as having a First Amendment
value that extended beyond the accuracy of the medical information it
conveys. If the only First Amendment value of occupational speech lies
in the accurate information it conveys to a patient or client, it is unclear
why a compelled ideological message is problematic if it does not
undermine the truth of what a professional says. And, since Wooley
focuses only on compelled speech requirements, it does not explain why
it would be problematic for government to restrict a psychotherapist or
other professional's speech on ideological grounds instead of compelling
her to give voice to a state-approved message.354

349. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014).
350. Post, supra note 235, at 959.
351. Id. at 959.
352. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
353. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(citing Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
354. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/8

64

Blitz: Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy

2016]

FREE SPEECH, OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

745

For some commentators, the answer lies in the fact that such
ideological compulsion often entails not just control of professional
activity, but of the physician's thought and speech outside of this
professional role. Sawicki, for example, stresses that "not every word [a
doctor] says" should be "considered 'professional speech' even if she
utters those words while providing care to a patient. . . mandates of

ideological or political statements, for example, may be better treated as
compulsions of private speech."355 This is a plausible doctrinal stance.
But where, for example, a psychotherapist is giving a patient advice
about how to understand mental function (or asking her questions
intended to elicit such understanding), it seems odd to say such
discussion would count as "professional speech" when subject to safetyminded regulation, but as "personal speech" when subjected to
regulations motivated by ideology. Moreover, as Sawicki acknowledges,
what makes a state mandate for physicians or other professionals
"ideological" or political is not self-evident.356
R.A. V. provides a plausible doctrinal solution to this puzzle.
Government, under R.A. V, may not justify interfering with and
reshaping advertising or commercial speech to its liking--even if it can
show that doing so leaves the speech in a state that is factually accurate,
or has a plausible account of why its speech requirement is in some
sense, non-ideological.35 7 It needs to show more than that. More
specifically, it needs to be able to show that its interference in
commercial speech is justifiably aimed at the "risk of fraud" or some
other harm of a kind that makes the content of commercial speech fair
game for state restriction. 5 Similarly, if the government restricts
physician speech, for example, by requiring that a physician or
psychotherapist act as a mouthpiece for the government's message, it
cannot fend off First Amendment objections simply by claiming that its
doing so leaves the physician or therapist free to provide an accurate
account of medical or psychological knowledge.35 9 Rather, it has to have
a plausible claim that its interference in physician or therapist speech is
justified by the need to protect patients or therapy clients from fraud or
incompetence, or to otherwise protect their reliance interests that are at

355. See Sawicki, supra note 339, at 8.
356. See id. at 27 ("[T]here remains significant uncertainty, as to what, precisely, qualifies as
'ideological speech' for the purpose of the First Amendment.").
357. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992).
358. Id. at 424-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
359. See id. at 395-96 (majority opinion).
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stake when they put their physical or mental health in the hands of a
doctor or therapist.3 60
In most cases, perhaps, the existence of a health or safety concern
that justifies some speech limits will be obvious, and a court will thus
not need to give any serious consideration to the question of whether a
particular licensing or malpractice law violates the First Amendment. As
noted earlier, for example, where government malpractice laws come
from the judgment of a professional body itself, courts may quickly
conclude that they are necessary to protect the reliance interest that a
patient or client brings to a professional relationship.
There may be other cases, however, where a government's
insistence that it is only acting to protect clients' reliance interests may
be far more suspect. First of all, such a reliance interest may simply not
be at stake in a particular form of occupational speech. For example,
while getting accurate medical advice may be a matter of life or death,
there may be much less at stake when we hire a tour guide to tell us
about a neighborhood. We might, of course, find ourselves confused or
misinformed by a tour guide who is ignorant or ineffective at clearly
communicating her knowledge. And, we might be similarly confused or
ill-informed by a tutor we hire to answer questions we have about
economics, philosophy, or literature. But, that does not necessarily mean
that we can claim a right to rely on such a tutor or tour guide akin to the
justifiable reliance we place in physician's judgment-nor to insist that
the First Amendment leaves government with power to restrict what they
say to us (or to others who wish to hire them). In these circumstances,
after all, individuals are using tour guides or tutors to obtain the same
kind of information they could obtain by reading a book, watching an
Internet video, or using a smartphone application. The First Amendment
does not allow government to censor the content of a tour book or a
history book, and it is not clear why it should have any more authority to
censor the same content when it comes-in a more personalized formfrom the mouth of a tour guide or history tutor.3 61 Courts should thus not
rush to conclude that a reliance interest justifying speech restriction is
present whenever advice or other expressive activity is "personalized,"
or is offered in exchange for a fee. If our physician's words have a
360. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216,224, 232 (3d Cir. 2014).
361. In fact, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize a reliance interest in one case where
individuals felt they had a right to rely on the accuracy of written materials. In Winter v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons, "mushroom enthusiasts" sued the publisher of a book called The Encyclopedia of
Mushrooms after they ate mushrooms, relying on this encyclopedia's classification of these
mushrooms as "safe to eat." 938 F.2d 1033, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1991). The court refused to find that
the publisher could be liable for this information under products liability and noted that its reasoning
was "[g]uided by the First Amendment and the values embodied therein." Id at 1036.
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different significance for us than information we find on the Internet or
in a medical book, and are more subject than are the latter to government
regulation, this is not simply because it comes in the form of a
personalized service, but also because it comes as part of a fiduciary
relationship wherein the physician has undertaken certain duties to us or
other patients.
Nor should courts assume that a reliance interest is present
whenever advice we receive is "characteristic dependent." As Robert
Kry pointed out, whether it is personalized or not, advice from a hired
expert may be "[c]haracteristic dependent," in the sense that its content
may "var[y] depending on the characteristics or circumstances of the
person receiving it, regardless of the manner in which it is delivered."3 62
Certain software on an application or a website, for example, may
produce different content according to answers we give to certain
questions. While such characteristic-dependent advice may be something
we are more likely to perceive as information we can rely upon and use
for solving specific problems, courts cannot simply assume we have a
right to rely on information in this way. Consider newspaper columnists
who provide personal advice in response to reader questions. The advice
they give in the column is not personalized in the same sense as a
doctor's private advice to a patient-it is available to all readers of the
newspaper (and is read by many of them). But, it is characteristicdependent in the sense that its content is framed as the answer to a
particular concern raised by a particular questioner, generally about her
own life circumstances. Still, this does not mean that the reader should
have a right to rely on the columnist's response in the same way that a
patient or client relies on a doctor or therapist. In fact, a federal district
court recently found that Kentucky violated the First Amendment when
it attempted to silence such an advice columnist on the ground that he
was engaged in the "unauthorized practice" of psychology. 6
E. Aesthetic Freedom and OccupationalSpeech
Moreover, there is a second respect in which First Amendment
protection might go beyond simply protecting a client's access to (and
reliance upon) "disciplinary truth" and protect clients not only against
the betrayal of reliance interests, but also other interests that are at stake
362. Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 885, 907 (2000).
363. Rosemond v. Markham, No. 13-42-GFVT, 2015 WL 5769091, at *3, *6, *11 (E.D. Ky.
Sept. 30, 2015) (finding that, where the advice columnist gave advice about dealing with a teenager
in response to a letter writer's questions, "[t]he relationship that is necessary between a professional
and a client to trigger application of the professionalspeech doctrine just did not exist").
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"

in their conversations with professionals or other hired experts. This is
especially clear where the occupational speech in question has an artistic
or aesthetic component. We sometimes recruit the aid of experts in a
given field not only for expert truth that we can trust in and use as a solid
foundation for action, but also for more idiosyncratic aesthetic or value
judgments. For example, if I hire an interior decorator to suggest a
design and color scheme for a living room or office building, I may
expect that interior decorator to have certain training and skill sets (or, at
the very least, that she be honest with me about her training or
experience), but I should not be shocked if her judgments differ
markedly from those I would receive from other interior decorators.
Likewise, if I wish to hire a composer for a film project, or a graphic
designer for a website I am creating, I may understandably ask about
that person's musical or artistic training. But, I cannot expect I would
receive anything close to the same musical score from different
composers, or the same web layout, color scheme, or illustrations from
different graphic designers.
In all of these cases, moreover, I may find that the artistic design or
the musical score I receive is not only at odds with those I might receive
from other interior decorators or composers but also with my own
aesthetic judgments. The reliance interest that we have been discussing
here as the basis of First Amendment protection is no longer present in
the same way. Rather than being forced to trust in an expert, such as, a
physician or surgeon, whose judgments I am ill-suited to question
(except, perhaps, by going through the burdensome process of getting a
second or third opinion), I will here be in a position to reject what the
interior decorator, graphic designer, or composer proposes because it is
not simply a matter of disciplinary truth that I am powerless to assess,
but also a matter of my own artistic taste-against which I can assess the
proposals of a decorator, a designer, or composer, even if I am not an
expert in those fields. In these situations, the professional discourse in
question is, to use Halberstam's terminology, not the kind of "bounded
speech practice" where there is a profession-wide consensus about the
appropriate "content and purpose of the communication." 3
If the government forbade an interior decorator or graphic designer
from expressing a certain artistic judgment-whether in a sketch or in
words-to "protect" a client from being exposed to the artistic
judgments reflected in such proposals, such a restriction should certainly
raise significant First Amendment concerns. The law may be a "surety

364.

See Halberstam, supra note 292, at 833.
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for the disciplinary truth of expert pronouncements"3 65 -where there is
such disciplinary truth-but it cannot, consistent with the First
Amendment, be a surety for artistic or aesthetic conformity. As the
Supreme Court has stated: "[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature . .. are for the individual to make, not for the Government to
decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority." 6 6 Likewise, it
is not the government's role to decide what musical compositions are
good enough to deserve the money of an individual who is willing to pay
for them. In professional exchanges of this sort, artistic freedom is at
stake, and the government may not limit it without raising First
Amendment concerns.3 67
The same is true, moreover, in some professional relationships
where the expertise recruited by a client is more academic than artistic in
nature. I might, for example, hire a historian to research and write a
report about my family's history, or that of a company or club in which I
have a leadership role. While I might expect that all competent historians
who come to this task will come with certain research skills and
knowledge, I cannot expect that they will all make the same judgments
about which characters or twists in this history are most significant or
deserving of attention. In a similar vein, when people hire a tour guide to
lead them through a city neighborhood, they might not do so only to
obtain accurate information about that city, but also in the hope they will
find other value in the tour guide's words. They may, for example, want
a tour guide who is not only a specialist in the neighborhood's haunts
and history, but also an animated and skillful storyteller, or someone
who has lived in the neighborhood and infuses the tour's narrative with
accounts of her own day-to-day life there. In such a situation, citizens
may well welcome some state regulation-for example, a background
check system that can give them confidence that the tour guides they
follow are fit to be trusted with their safety. But, it is not for the state to
say how historians or tour guides are to select which historical facts are
important, or to decide how to recount them.
365. POST, supra note 63, at 45.
366. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
367. It is thus puzzling why the Eleventh Circuit was so dismissive of First Amendment
concerns about Florida's requirement for licensing interior designers. Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d
1185, 1191 (1lth Cir. 2011). The court insisted that, because the law governs "direct, personalized
speech" of professionals with clients, it "does not implicate constitutionally protected activity under
the First Amendment." Id It is hard to see, however, why such a principle would not allow
government to likewise interfere with the speech of life coaches, college tutors, or historians hired
by individuals or organizations on the ground that it disagreed with the views expressed in the
speech. It may be that the court was comfortable with the licensing statute because it deemed it
content- and viewpoint-neutral. But, this point was not elaborated in the case itself.
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It should not be surprising, then, that two recent federal appellate
courts-each asking whether tour guide licensing requirements violated
the First Amendment-both agreed that government would likely run
afoul of the First Amendment's protection if it tried to restrict what tour
guides could tell sightseers. 6 The courts came to different conclusions.
The District of Columbia and New Orleans had each required tour
guides to obtain a license before offering tours to sightseers and to pass a
multiple-choice test about the city's geography and history as a
condition of obtaining this license.369 In Edwards v. District of
Columbia, the D.C. District Court found this requirement infringed upon
the First Amendment.3 70 In Kagan v. City of New Orleans, the Fifth
Circuit found that it did not.37 But, while these courts came to different
conclusions, they agreed on the First Amendment framework. The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the stories and information tour
guides shared with sightseers counted as protected speech.372 This
licensing requirement survived First Amendment scrutiny, in its view,
but this was only because it did not prevent tour guides from talking or
control what they said: "Tour guides may talk but what they say is not
regulated or affected by New Orleans."373 It agreed, moreover, that to
the extent that regulations were to impose any limits on tour guides'
speech, they would have to survive intermediate scrutiny.37 4
One possible response to these observations is to advocate that First
Amendment law draw a distinction between the speech of
"professionals" and that of other occupations. Professional speech, on
this view, might be subject to state restriction more than occupational
speech. More specifically, one might argue, the state has a strong interest
in restricting speech not merely where an expert offers us the benefit of
her expertise (artistic or otherwise), but also where the expert, to use
Justice White's words, "takes the affairs of a client personally and
purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client."3" Doctors,
lawyers, and accountants, for example, appear to fit this description.
Tour guides, historians, and interior designers perhaps do not. One might
likewise emphasize, as the Eleventh Circuit panel did in Wollschlaeger,
368. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Kagan v. City
of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).
369. Edwards, 755 F.3d at 999; Kagan, 753 F.3d at 561.
370. 755 F.3d at 1001-02, 1009 (striking down tour guide licensing regulations as an
unconstitutional limitation on tour guide speech).
371. 753 F.3d at 562.
372. See Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1000; Kagan, 753 F.3d at 562.
373. Kagan, 753 F.3d at 562.
374. Id.
375. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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that a state's interest in regulating speech between a client and physician
is strong not only because it concerns medicine, but because it occurs
"within the confines of a fiduciary relationship."376 Such a fiduciary
relationship may well be absent in other occupational relationships.
In any event, one cannot assume that the reliance interests we bring
to a commercial exchange will be the same in all circumstances or that
the presence of such reliance interests justifies giving the government
space to regulate aspects of occupational speech that have little to do
with protecting such interests. As the Court noted in R.A. V, it is a
familiar part of First Amendment doctrine that "a particular instance of
speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (for example,
obscenity) but not on the basis of another (for example, opposition to the
city government).""7 It may be that, in certain kinds of occupational
speech, we do not justifiably rely heavily on the truth of what an expert
says, and in such cases, there will be far less occupational speech that is
legitimately "proscribable" (because of the risks it creates for our health,
safety, or financial welfare) than there is in, say, the advice we receive
from our physician or accountant. As noted earlier, it may not always be
obvious to judges which regulations can legitimately be said to count as
protecting such reliance interests and which cannot, and courts will
therefore have to decide how much to defer to officials' judgment that a
certain professional regulation, for example, really counts as a regulation
dedicated to promoting patient safety.3 7 8 Nevertheless, in at least some
kinds of occupational speech regulation, for instance those that prevent a
client from hiring a graphic designer with a particular kind of artistic
approach, any such government claim is likely to be implausible because
while the health or safety advice we may receive from a physician is fair
game for restriction under the First Amendment, the aesthetic
recommendations of an artist are not.
These examples make it clear that courts cannot assume a reliance
interest is present and justify restriction of speech any time a client (1)
pays for a service, (2) that is "personalized," and (3) that is
"characteristic-dependent." These three conditions, after all, exist not
only when we rely on a physician or an attorney, but also when we hire a
portrait artist to create a painting in a certain style or a piano teacher to
teach us skills using a certain instructional technique.
Government may, in some cases, need to regulate activities that
entail aesthetic judgments in the course of protecting citizens' reliance
376.

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 891 (1lth Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc

granted, opinion vacated (Feb. 3, 2016).

377.
378.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

71

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

752

[Vol. 44:681

interests. For example, it imposes certain limits on the way architects
and the structural engineers working with them design buildings or other
structures to ensure the result is both safe and functional. In that case,
perhaps, its protection of clients' (and the public's) interest in safe
structures will require it to simultaneously place some limits on the kind
of aesthetic decisions an architect can propose to her client. Where
legitimate regulation does collateral damage to First Amendment
expression in this way, however, courts should apply intermediate
scrutiny (rather than rational basis review) to assure that such damage is
not much greater than necessary to accomplish the state's goals.1 79 Nor
is it clear that such First Amendment concerns will entirely disappear
when an occupational relationship is also a professional relationship in
which the professional exercises judgment on the client's behalf. Not all
features of the interactions we have with a doctor or lawyer may be
characterized by such reliance on that kind of expert judgment.
V.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

It may seem at first that, because psychotherapists are in the
business of mental health treatment, First Amendment law should treat
them in all respects like physicians, and not like artists or historians.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit essentially treated psychotherapy as a branch
of medicine. California's therapy restriction, it concluded, is just as
deserving of "deferential review" as are "other regulations of the
practice of medicine."380 And, in certain respects, psychotherapy is
undoubtedly much closer to medicine than to many other kinds of
professional activity."' A psychotherapist, like a physician, sets herself
the goal of restoring a person's health.
This Part argues, however, that this vision of talk therapy is too
simple.382 Psychotherapy is not just a variant of medicine; it is a
distinctive kind of healing practice-and one which may often be more
likely than medicine to include expression of idiosyncratic value
judgments that are shared by therapist and client, but do not reflect a
consensus. According to Nancy
professionor society-wide
McWilliams, for example, psychotherapy is a practice "at the
intersection of two vertices: the medical and the religious."
Psychotherapists resemble physicians in some of what they do: they heal

379.
380.

See supra Part I.C.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014).

381.

See SAKS & GOLSHAN, supranote 52, at 77.

382.

See infra Part V.

383.

MCWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 3.
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specified diseases, often using "validated techniques" that have
"specific, replicable effects."384 But, their work also sometimes ventures
into the territory of philosophy: they use "existential, experiential,
humanistic, romantic, collaborative, or discovery-oriented ways of
seeking answers to (unanswerable) human questions."385
A.

The Medical Model and Psychotherapy

This does not mean that First Amendment law should simply ignore
the strong parallels between psychotherapists and physicians. Indeed,
psychotherapy has long been viewed as a kind of medical treatment, or
something analogous to it, by both practitioners and many of those who
seek its benefits. As Eric Caplan writes in his seminal history of
psychotherapy, it was born in America in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when physicians decided to claim talk therapy for
themselves-so that they could offer a scientific alternative to the
popular religion-tinged "mind cure" movement and similar programs. 8
On a number of occasions, in fact, physicians lobbied for laws
permitting only those in their own profession to treat mental illness."8 In
the 1890s, they moved-unsuccessfully-to ban "mind cure" adherents
from offering talk therapy.3 88 A decade later, they made a similar effort
in response to the rise of the Emmanuel movement, a "cooperative
venture between Boston physicians and Episcopalian ministers" that
aimed to improve psychological, spiritual, and physical health by
offering the public a mix of classes, clinics, and psychotherapy
sessions.389 The "movement's medical critics," writes Caplan, expressed
concern about its popularity and "sought to restrict the practice of
psychotherapy to licensed physicians.""o They argued (in the words of
neurologist Charles Dana) that "the care of the sick is safest in the hands
of those trained for the purpose,"3 91 and that "there ought to be definite
forms of psychotherapeutics" based upon science.3 92 And, in 1955 and
1956, similar efforts arose from within the American Medical
Association ("AMA"). The "legislature for New York," writes Rollo

384. Id
385. Id
386.

ERIC CAPLAN, MIND GAMES: AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE BIRTH OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

62-63, 149-51 (Andrew Scull ed., 1998).
387. Id at 84-85.
388. Id. at 63-64, 84-89.
389. Id. at 117-23.
390. Id. at 131.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 133.
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May, "had before them a bill introduced by the conservative wing of the
AMA that would make all psychotherapy a branch of medicine" 393 and
thus, effectively, make it illegal for anyone to practice psychotherapy
unless they had graduated from medical school and were following the
professional standards applicable to practicing physicians.394 Thus, wrote
May, passage of such an act would have meant that therapists like
himself-a practitioner of existential-humanist therapy who held a Ph.D.
in psychology rather than an M.D.-could be "outlawed and possibly
arrested for practicing medicine" without a license.3 9
These takeover efforts failed in the end to give physicians a
monopoly over talk therapy. Although some talk therapy is offered by
those with medical training (especially psychiatrists), much talk therapy
is offered by psychologists, social workers, or others without a medical
degree.396 Still, one might argue, even where these therapists are not
practicing medicine, they are engaged in a healing practice that in many
ways follows the same model: they cure or treat illnesses (mental rather
than physical) by drawing upon scientific findings (in this case, about
the mind rather than the body).
In fact, such a "medical model" for psychotherapy seems to be
implicit in the two forms of psychotherapy that were dominant in the
United States throughout the twentieth century: (1) psychoanalysis,
rooted in the theories and methods of Sigmund Freud; and (2) the
behaviorist approach, rooted in the psychological theories of John B.
Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and B.F. Skinner. 397 In many ways, these
approaches are starkly different. For those in the psychoanalytic (or
psychodynamic) school, a client's emotional or mental struggles often
have their roots in unconscious feelings or beliefs forged in childhood
experience or other significant episodes in life. 398 As Frank and Frank
describe this approach, it "involve[s] repeated, emotionally charged
interactions with a therapist who tries to increase the patient's awareness
of more or less unconscious feelings and attitudes, especially those
formed in childhood." 399 The behaviorist approach, by contrast, focuses
not on the patient's internal life or history, but on understanding and
changing the "immediate environmental determinants of patients'

393.

Rollo May, Forewordto AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A

CENTURY OF CHANGE, at xxiii (Donald K. Freedheim et al. eds., 1992).
394. See id.
395. Id.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id at xxiii-xxiv.
See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 262, at 4-5; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 1.
See MCWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 1-2.
FRANK & FRANK, supra note 262, at 4.
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attitudes and behavior."400 As one of its most prominent practitioners,
Joseph Wolpe, describes it: "Behavior therapy consists of applying
experimentally established principles to overcoming these persistent
unadaptive habits."40 1 It is rooted in a "deterministic outlook"
that regards the patient as a product of biological and environmental
determinants, with every "[a]ttitude[], thought[], verbal behavior,
and emotional behavior hav[ing] all been shaped in various ways
and various degrees by the organism's previous interactions with
his environments."4 02
Despite their significant differences, both of these schools focus on
using science to fix mental malfunctioning.4 03 As the book Persuasion
and Healing observes, the conceptual schemes provided by Freud,
Pavlov, and Skinner "[t]ogether . .. supply scientifically respectable
rationales for contemporary methods of psychotherapy." 404 As
Bruce Wampold points out, both of these approaches also emulate
the medical model by (1) identifying "an illness or disease" or
"disorder," (2) seeking "a biological explanation for the illness or
disorder," (3) a "mechanism of change," and (4) "a particular therapeutic
procedure." 405 Freudian psychologists, for example, may (1) diagnose
hysteria, (2) explain it as based in "repressed traumatic events," (3) seek
to change it with "insight into [the] unconscious," and (4) use "free
association" as the treatment tool. 40 6 Behaviorists might likewise treat a
client with (1) "phobic anxiety" by, (2) explaining it as arising from
Pavlovian conditioning, (3) seeking to desensitize the client to the
stimulus that triggers the anxiety, and (4) do so with techniques of
"systematic desensitization." 407
In more recent years, most behavioral therapy has incorporated a
focus on "cognitive processes" and, as a consequence, has become
"cognitive-behavioral therapy." 408 But, it has maintained its scientific
focus. According to Derek Trustcott, when psychiatrist Aaron Beck laid
the foundations for cognitive therapy, his work appealed to "empirically
minded therapists" in the behaviorist school because of its "scientific
400. Id. at 5.
401.

JOSEPH WOLPE, THE PRACTICE OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY 1 (Arnold P. Goldstein & Leonard

Krasner eds., 2d ed. 1973).
402. Id. at 53.
403.

See FRANK & FRANK, supranote 262, at 5.

404. Id. at 5.
405.

WAMPOLD & IMEL, supranote 266, at 7-9.

406. Id at 18.
407. Id at 19-20.
408. DEREK TRUSCOTT, BECOMING AN EFFECTIVE PSYCHOTHERAPIST: ADOPTING A THEORY
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY THAT'S RIGHT FOR YOU AND YOUR CLIENT 105-07 (2010).
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rigor." 409 Unlike behaviorists, Beck wanted to take stock of unseen
mental operations, but he adhered to scientific standards as he did so:
"hypothesiz[ing] change processes, operationalizing his change tasks,
and evaluating the efficacy of his approach."4 10
However, it is wrong to think that this medical model provides the
only template for psychotherapy. There are circumstances in which it is
a poor fit for describing what happens in talk therapy. In fact, some
psychologists have made efforts to distance themselves from the medical
model. They have, as one commentator writes, begun to address therapy
users as "clients" rather than "patients" to "signify a rejection of [a]
medical way of thinking, replacing it with the humanistic language of
growth and change." 4 1' In the view of these psychotherapists, therapy is
"not about curing illness but about helping people to find solutions and
new directions in life for themselves."4 12 Among the many well-known
and widely used psychotherapy approaches are some, such as the
humanistic approach developed by Carl Rogers, that are more aligned
with philosophy than with science and medicine.413 This is also true of
the Existential Psychotherapy practiced by therapists such as Ludwig
Binswanger, Victor Frankl, Irvin Yalom, and Rollo May. 414 As Yalom
writes, the "basic tenets of existential therapy are such that empirical
research methods are often inapplicable or inappropriate." 415
More specifically, there are three important aspects of
psychotherapy, which seem to require a departure from the idea that it is
simply a branch or variant of medicine and can thus be subject to
precisely the same First Amendment rules: (1) the plurality of
approaches that exist in place of any discipline-wide professional
consensus; 4 16 (2) the desire of many therapy-seekers to use therapy not
simply to achieve mental health but to struggle with questions about
what will give them a sense of meaning or give their lives (or work)
value; 417 and (3) the respects in which the conversations individuals have
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 99.
Joseph, supra note 2.
Id.

413.

See TranspersonalPioneers: Carl Rogers, SOFIA U., http://www.sofia.edulabout/history/

transpersonal-pioneers-carl-rogers (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
414.

ROLLO

MAY

&

IRVIN

YALOM,

EXISTENTIAL

PSYCHOTHERAPY

http://www.cengage.com/resourceuploads/downloads/0495097144_81300.doc
10, 2016).
415.

1,

11,

(last visited Apr.

IRVIN D. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 22 (1980).

416. Lynn Margolies,
Understanding Diferent Approaches to Psychotherapy,
PSYCH CENTRAL (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.psychcentral.comlib/understanding-differentapproaches-to-psychotherapy.
417. Cheryl A. MacDonald, How to Achieve Success with Counseling, HEALTH
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with therapists not only count, in some ways, as an exercise of freedom
of expression, but also serve as a crucial means of exercising another
First Amendment freedom (namely what the Court has called the
"freedom of thought").4 18
B.

Challengesto the Medical Model: The Diversity ofPsychotherapy
Approaches and the Common FactorsModel

One reason that psychotherapy cannot be treated as perfectly
analogous to medicine is its methodological diversity. Psychotherapy
often involves far more experimentation and uncertainty. It is more often
the case in psychotherapy than in medicine that clients can, and do,
experiment at times by switching between radically different
approaches. A doctor treating a bacterial infection (say a stubborn sinus
infection) often decides that the typical and appropriate medical
response to such an infection is a course of antibiotics. As Bruce
Wampold writes, "in medicine, . . . there is a modal explanation for a

disorder and one or a few competing treatments based on the modal
explanation."4 19 By contrast, imagine that this person, having recovered
from his sinus infection with the help of antibiotics that the doctor
prescribed, now turns from medicine to psychotherapy in order to help
address a different, more lasting set of problems in his life: a long-felt
sense of depression, a tendency to become anxious and inarticulate in
social interactions, a paralyzing writer's block, or an abiding sense of
low self-esteem. It is no longer the case that all competent practitioners
will likely provide similar treatment. Rather, the client and the
practitioner will face a dizzying array of choices and possibilities. As
Wampold writes, in psychotherapy, there are "more than 500 distinct
psychotherap[eutic] theories and ... the number is growing."420
There are, moreover, immense differences between different
approaches and often between different variants of the same approach.
An anxious person who goes to a psychodynamic therapist might find
herself trying to seek out the roots of her anxiety in past family
interactions or other childhood experiences. If she goes to a behaviorist,
she may instead engage in the more focused task of understanding what
PSYCHOL. CTR., http://www.healthpsychology.org/achieving-success-with-counseling
Apr. 10, 2016).
418. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).

(last visited

419. WAMPOLD, supra note 39, at 25.
420. Id; see also David Wasdell, In the Shadow of Accreditation, in IMPLAUSIBLE
PROFESSIONS: ARGUMENTS FOR PLURALISM AND AUTONOMY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND

COUNSELING, supra note 41, at 29, 31 (noting the "bewildering array of therapies and approaches
from which to choose").
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events in the external world trigger the anxiety and how to teach herself
to react differently. If she goes to a cognitive behaviorist, she may be
counseled to recognize the irrational "automatic thoughts" that arise with
such anxiety and teach herself to recognize and correct or modify those
thoughts when they appear. An existentialist therapist, by contrast, may
work with her to explore how to distinguish neurotic and paralyzing
anxiety from "the unavoidable existential anxiety of living."421 A
psychiatrist, or a psychotherapist well-versed in neuroscience, may
adhere to one of the aforementioned approaches, but also consider the
possibility that the anxiety is rooted in aspects of brain physiology or
chemistry, and may require medications.
This raises a significant complication for arguments that, like those
of the Ninth Circuit, quickly classify the talking cure as a type of curing
that the state may assure meets professional standards. In medicine,
perhaps, such a quick exclusion of a doctor's treatment-related speech
from the First Amendment realm makes intuitive sense. Whereas, a
doctor can voice professional heresy in the realm of public debate, she
cannot be left free to do so in private treatment. As noted earlier, Post
accounts for this difference by noting that, whereas public discourse
follows the tenet that "all life is an experiment," the law does not excuse
a doctor "who offers bad advice to a patient" and then argues that "his
advice was an experiment, as all life is an experiment."4 22
But, for seekers of psychotherapy, life inevitably is an experiment
to some degree because psychotherapeutic wisdom does not provide a
single "modal explanation" and solution for a given mental health
problem or psychological goals. Rather, it offers a marketplace of
psychological theories (and associated methods) from which individuals
are left to choose, and within which they can experiment. 423 This
marketplace of psychological approaches is not as unconstrained or
immune from professional regulation as is the more general First
Amendment marketplace of ideas one finds in public discourse. Given
the risks that therapy can raise for clients' mental health, it cannot be left
immune to regulation; and, while there are many very different
counseling options available, this does not mean that even unsafe
counseling approaches should get a chance to recruit clients in the
therapy marketplace. Still, the bazaar of approaches one finds in therapy
is closer to a First Amendment marketplace of ideas than is a body of
disciplinary truth in medicine.

421. MAY & YALOM, supra note 414, at 2-3.
422. POST, supra note 63, at 45.
423. WAMPOLD, supra note 39, at 25-27.
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One might still argue that the legislature and other authorities in a
democratic government should, in this circumstance, be charged with
doing some of the experimenting themselves-and remove therapy
techniques from the market when evidence indicates they are
unsuccessful in restoring clients' mental health, so that clients are not
misled into placing reliance on them. Rather than view the set of therapy
choices that confront a client as a pure marketplace of ideas, perhaps
it is at least to some extent a marketplace of professional services
which professional authorities and legislatures should prune of
ineffective offerings. This observation is at least partially right: If
government has a legitimate role in protecting the reliance interests we
bring to therapy-for example, our dependence on the therapist to
correctly identify a particular mental illness and give us sound advice
about treatment-it has to have power to act against therapists that
betray these reliance interests.
However, this is only part of the picture. As in a marketplace of
ideas, at least some of the experimenting and evaluating of different
therapy techniques must be left to individual therapy seekers. Which
techniques work for a particular patient may well depend (to a far greater
extent than is true in medicine) on the client's own value and belief
system. In fact, this is one of the central points made by a well-known
challenge to the medical model raised by therapists and writers who
espouse the "common factors" approach of the "contextual model."424
This common factors approach traces its origin to a 1936 article by
the psychotherapist Saul Rosenzweig in the American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry titled, Some Implicit Common Factors in Diverse
Methods ofPsychotherapy.425 Rosenzweig aimed to explain a puzzle that
stemmed from the fact that different practitioners of psychotherapy held
radically different views of how the human mind works and how it could
be cured.426 If the success of a therapy method depended upon the
accuracy of its assumptions about human nature, then one would expect
to see some therapy methods succeed (those with the correct view of
human mental processes), and other mistaken therapy methods fail.427
Instead, observed Rosenzweig, diverse therapy methods of the time
virtually all seemed to have the same success in treating patients.428
Analogizing this situation to the Dodo Bird race in Alice in Wonderland
424.

WAMPOLD & IMEL, supranote 266, at 57-59.

425. Saul Rosenzweig, Some Implicit Common Factors in Diverse Methods ofPsychotherapy,
6 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 412,413 (1936).
426. Id. at 412.
427. See id.
428.

WAMPOLD & IMEL,supra note 266, at 33.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

79

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

760

[Vol. 44:681

in which "[e]verybody has won," Rosenzweig stressed that all therapy
methods appeared to be proven right by the results, even though
Freudians, behaviorists, and adherents of other schools of therapy argued
that other types of psychotherapies were mistaken. 429 The solution to this
puzzle, claimed Rosenzweig, is that there are "unrecognized factors" in
any therapeutic situation-whether it occurs in Freudian therapy,
Behavioral Therapy, or another kind of counseling-and these common
factors lead to common results (and often successful results) no matter
what the details of the particular theory.430
In Persuasion and Healing, Jerome Frank provided perhaps the
most prominent elaboration of such a common factors model.4 31
Originally published in 1961, and then revised and republished by Frank
and his daughter, Julia Frank, the book suggests that "all
psychotherapies share at least four effective features": (1) a "therapeutic
alliance" or an "emotionally charged, confiding relationship with a
helping person";4 3 2 (2) a "healing setting";4 33 (3) a "rationale, conceptual
scheme, or myth that provides a plausible explanation for the patient's
symptoms and prescribes a ritual or procedure for resolving them";434
and (4) a "ritual or procedure that requires the active participation of
both patient and therapist and that is believed by both to be the means of
restoring the patient's health."435
The third of these four factors-namely, the fact that therapeutic
alliance is built around a "rationale, conceptual scheme, or myth" shared
by the therapist and the client-presents perhaps the starkest contrast
with medicine. In medicine, a particular antibiotic will likely kill the
bacteria causing an infection-and will do so regardless of a particular
patient's beliefs or philosophy of life. Indeed, it will do so once it enters
a patient's body, even if the patient is entirely unaware that the antibiotic
is inside of her body. By contrast, according to the common factors
approach, the psychotherapeutic community can and should understand
that "personal values, characteristics, and life experiences may make
particular patients more amenable to one technique than to another.
Patients who fail to profit from an existential approach may respond to a
behavioral one, and vice versa."436 This is because the value that a
''conceptual scheme" has for a particular therapy client often lies not in
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See id.
Id.
FRANK & FRANK, supra note 262, at 39-43.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 50.
Id at xiv.
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its underlying truth but in the aid it offers for addressing a particular
task. The more a particular conceptual scheme makes sense to a client,
given her "assumptive worldview," the better a foundation it provides
for building an alliance with a therapist who shares a commitment to the
same scheme for helping the client to make sense of the problem, and for
inspiring hope that she can solve it.
This cuts strongly against "[t]herapists who see themselves as
applied behavioral scientists" and invariably "assum[e] that the
therapeutic power of an interpretation depends on how closely it
approximates objective truth."4 37 Because the value of a therapy method
lies not in how much it approximates such an external truth but in
whether it serves the function of helping a client to make sense of her
situation and improve upon it, the "patient," according to Frank, "is the
ultimate judge of the truth of an interpretation."43 8 Thus, while the
therapist is an expert in psychology and the diagnosing and treatment of
psychological illness, the client will also bring a critical element to
answering the question of what constitutes good therapy. Just as I might
override the professional recommendations of a composer or designer on
the basis of my own aesthetic preferences,439 so a client may decide that
a particular form of therapy is a poor fit for her own beliefs and values.
As a consequence, what counts as good therapy is not simply a matter of
what techniques the majority of therapists, or the legislature, is willing to
endorse, but also what works for a particular individual.
This, of course, makes it very challenging for the court to apply the
Third Circuit's principle that courts must distinguish between genuine
professional regulation and censorship "under the guise" of such
regulation." Distinguishing legitimate therapists from charlatans is
difficult where there is a bewildering number of competing approaches
and theories, and what counts as good therapy for one school might
count as irresponsible for another. If a state is to ban a particular
psychotherapeutic practice as outside the professional consensus, where
does it find such a consensus? How can it insist to a psychologist or to a
client seeking psychotherapy that, as in medicine, she does not have a
right to experiment with different approaches, but must use the accepted
approach if there is no one accepted approach?
One possible answer is that there may be a unifying thread that
extends through and ties together even the fragmented world of
psychotherapy. Perhaps states can exclude techniques like SOCE from
437.
438.
439.
440.

Id. at 72.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 363-64.
King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2014).
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the realm of accepted psychological techniques by showing that
SOCE is outside even the very large circle that embraces approaches
as different as psychodynamic theory, cognitive-behaviorism, or
existential and humanistic psychology. Indeed, the Third Circuit
observed that this seemed to be the case. Many different organizations of
psychological experts, it noted, have spoken with "urgency and
solidarity" against SOCE."'
But, if it is correct that the "the patient is the ultimate judge of the
truth of an interpretation," then this argument requires elaboration.4 2
How, one might ask, can the psychotherapeutic community insist that a
particular patient or client is receiving an unacceptable form of therapy
when the client believes it is correct and helpful? The answer might
come in different forms.
One basis for psychotherapists' solidarity---even in the face of
uncertainty and a client's contrary claims-might be the strong sense of
many practitioners, both from empirical evidence and their personal
sense of how psychotherapy works, that a certain kind of
psychotherapist response to a situation may be dangerous for a client
regardless of the therapist's school of thought. All therapists, for
example, might be expected to recognize, and take proactive measures to
address, signs of suicidal tendencies in a particular case.
Another basis for the solidarity might be that there are situations
where even a client's belief in a conceptual scheme will not make it
effective. Consider again the hypothetical claim of a talk-therapy
Alzheimer's cure discussed earlier." No matter how strongly a
particular client wants to believe in the efficacy of such a talk therapy
cure, it will not banish his Alzheimer's. Other aspects of a client's
441. Id at 238. Claudia Haupt provides a far more developed theoretical account of how such
disciplinary knowledge may play a role in First Amendment law. She suggests that professions,
including that of psychotherapy, be considered "knowledge communities" and that the First
Amendment should bar government interference not only in the way members of these communities
communicate with clients, but also in the way they develop the disciplinary body of knowledge that
defines them (for the sake of the clients, professionals themselves, and the wider society). See
Haupt, supra note 307, at 1271-77. She also argues that in disputes such as the legal disputes over
SOCE, the most "workable approach" for courts "is to defer to the knowledge community." Id. at
1295. However, applying this model to psychotherapy requires at least some confidence that
psychotherapy is, in at least some respects, a single knowledge community "drawing on a shared
reservoir of knowledge" that cuts across the different schools of therapy. Id. at 1251. If each school
of therapy is instead its own knowledge community, with "psychotherapy" and the American
Psychological Association, respectively, providing a shared label and shared organizational
umbrella (but not a shared body of disciplinary knowledge), then such a model would not justify a
judicial approach whereby some psychological knowledge communities can suppress the
occupational speech of others.
442.

FRANK & FRANK, supra note 262, at 72.

443.

See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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mental functioning may be just as resistant to change. As Jerome and
Julia Frank point out, certain psychoses may have a "significant genetic
or constitutional component" and, for this reason, "psychotherapy by
itself cannot cure most psychoses," although it can "play[] a part
in their management."' In short, while a client's belief in a conceptual
scheme may be an important determinant in what therapy method is
effective, it is not the only variable and is, at times, not the most
important. Thus, Jerome Frank also observes that, while most studies
have shown different therapy methods to be equally effective, there is
evidence that "certain techniques may indeed prove to be more effective
than others for specific syndromes-notably, exposure to the fearinducing stimulus for situation-bound fears, and abreaction for
posttraumatic stress disorders.""
This brings us to still another possibility for generating agreement
across different psychological schools: There might be some common
metric whereby even psychotherapists who cannot agree on how the
human mind works or how to fix it can agree on how to measure the
success of therapeutic outcomes. As Wampold points out, studies of talk
therapy's efficacy have largely found it to make a difference for therapy
clients." 6 As noted above, one of the striking aspects of these findings is
that therapy seemed to have a powerful healing effect on clients
regardless of the type of therapy used." Across a range of
mental disorders, psychodynamic approaches, cognitive-behavioral
approaches, humanistic approaches, and others, all appeared to work just
as well.448 There was "no evidence to suggest that some treatments were
more effective than others."449 One might thus argue that when a therapy
like SOCE falls short of this standard-when it produces no clear
evidence of the efficacy that one finds in other methods-that is one
basis upon which psychotherapists can recommend against it, and
perhaps take steps to exclude it from the acceptable practice of the
profession. It certainly seems plausible for the community of mental
health practitioners to consider excluding from the list of commonly
accepted practices a technique that consistently fails to produce the
result that it promises.
In some ways, in fact, the therapeutic community has already
embraced the use of such effectiveness measures. As Wampold
444. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 262, at 11.
445. Id. at xv.
446. See WAMPOLD & IMEL, supra note 266, at viii-ix.
447. Id at x.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 395-418.
449.

WAMPOLD, supra note 39, at 70.
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notes, psychologists have become uncomfortable with the contrast
between medicine's "well established explanations" and psychology's
proliferation of approaches.4 50 Wampold additionally highlights that
"psychotherapy has [also] been fighting to be seen as a recognized
treatment within the healthcare delivery system" and "an unrestricted
variety of treatments, all of which are claimed to be effective, is not
particularly appealing to third-party payers." 451 In part for such reasons,
the Society of Clinical Psychology (Division 12 of the APA) appointed a
task force to identify "empirically validated treatment[s] (EVT[s])."4 5 2 In
response to criticism that, given the "uncertainty in science and the
evolving nature of conclusions," it was unclear whether a technique
could ever be validated, the classification effort began to instead use the
label "empirically supported treatments (ESTs)"; however, this too met
criticism, and in recent years psychologists seeking to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate treatment have focused more on the concept
of "evidence-based treatment (EBT)," using it to "designate treatments
for which there is evidence of efficacy."45 3
Such measures, perhaps, provide one basis for psychotherapists and
regulators to find that certain therapies, including SOCE, simply cannot
deliver what they promise. Drawing on such indicators of efficacy--or
of harm that might accompany a psychotherapeutic technique whether it
is efficacious or not-one might distinguish therapies that are safe and
effective from those that are not, much as the FDA evaluates the safety
and effectiveness of pharmacological treatment.454 And, just as FDA
studies might find that a drug is ineffective or harmful even if scientists
are not sure why it is ineffective or harmful, so psychotherapists (or
those regulating them) might argue that, even if therapists cannot agree
upon a particular model of mental functioning or how to repair it when it
fails, they can agree, at least in some cases, on what counts as a
therapeutic failure.
This is precisely the approach that the 2009 APA Report relies
upon in recommending against the use of SOCE therapies.455 Canvassing
the studies it could find on the use of SOCE, the APA Task Force found
insufficient evidence to conclude that SOCE was effective (and also
found that "there was some evidence to indicate that individuals
450. Id. at 27.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis omitted).
453. Id. at 28, 31 (emphasis omitted).
454. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695,
697, 703, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that "drug regulation" takes account of "the risks associated
with both drug safety and efficacy").
455. See 2009 APA REPORT, supra note 15, at 86, 90-92.
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experienced harm from SOCE").4 56 Critics of the California and New
Jersey SOCE bans for minors have raised doubts about both the APA's
finding of ineffectiveness and its finding of harm.457 The APA could
draw confident findings about lack of effectiveness, they point out, only
with respect to early studies, primarily from the late 1960s and 1970s,
which generally involved use of "aversive methods," rather than the pure
talk therapy conducted in more recent programs.45 8 With respect to later
studies, the APA Report made clear that the APA Task Force was unable
to draw "a conclusion regarding whether recent forms of SOCE are or
are not effective." 4 59 The APA Task Force added a similar caveat to its
conclusion about harm. On the one hand, it noted that the potential harm
from SOCE therapy could be grave: "[A]ttempts to change sexual
orientation," it observed, "may cause or exacerbate distress and poor
mental health in some individuals, including depression and suicidal
thoughts."4 60 On the other hand, it stressed that "there is a dearth of
scientifically sound research on the safety of SOCE," and the research
gave no indication of the "prevalence of harmful outcomes" or the
"frequency of. . . harm."461

In any event, it seems unwise to make a First Amendment
protection depend heavily upon what studies like this show. In the first
place, such studies present a moving target. For example, a 2015
article-following up on the 2009 APA Report-released new findings
that the "SOCE participants" in its study "reported little to no sexual
orientation change as a result of these efforts and instead reported
considerable harm." 46 2 Moreover, courts are not nearly as well-placed to
make sense of such studies as are psychotherapists and regulators. While
courts will give a "hard look" to agency determinations to tell if they are
arbitrary and capricious, and must sometimes evaluate evidence to tell if
the empirical evidence supporting a particular restriction allows it to
meet heightened scrutiny, this does not mean they should do so
every time professional activity (and the speech within it) is restricted in

456. Id. at 43.
457. Spencer Case, Do "Conversion Therapy" Bans Violate Free Speech?, NAT'L REV. (July
14, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/382442/do-conversion-therapy-bansviolate-free-speech-spencer-case.
458. 2009 APA REPORT, supra note 15, at 27.
459. Id. at 43.
460. Id. at 42.
461. Id
462. John P. Dehlin et al., Sexual Orientation Change Efforts Among Current or FormerLDS
Church Members, 62 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 95, 104 (2015).
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any way. 4 63 Rather, where there is a reliance interest at stake in
psychotherapy, as there is in medicine-when a particular client is
justifiably relying on his therapist to use methods that have been shown
to be effective (in the same way that a particular patient may rely on her
physician to prescribe only drugs that have been shown to be safe)then courts should generally defer to the relevant experts. The key
question for a court is thus not the question of whether the method is
ineffective or harmful. That is a question they should, except in rare
cases, leave for experts.
It is, rather, two other questions: First, a court should ask, is there in
fact a reliance interest at stake in the situation in question? Is a therapy
client really justifiably expecting a therapist to use only those talk
therapy methods that have been deemed effective and free of certain
risks of harm? Or, is this a situation where a therapy client is permitted
to seek (and does seek) certain therapy methods that do not count as an
"evidence-based treatment" or that otherwise fall short of the bar that
psychotherapy studies use to measure efficacy? The reason this question
is important is, again, because the state's interference in professional
speech is more clearly justified only when such interference is needed to
protect a patient or client interest of a kind that is absent in other
conversations-namely, the patient or client's need to stake her health or
financial welfare on the truth and the soundness of advice she is unable
to effectively evaluate herself. In some fee-for-service exchanges, this
reliance interest is absent-for example, it may not be present when
someone hires a "life coach" or college tutor-and where it is absent, the
state's justification for interfering (and shaping) the conversation
disappears. It may likewise be absent in some therapeutic encounters if
individuals want the freedom to continue to experiment with methods
that may not have worked for other people, even if such experimentation
requires them to forego the security (and state "surety" of "disciplinary
truth") that they would have when limiting themselves to methods that
have already been proven effective.
Second, even where there is a reliance interest at stake, courts
should ask, following R.A. V, if a state's speech restriction is, in fact,
designed to protect that reliance interest. To illustrate, if a minor seeking
SOCE therapy can be assumed to be counting on that SOCE therapy to
help (not harm) her, courts should ask, as the Third Circuit di464
whether that state's regulation is really designed to protect that minor or

463. See Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glicknan, 81 F.3d 437, 443, 445
(4th Cir. 1996).
464. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir. 2014).
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whether it is instead aimed at the impermissible goal of suppressing the
ideas in the therapist-client conversation. Again, a key question here is
how deferential the court should be-specifically, whether it should
simply accept the government's claimed purpose or whether (and how) it
should look behind such a claim. At least one basis for skepticism is
discussed in R.A. V. itself. Where government claims its speech
restriction is needed to address a particular kind of speech, for example,
the reputational damage inflicted by libel, but then seems concerned only
with libel that is "critical of government," this is a red flag that
government is likely less concerned with countering reputational damage
than it is with censoring criticism.46 5 Similarly, if legislators bar a
therapy technique (such as, SOCE) because it flunks certain measures of
efficacy or has been shown to raise certain risks of harm or both, this
will be legitimate only if it is clear legislators would be protecting clients
from such efficacy or harm problems as a general matter and in all forms
of therapy where they arise, not merely in therapies rooted in ideas that
legislators oppose. It may be justifiable, as R.A. V makes clear, 466 for a
legislator to focus on forms of talk therapy where lack of efficacy risks
of harm are most serious because that kind of selectivity tracks the
reason that professional speech should be subject to greater regulation in
the first place (to protect clients from ineffective or harmful techniques).
But, that would not provide license for subjecting equally ineffective or
harmful therapy techniques to different legislative treatment because the
legislator found one such technique more offensive than another.
In short, evidence for lack of efficacy or risk of harm may justify a
legislature or regulatory body in excluding some talk therapy schools
from the marketplace of psychological ideas (and associated methods)
from which therapy seekers may explore and choose. But, if R.A. V
provides the background for professional speech regulation (as Sorrell
did for commercial speech regulation), then the state should only be able
to exclude a talk therapy method in this way if it can show the following:
(1) that the client brings a reliance interest (in a technique's efficacy and
lack of harmfulness) to the therapist-client relationship; and (2) that the
state's speech restriction is genuinely aimed at protecting that reliance
interest, and not simply at suppressing opposing ideas.467

465. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
466. Id. at 388-90.
467. See id. at 382-83, 395-96.
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Challenge to the Medical Model II: The Goals of Psychotherapy
and "Capacityfor a Conception of the Good"

There is a second problem with attempting to fit psychotherapy
entirely within the template of the medical model. Not only is
psychotherapy marked by a great diversity of different paths for
addressing mental health concerns, it is also marked by diversity of
goals. Therapy seekers do not seek out psychological experts solely to
treat a particular neurosis or other mental illness; they sometimes enter
therapy with other goals that are less about curing diseases than about
solving other types of life dilemmas. Nancy McWilliams, as discussed
earlier, notes that some individuals enter therapy "seeking answers to
(unanswerable) human questions."46 8 According to Irwin Yalom,
"therapy is a deep and comprehensive exploration into the course and
meaning of one's life."469 As Tim LeBon explains in a book on the value
of philosophy for psychotherapists, some individuals seeking therapy
sometimes do so not to "have their unconscious interpreted, or be
clinically diagnosed," but rather to "make good decisions, understand
the language of their emotions and work out how to lead a meaningful
and worthwhile life."470
This gives talk therapy a different kind of First Amendment value
than physician speech. When psychotherapy veers into discussion of
"unanswerable human questions," it strays outside the borders of a
"bounded speech practice" dedicated to an agreed-upon practical goal
(such as restoring health with a specified medicine or treatment
procedure), and it moves more deeply into First Amendment territory. It
provides a forum for expression of a kind that is not only covered by the
First Amendment, but lies at its core-namely, expression that is used to
engage in autonomous thinking and formation of one's beliefs. More
specifically, if a person in therapy is seeking to figure out how she
should live her life going forward, or what kind of a person she should
be, or what kinds of commitments and activities will give her life value
(whether in family life, work, or other settings), then she is engaged in
an activity that is staunchly protected by the First Amendment against
state intrusion-at least when it takes place through speech-namely, an
individual's revision of her own "conception of the good."
As John Rawls defines it, "[t]he capacity for a conception of the
good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue . . . a

468.

MCWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 3.

469. YALOM, supra note 88, at 125.
470.

TIM LEBON, WISE THERAPY: PHILOSOPHY FOR COUNSELLORS 1 (2001).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/8

88

Blitz: Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy

2016]

FREE SPEECH, OCCUPATIONAL SPEECH, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

769

'

conception of what we regard for us as a worthwhile human life."47
Moreover, says Rawls, a crucial feature of modem liberal societies is the
existence of "different and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable
conceptions of the good"4 72 and a foundational commitment in each such
society to a "liberty of conscience" that allows room for different
individuals to form, and adhere to, their own conception of the good. 4 73
In fact, as a number of scholars point out, modern freedom of speech law
can be understood as providing such protection.47 4 As Daniel Solove
argues, for example, liberal theory holds that "the government must
maintain neutrality as to different conceptions of the good" and, "[i]n the
context of free speech, the neutrality principle mandates that the
government must avoid favoritism or bias toward particular
messages."47 5 Corey Brettschneider likewise argues that the First
Amendment prohibits government from restricting speech on the basis
of viewpoint, at least in part, because "[c]itizens must be free from
coercive threat as they develop their own notion of.. .the good."47 6
If therapy is often sought by individuals who are seeking to give
life meaning, or attain a sense of purpose, then this is a place where
government's coercive force is out of place, even if the state can
conceivably recruit experts within the field of psychotherapy to take its
side in debates about what constitutes a good life. More specifically,
government can have no veto on which conception of the good we
choose through conversation, whether those conversations are with a
friend, a life coach, or a psychotherapist. Claudia Haupt observes in
proposing a theoretical framework for professional speech that "[n]o
amount of specialized training . .. by itself makes a professional more
competent to render value judgments," and courts should therefore not
defer to a professional community's judgments on such an issue. 477
To be sure, it is possible to imagine a world where there is a clearer
division of labor between the medical and philosophical sides of
psychotherapy with every practitioner focused exclusively on one, and
only one, of these dimensions of the profession. There are, in fact, some
types of professionals that seem to tackle some of the philosophical
quandaries that sometimes bring individuals to a psychotherapist-but
471.

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 302 (1993).

472.
473.

Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 313-14.

474.

See, e.g., Daniel Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections

Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 984-85 (2003).
475. Id.
476. COREY BRETrSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?: How
DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 75-76 (2012).

477.

Haupt, supranote 307, at 1253.
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forswear any expertise in diagnosing or treating mental illness.
Philosophical counseling, for example, "uses philosophical insights and
methods to help people think through significant issues in their life," but
generally limits itself to "non-pathological 'problems in living' such as
questions around direction in life, relationship issues, ethical problems
and career dilemmas." 4 78 As the National Philosophical Counseling
Association explains, "the philosophical counselor specializes in the
examination and analysis of arguments rather than in looking for the
underlying causal etiology of dysfunctional mental processes." 4 79 Life
coaching is another professional activity that, in many cases at least,
might tackle problems regarding life quandaries without addressing
questions stemming from mental illness. 48 0 So, arguably, is the spiritual
or pastoral counseling that religious figures might use when they help
individuals of a certain faith try to draw on that faith in meeting
particular challenges. One might argue that if these professions handle
the philosophical side of psychotherapy, then psychotherapists should
confine themselves to the medical side. Perhaps this is true of the way
many psychiatrists help patients with mental disorders, and would have
been true of psychotherapy had certain physicians (in the 1950s and in
earlier times) succeeded in limiting the practice of psychotherapy to
individuals with medical training.
In its existing form, however, the practice of psychotherapy appears
to involve more than simply treating illness. This is perhaps most clear
in existential and humanistic schools of psychotherapy; but, as LeBon
explains, one can also find examples of philosophical problem-solving in
other schools, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy and rationalemotive-behavioral therapy.481 More generally, the profession seems to
understand itself as offering methods not only for curing mental
sickness, but also at changing mental patterns in other ways. 482 The
APA's Psychologist Locator website thus avoids describing clinical
psychology as focused exclusively on the treatment of illness. It states
that "[p]sychologists are trained to help people deal effectively with
many of life's problems and can help improve physical and mental health
for you and your family."483 The message seems to be that a
478.

LEBON, supra note 470, at 9.

479.

Philosophical Practice, NAT'L PHIL. COUNSELING ASS'N, http://www.npcassoc.org/

philosophical-practice (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (emphasis omitted).
480. See What Is Life Coaching?, LIFECOACHING.COM, http://www.lifecoaching.com/pages/
life coaching.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
481. LEBON, supra note 470, at 14-15.
482. Id at 14.
483. Psychologist Locator, PRAC. CENT., http://www.locator.apa.org (last visited Apr. 10,
2016) (emphasis added).
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psychologist will treat a client's concerns even if they do not stem from
a mental illness. To the extent state regulation of psychotherapy's
medical functions necessarily also embraces, and places limits on, the
way it aids individuals in dealing with other issues, related to forming a
conception of the good, it should be subject to the intermediate scrutiny
necessary to assure that the limits it places on our autonomous belief
formation are not substantially more onerous than they have to be.484
To be sure, a profession may commit its own members to respect
certain values in carrying out their profession and to reject others. As
Ezekiel Emmanuel writes, a "profession is partially characterized by its
ends, the purposes that define its activities," and "[w]hen a person
chooses to become a member of a profession, he accepts . . . the
profession's ends as his own." 485 A physician, for example, will commit
herself (among other things) to the end of "restoring the health of sick
individuals" and should not be surprised if the profession insists on
respect for this end in its code of ethics and in the rules that it applies to
the verbal advice that the physician offers to patients.4 86 In fact, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the state has a strong interest in
protecting a physician's commitment to her "role as healer." 48 7
Psychotherapists might similarly adopt a code of ethics that rules
out use of psychological expertise for certain tasks-such as, aiding the
efforts of government interrogators to use techniques amounting to
torture or inhumane treatment. Bound by its code of ethics, a
psychotherapist may have to reject a client's request for aid in promoting
certain sorts of goals. But, it is one thing for a profession to turn such an
individual away; it is another for it to recruit the state's coercive power
to block that individual from having those conversations elsewhere. A
particular professional community, in other words, may refuse to aid
certain conceptions of the good (like those that show profound lack of
respect for other individuals' dignity), and it may do so simply by
defining its own collective values. But, for government to bar such
conversations throughout society-whether in books or in sessions
which seek personal advice-it has to have reasons that go beyond a
bare desire to exclude that conception of a worthwhile life from its
boundaries. That is because, unlike the governing body of a professional

484. See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
485. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLITY

14(1994).
486. Id. at 16-18.
487. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (quoting AM. MED. ASs'N CODE OF
MED. ETHICS, Op. 2.211 (1994), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211 page).
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community, the government of a liberal society is not permitted to
impose limits on what ethical values its individual members choose to
believe in, or discuss-except in those circumstances where individuals'
verbal efforts to advance such a goal threaten the kind of harm that the
state is empowered to regulate, for example, through "incitement" to
engage in violence.48 8
This analysis has significant implications for how courts evaluate
the constitutionality of a restriction on psychotherapy (or other
professional activity). More specifically, courts might distinguish, and
treat differently, two kinds of professional speech rights: (1) the right of
an individual to engage in-and describe herself as engaging incertain types of talk therapy as part of a recognized profession, such as
the profession of psychotherapy or clinical psychology; and (2) the right
of an individual to engage in certain types of talk therapy on her own,
outside of any recognized and licensed professional practice (and
without misleading clients into thinking it is a part of such a practice).
The latter of these bans is more far-reaching: it bans or penalizes a
certain kind of verbal interaction in any context (perhaps on the ground
that it constitutes the "unauthorized practice of psychology").
If we revisit the Ninth Circuit's decision in Pickup, it becomes
apparent that the Ninth Circuit saw California's law as applying the
former, less speech-restrictive type of measure. 48 9 The Ninth Circuit
seemed comfortable
finding
California's therapy restriction
constitutional at least in part because-even though that restriction
barred professionals from offering minors SOCE therapy while acting as
a "licensed psychotherapist" in California-it continued to let them offer
it outside of this professional community in a variety of other
contexts.490 It remained permissible, for example, for pastoral counselors
offering therapy, and remained permissible for a variety of advice-giving
services outside of licensed psychotherapy. 49' Arguably, then, the Ninth
Circuit's decision could be understood as applying only rational basis to
California's SOCE ban because it was simply giving legislative force to
standards already adopted by the APA and other organizations
representing the view of this particular professional community. 492 The
views and arguments that psychotherapists had defined as unacceptable
within their own community remained permissible in other contexts.
On the other hand, one could argue that California's ban is, in fact,
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 238.
See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231.
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more far-reaching, at least when considered in conjunction with
section 2903 of the California Business and Professions Code.493
This provision forbids anyone from engaging in "the practice of
psychology . . without a license granted under this chapter, except as
otherwise provided in this chapter," and it defines psychology quite
broadly to include any service applying "psychological principles,
methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and influencing
behavior, such as the principles pertaining to learning, perception,
motivation, emotions, and interpersonal relationships and the methods
and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior
modification, and hypnosis," including any "amelioration of
psychological problems."4 9 4 This statutory language seems to extend
California's standards for practicing psychology not only to those who
call themselves "psychotherapists," but also to anyone working under
any title who helps clients by applying "psychological principles" to
ameliorate their "psychological problems."49 5 Given the analysis set
forth earlier in this Article, such a law would likely be unproblematic
under the First Amendment only if it is understood by courts as limited
in scope. More specifically, to the extent the law bars not merely those
who present themselves as psychotherapists, but also all others from
dispensing certain kinds of advice, it should do so: (1) only to protect a
client who can be said to rely on a professional's advice in the way that
patients rely on a physician's or psychotherapist's advice regarding
mental illness or treatment options; and (2) only in ways that protect
such a reliance interest, and avoid imposing across-the-board the kind of
conception of the good that individuals can adopt, or seek help in
understanding or refining.
There may be some circumstances where even such an across-theboard ban on certain types of psychological advice is justified:
Government may, as noted earlier, restrict certain kinds of speech, so
long as its restriction focuses on certain kinds of harm.496 A legislature
may, for example, make it a crime for individuals to make "true threats,"
to incite violence, or to publish hardcore pornography or any other
sexual expression that counts as "obscene," and it may make such
speech illegal not only within a specific community or context, but also
in social or commercial interactions more generally.497 Similarly, even
493. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (Supp. 2016).
494. Id. (West 2003 & Supp. 2016).
495. Id.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
497. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17
& n.1, 18-19, 24-27 (1973).
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where a person offering SOCE therapy for a minor expressly states that
she is not acting as a psychotherapist-for example, if she characterizes
herself as a "life coach"-it is conceivable that some of the techniques
she uses in such an interaction could cause some of the same harms that
led the APA to express concern about the SOCE therapy practiced
by therapists-that it could "cause or exacerbate distress and
poor mental health in some individuals, including depression and
suicidal thoughts."4 98
In fact, as Jacob Victor notes, state laws barring fraudulent services
may already provide a legal means for individuals to sue providers of
SOCE therapy.49 9 In June 2015, an aggrieved individual prevailed in a
civil suit against an organization called "Jews Offering New Alternatives
for Healing," which he had sued, claiming it had engaged in consumer
fraud by telling him that homosexuality was a mental disorder and that it
could offer him a cure in exchange for money.so The counselor at the
center of that case was not a licensed therapist and had had "no
50
psychology degree or mental health license of any kind."o
Outside of a commercial context, activities akin to those that occur
in SOCE can still conceivably cause harm akin to that which the APA
found occurs in SOCE-but would be harder for the state to regulate
under the First Amendment-for two reasons. First, whereas the state
can impose criminal and civil liability for fraudulent commercial
transactions, the Supreme Court in a plurality decision rejected the
notion that false speech is "presumptively unprotected" and found
punishing certain types of false speech on the basis of its content triggers
"exacting scrutiny."5 02 Although in a concurring opinion Justices Breyer
and Kagan argued the government should be able to forbid or punish
false speech subject only to intermediate scrutiny,50 3 they too would
apply strict scrutiny where government restricts "false statements" in
disciplines such as "the social sciences" or "history" because
government interference would risk undercutting the process by which
true information is generated in such disciplines.504 And so, six Justices
adopted a First Amendment rule that would likely extend staunch
498. See 2009 APA REPORT, supranote 15, at 42.
499. Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California
Approach, Its Limitations, and PotentialAlternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1562-64 (2014).
500.

Zoc Schlanger, Jonah: The Largest Jewish Gay Conversion Therapy Organization Takes

Its Last Breath, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/life-and-deathjewish-exgay-therapy-organization-406898.
501. Id
502. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546-48 (2012) (plurality opinion).
503. Id at 2551-52 (Breyer, J., concurring).
504. Id at 2552.
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protection to psychological falsehoods-at least where such a falsehood
is not part of a fraudulent commercial transaction. 0
Nor does existing First Amendment law leave government free to
restrict non-commercial variants of SOCE therapy based upon the
emotional damage they might cause. In Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass 'n, the Court found that the First Amendment forbids
California from banning the sale of violent video games to minors. 5 0 6 It
rejected California's argument that such a speech ban should be
permissible because scientific research reviewed by legislators indicated
that such video-game playing made minors more aggressive.o As Clay
Calvert and his co-authors noted in a recent article examining the
implications of the Brown decision for SOCE therapy bans, the Court's
analysis of California video games seems to create "a very steep burden"
for "anti-SOCE law," except to the extent such laws can be said to be
confined to "a heavily regulated profession like medicine."os
In short, while government can likely bar fraudulent equivalents of
psychotherapy in a commercial context, it would be difficult for it to
extend such bans, for example, to the "religious and private efforts" used
by the majority of SOCE-users in a recent study (efforts which included
"church counseling" or "group-involved . .. change efforts").50 9 And,
this is true even though the researchers conducting the study found, as
with SOCE provided by therapists, that SOCE carried out through these
former means was deemed by those using it to be even more ineffective
and harmful than psychotherapy. 10
D.

Psychotherapy andProtectionfor Freedom of Thought

There is one other reason that talk therapy may, to a far greater
extent than medicine, count as an activity that lies firmly within the
realm that the Constitution preserves (in the Court's words) for the
autonomy of self.'" Talk therapy is not only an activity where a
therapist's and client's freedom to speak are at stake; it is also a key tool
by which a client exercises her freedom of thought. It not only enables
us to understand our thinking processes but also to reshape them.
As Henry Greely writes, psychotherapy is an "intervention that
505. See id. at 2542-43, 2547, 2551.
506. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011).
507. Id. at 2739.
508. Clay Calvert et al., Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinaland Theoretical
FirstAmendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 555-57 (2014).
509. Dehlin et al., supra note 462, at 99-100.
510. Id. at 100 & fig.1.
511. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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people ... want to use to change how their brains work,"5 12 and
regulations of psychotherapy implicate not only expressive liberty, but
also "cognitive liberty."' In other words, psychotherapy restriction
implicates an interest that Seana Shiffrin argues is at the heart of free
speech jurisprudence (namely, "the individual agent's interest in the
protection of the free development and operation of her mind").5 14 When
the state bars a person from developing her mind in a particular wayusing a particular kind of therapy-it wrongly wrests away from her the
power to determine what kind of a person she will be and how her mind
will function.
This kind of freedom to shape oneself may initially seem to have a
closer relationship to the realm of substantive due process than to First
Amendment speech rights. After all, when people transform "how their
brains work," they are not simply adopting or communicating certain
ideas. They are engaging in a kind of self-alteration which seems to have
more kinship with activities the Court has previously protected under the
Due Process Clause."s For example, where the Court has previously
given individuals autonomy in certain realms of medical decisionmaking, it has done so under the Due Process Clause.5 16
However, there are reasons to think that, at the very least, when
individuals use conversations as the instrument of mental
transformation, they should receive protection under the First
Amendment and not solely under the Due Process Clause. Kent
Greenawalt has said the First Amendment includes not only a freedom to
speak with others, but a freedom to engage in internal dialogue or "selfGreenawalt wrote: "One might conceive of
communication."'
protection of self-communication as deriving from a principle of
freedom of thought more fundamental even than a principle of free
speech."' Moreover, such internal deliberation is a core First
Amendment activity whether it functions as "a preface to interpersonal
communication or [is] intended to remain indefinitely for oneself." 5 19
512.
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The Supreme Court has recognized this. In Stanley v. Georgia, for
example, it made clear that the First Amendment principles protect not
only individuals' freedom to express their beliefs and emotions, but also
their freedom to form them. 52 0
As other scholars point out, this process of reflection and belief
formation cannot remain completely internal.52 1 It necessarily has an
external dimension. Instead of developing their thoughts or preserving
memories solely in their "mind's eye," individuals often write them
down in journals. By writing their thoughts down, and then reviewing
them, they develop their thinking in ways that would be impossible if
they had to rely solely on natural memory.5 22 As Neil Richards and Julie
Cohen have written in their respective works on intellectual privacy,
modem digital media provides additional tools for self-understanding.5 23
As Richards writes, free speech requires that courts protect not just the
public "marketplace of ideas," but also the private mental "workshops
where ideas are crafted." 24 And, this requires protecting not
just our silent thinking, but also the "close proxy for our thoughts"
we create with the tools given to us by the Internet and other
technologies of communications (for example, as we surf the
Internet). 2 5 As Cohen writes, maintaining "breathing space for
intellectual privacy" requires (among other things) protection of the
"records about what people read, see, hear and use." 26 Moreover, while
self-communication may often be solitary, it also frequently relies on
institutional environments that require the actions of many people-such
as, the individuals who make digital communications or the librarians
whose compilation of physical and electronic resources provides raw
material for individuals' explorations. 52 7
Modem psychotherapy is another crucial realm for such reflection
upon, and shaping of, thought. It is a deeply personal process of self520. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that the Constitution is designed to protect individuals
"in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations" (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
521.

See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,

Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 335,378-79 (2011).
522. Id. at 342, 379.
523. See Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright and Privacy: Through the Privacy Lens, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 281-82 (2005); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Property, 87
TEx. L. REv. 387, 434-35 (2008).
524. Richards, supranote 523, at 396, 408.
525. Id. at 389, 434.
526. Cohen et al., supranote 523, at 282.
527. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguardsfor Silent Experiments in Living:
Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to

Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 830-31, 876 (2006).
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exploration. The therapist, after all, is not there to describe or understand
her own life. Although two people are present, the focus is squarely on
the individual receiving the therapy. The focus is on that individual's
personal history, her secrets, her feelings, and on addressing her
struggles. It is in this respect that another social institution provides a
setting for "self-communication."
It is conceivable that protection of this mental freedom might
sometimes justify, rather than forbid, certain kinds of government
intervention (for example, where teenagers believe their mental
autonomy requires independence from their parents' control). As
Catherine Ross observes, mature minors' autonomous access to
information can sometimes be gained only if they can, at least, in some
circumstances, make choices free from their parents' oversight.528 This
was the stance the APA appeared to take when it reported that SOCE
therapy was often used in ways that appeared to undercut minor clients'
autonomy rather than support it.5 2 9 Its deepest worries were about
"adolescent inpatient facilities that offer coercive treatment."53 0 It rightly
emphasized that "involuntary and coercive interventions and residential
centers for adolescents" raised grave concerns, not only because of the
possible harms of SOCE therapy itself, but because of the "restriction of
liberty" accompanying this treatment and the threat it posed to "client
self-determination." 53
Even in less oppressive environments,
psychotherapy may be less a foundation for teenagers' autonomy and
freedom of thought than an attack upon it. It may be that teenagers
struggling with sexual feelings and the need for psychological guidance
should be protected against limitations from their parents to one type of
sexual-orientation therapy, when they should be made aware of, and
might benefit from, others (like affirmative-support therapies). Even
where teenagers steered toward sexual conversion are made aware of
alternative forms of therapy, they may still feel they have no choice but
to undergo the therapy that their parents insist upon, and they may still
suffer harm from intensive therapy and need safeguards against the
harms generated by it. As the Third Circuit noted in upholding New
Jersey's ban on such therapy, the state's interest in protecting patients'
health was especially strong because it sought to "protect minor
clients-a population that is especially vulnerable to [harmful

528. See Catherine J. Ross, An EmergingRightfor Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 230, 250-51 (1999).
529. See 2009 APA REPORT, supra note 15, at 71 & n.55.
530. Id. at 71.
531. Id. at 79.
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professional] practices" and likely to suffer far greater harm from these
practices than others.532
Still, if teenagers' mental freedom might sometimes require that
they be protected from being pressured or coerced into talk therapy they
find ineffective, it also likely requires that they, like adults, be free to
consider and use even those forms of therapy that a legislature
dislikes or believes is based on offensive ideas. In other words,
just as the state should have to show that its restrictions on adult therapy
are legitimate attempts to protect client safety and not "suppress[ion]
[of] disfavored ideas under the guise of professional regulation,""' so
the state should have to make the same showing when it bars mature
minors from undergoing forms of therapy which they freely accept and
may find helpful.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A therapist does not simply heal a client's mental illness, or help
her to improve her mental functioning. She does so in large part by
communicating ideas to her about how to understand and transform her
thoughts and feelings. In doing so, therapy serves a crucial First
Amendment purpose, which as Seana Shiffrin points out, is to secure
"the individual agent's interest in the protection of the free development
and operation of her mind."53 4 Psychotherapists guide their clients in
exploring and shaping their psyches, and do so in a manner that depends
heavily on the client's own conception of the good (and not simply a
socially or professionally endorsed conception of physical or mental
health). While First Amendment protection has some role to play in
medical speech that occurs between physicians and patients, its
importance and strength intensifies when the focus of psychotherapists'
speech is not solely on applying scientifically validated principles of
biology or behavior to physical and mental health, but is also largely on
helping the client think about, develop, and choose between personal
value commitments.535
The Third Circuit's decision in King largely recognized this, and
responded by holding that talk therapy is First Amendment speech
subject to intermediate scrutiny of the same sort that courts apply in
commercial speech cases."3 But difficult questions will likely arise

532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

King v. Governor ofN.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 235, 236.
Shiffrin, supra note 514, at 287.
See supra text accompanying notes 437-40.
767 F.3d at 233-35.
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about how courts should apply this uncertain middle-ground level of
scrutiny, or the choice of scrutiny rule set forth in R.A. V v. St. Paul. It is
unclear, for example, how courts can distinguish legitimate professional
regulations of psychotherapy from those which are a pretext for
censorship, especially in a field like psychotherapy where different
schools of thought have very different stances on which therapy
techniques are legitimate. Nor is it clear how much deference they
should give to legislatures' insistence that their regulations are aimed at
protecting health (and not at suppressing speech for other, less laudable
reasons). Still, this is a task courts cannot easily avoid. For better or
worse, psychotherapy straddles the key constitutional boundary line
between individuals' inner lives, where each person should exercise
autonomy free of state control, and the realm of appropriate health and
safety regulations, where clients count on government to monitor
medical practice. To understand psychotherapy's First Amendment
status, courts cannot pretend that psychotherapy lies on only one side of
this boundary line where health regulation can remain unhampered by
the Constitution. Rather, they must elaborate and adapt the Court's
earlier First Amendment doctrines for assuring the government stays, as
much as possible, on its own side of this boundary line and leaves
individuals free to chart their own course on the other.
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